Zhou Enlai addresses the State Council citing a need for China to "master atomic energy." The Chinese program is far behind in this area, but plans to catch up with the help of Soviet technical assistance.

Request by Chinese leaders to the Soviet leadership for technical and scientific aid in establishing a nuclear program in the People's Republic of China, including exchange programs for Chinese scientists, building of scientific labs in China, and providing specialized education for Chinese students.

A Chinese Central Committee circular stresses the need for China to develop a healthy uranium prospecting and mining industry, and to transfer technical and administrative cadres to work with Soviet experts.

Mao speaks to the Central Committee Politburo about the need to develop an atomic bomb to avoid being "bullied," but stresses that this can only happen if economic development increases simultaneously.

A memorandum from the Soviet government to the Chinese updating them on the arms reduction talks, a key component of which was a prohibition of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet proposal also called for reductions in conventional weapons and the prohibition of installing nuclear weapons outside their territorial borders.

A letter to Zhou Enlai informing him that the industrial development plan for China's atomic energy program has not been finalized and that the technical agreement with the Soviet Union must be delayed.

A letter from the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Chargé informing him that revisions must be made to the “Agreement on the Provision of Technical Assistance from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the People’s Republic of China in Establishing an Atomic Energy Industry,” and that until it is revised the delivery of technical equipment should be delayed.

In a conversation with Soviet ambassador Yudin, Mao sees a prohibition of the use of hydrogen weapons as very likely, as the capitalist countries "[fear] fighting this kind of war." Further, he notes that the socialist countries have an advantage over Western ones in terms of conventional army size.

Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.

Mao addresses the Central Military Commission to report on China's steel production, which he believes will surpass the Soviet Union's capability in seven years and the United States' in ten. He also makes it known that China will build "atom bombs, hydrogen bombs and inter-continental missiles," and believes this can be done in as few as ten years.

The Soviet Central Committee informs their Chinese counterparts that, in light of the arms reduction talks taking place in Geneva, Soviet nuclear assistance must cease. The Chinese had requested a sample atomic bomb and technical data, but the Soviet feared that doing so would imperil the efforts of the socialist countries in Geneva.

Nie Rongzhen reports to Mao on scientific and technical issues and Soviet assistance and cooperation in the area of nuclear development. The Chinese were becoming frustrated by what they called the Soviet "stranglehold" on key technical data, and led to an unwanted feeling of dependence on their Soviet comrades.

In the wake of a deepening Sino-Soviet split, Zhou Enlai explains how to manage Chinese bilateral technological and educational exchanges. Above all, Zhou emphasizes the importance of Chinese self-reliance in innovation and education as the country moves forward.

Mao Zedong declares that, in the absence of Soviet assistance, China must rely only upon itself in its pursuit of technological modernity and socialism.

In order to rapidly strengthen its atomic energy industry, the Central Committee proclaims that China must dedicate further resources exclusively to nuclear-related activities. For this purpose, the report calls for the mobilization of students, scientists, public health officials, and industrial laborers; and the provision of factories, equipment, medicine, and hospitals.

Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.

Zhou Enlai offers multiple dates on which the first nuclear test explosion may take place and asks Mao Zedong for his preference.

Zhou Enlai notifies Mao Zedong and other prominent political and military officials that preparations have been made to detonate the explosion between October 15 and 20, depending on weather conditions. Attention is also given to the high level of secrecy surrounding the explosion, methods of data collection, publicity, and the political consequences of the explosion.

This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.