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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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The Six-Day War

This collection gives insight into the thought processes of global decision-makers as the events of the 1967 War, or Six-Day War, unfolded.

  • February 10, 1966

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, 'Some Aspects of Israel's Foreign Policy and the GDR's Position Toward Israel"

    A detailed analysis of Israel's founding and the history of East German foreign policy toward Israel and the Arab states. Vehemently attacking Israel, and emphasizing the close relations between West Germany and Israel, was considered essential to capture the interest of Arab audiences, steering them towards closer relations with the GDR.

  • February 16, 1967

    The Visit of the [Syrian] Ba’ath in the USSR, Political Report No. 3

    The document records the state of play in Syrian-Soviet relations prior to the Six-Day War. According to the author of the report negotiations between the Syrian Ba’ath delegation and Soviet authorities, which took place in Moscow during January 1967, were tense and uneasy because the Soviets were displeased by the provocative and aggressive Syrian policy toward Israel.

  • May 26, 1967

    Protocol of the meetings between Egyptian Minister of War, Shams Badran, and Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, on the 25 and 26 of May 1967

    Badran and Kosygin met in Moscow on the eve of the Six-Day War. Badran submitted a long list of weapons which Cairo wanted to be airlifted immediately. After a late night discussion in the Politburo, Kosygin informed Badran that Moscow would be willing to airlift only some of the items on the Egyptian list; others would be supplied in a later date. During the first meeting with Badran, Kosygin advised the Egyptian government to think of ways to end the crisis with Israel, perhaps by granting Israeli ships free transit in the Straights of Tiran.

  • May 26, 1967

    Protocol number 62 of the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Friday, May 26, 1967 at 4 pm, in The Kirya, Tel Aviv

  • May 26, 1967

    Minutes of an Extended Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security Issues

    Faced with a growing Egyptian military buildup in Sinai the Cabinet tried to determine if the time had come for military action, or if additional diplomacy would strengthen America's support of Israel. No consensus was reached and the decision was postponed.

  • June 14, 1967

    Letter from Walter Ulbricht to Leonid Brezhnev

    Ulbricht and the SED Politburo suggests coordinating joint policy by seven socialist countries in response to the Six-Day War.

  • June 14, 1967

    Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Ambassador S.V.H. Sanandaji on the Six-Day War, Bucharest

    Nicolae Ceaușescu received Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Soltan Hossein Vakili Sanandaji, and they discussed developments in the Near East, specifically the ongoing conflict between Israel and Arab states. Ceaușescu suggested to the Ambassador that Iran should use its influence in the area to encourage other Arab states to seek a peaceful and realistic resolution to the conflict.

  • June 14, 1967

    T. Zhivkov’s Report at the Bulgarian Plenary Meeting on the Middle East

    Zhivkov presents the BCP position on the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 'The Near East Situation and Our Further Procedure"

    Cover page to a long report on the outcome of the Six-Day War and Czechoslovakian relations with the United Arab Republic.

  • June 17, 1967

    Letter from Walther Peinsipp (Tel Aviv) to Lujo Tončić-Sorinj (Vienna), 'Final Confrontation of Soviet and American Opinions from Israel'

    Summary of conversation with a departing Soviet Embassy official who describes the Soviet assessment of the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Explanatory Report, Attachment to 'The Near East Situation and Our Further Procedure'

    Excerpts describing Czechoslovakian and other Eastern Bloc countries' involvement in the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Attachment, 'Information about Czechoslovak economic relations with the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic'

    Czechoslovakia anticipates decreased trade with the United Arab Republic and Syrian Arab Republic as they suffer negative financial repercussions from their defeat in the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Attachment, 'Preliminary Findings Regarding the Reasons for the United Arab Republic's and the Arab States' Defeat

    Detailed Czechoslovak report explaining the United Arab Republic's defeat in the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Attachment, 'Fundamental Lessons Learned from the Aggression and Proposals for Further Steps'

    Czechoslovakian assessment of the situation in the Middle East following the Six-Day War and recommended foreign policy activities.

  • June 20, 1967

    Attachment, Draft Resolution of the 37th Session of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 'The Near East Situation and Our Further Approach'

    Czechoslovakia offers assistance to the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic following their defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel.

  • June 24, 1967

    Record of Conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow

    Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.

  • June 28, 1967

    The Visit of the Czechoslovak President's Special Envoy, V. Koucki, to the UAR

    The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.

  • July 09, 1967

    Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Gerhard Weiss and Gamal Abdel Nasser

    Weiss and Nasser discuss the events of the 1967 Arab-Israeli or Six-Day War.

  • July 11, 1967

    Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Budapest (excerpts)

    Soviet-bloc leaders discuss fallout of the Six Day War on the Arab countries. The focus particularly on the critical need to support the "progressive" Nasser regime. There is some debate over whether more military aid to the Arabs is necessary or wasteful. The leaders make it clear that they support the existence of the State of Israel and want to avoid getting dragged into a wider Middle East War. The idea of UAR recognition of Israel in exchange for the right of return is floated. Kosygin also gives a summary of his meeting with Johnson in New York.

  • August, 1967

    General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army, 'Report on the Causes, the Course and the Results of the Israeli Aggression in the Near East from the Military-Political Point of View'

    Detailed analysis of Western foreign policy toward the Middle East, the outcome of the Six-Day War, and Czechoslovakian military support of the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.