Summary of a meeting with French non-proliferation advisor Andre Jacoment. Discussion of the consequences of the French government's cancellation of a project to build a plutonium reprocessing plant at Chashma, Pakistan.

Report on status of France-Pakistan deal for saviem trucks, which was connected with the recently canceled plutonium reprocessing plant project.

Ambassador Hummel describes a conversation with General Zia. They discussed the cancellation of the French reprocessing project, disputes over the Pakistani-Afghan border, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTRO).

The United States wants a public announcement from the French that the Pakistan plutonium reprocessing plant project is officially canceled.

Summary of meeting between Gerald C. Smith and Andre Jacomet. France refuses to give a public announcement about the cancellation of the Pakistan reprocessing plant project due to fears of controversy in France.

Plans for meetings with Congress members to discuss resuming aid to Pakistan. Talking points include the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant deal and the importance of Pakistan's position in the Middle East. Also includes discussion of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, technical capabilities, and the United States' efforts to block their nuclear development.

Request for the Paris Embassy to discreetly look into an export license granted to the French company Robatel to export centrifuges to Pakistan.

Andre Jacomet denied that a license had been issued to Robatel to export centrifuges to Pakistan. He also discussed the possibility of France issuing a higher level demarche on the cancellation of the Pakistan reprocessing plant project.

A source in President Giscard's staff informed the US embassy that Pakistan was determined to complete the reprocessing plant and was searching for another country willing to supply the necessary technology. Also discusses a developing nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil.

Summary of a British report on problems with the export "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The list did not include gray area items that could be used in building nuclear facilities. To begin correcting the problem, the British announced a ban of inverter exports and asked other governments to take parallel steps. Also includes a summary of a secret British paper on Pakistan nuclear intentions. The British believed that the “piecemeal” Pakistani purchasing efforts to acquire inverters were directly related to the building of a gas centrifuge unit for producing weapons-grade uranium. Attached to the cable is a 7 November "Memorandum for the Record" discussing sharing this information with the Department of Energy.

Comments by French advisor Jacomet on the State Department's demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. Jacomet stated that the French government was planning a similar demarche. He was most concerned about the response of Italy and West Germany.

Comments by Robert Alston of the British Foreign Office on the State Department's "non-paper" on Pakistan. He questions the list of countries and expresses concern about the response of states with their own covert nuclear programs, like South Korea and Taiwan.

The State Department asks for information on a letter sent by IAEA Director General Eklund to Munir Khan of the Pakistani atomic energy commission. IAEA inspectors in Pakistan should also be alert to "any questionable use of facilities or disposition of safeguarded material."

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

Australian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.

Summary of conversation with IAEA official Davi Fischer. Fischer stated that Director Eklund had not yet written to the Pakistani atomic energy commission. He also reported a number of "troubling bits of information" on the situation in Pakistan.

Swedish response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

Canadian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully and expressing surprise that Pakistan was attempting to complete the reprocessing plant.

Italian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. Reports that Pakistan has not yet requested any equipment from Italy, but if they did Italy would follow all mandated safeguards.