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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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Cuban Foreign Relations

 Documents on Cuban's international relations, focusing on it's relationship with the Soviet Union, China and the United States. See also the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Image, Zhou Enlai and Che, 1965)

  • March 15, 1962

    Report on US Policy toward Cuba

    Report on the US attempts to isolate Cuba from other countries in the Western Hemisphere and their intention to use counter-revolutionary forces and the uneasy economic situation in Cuba to incite an internal uprising against the Castro government

  • March 16, 1962

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on the Federal Republic of Germany and Cuba

    Ambassador János Beck reports on diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Cuba. Beck speculates that FRG does intelligence work for departed Americans. Central to Beck’s report is the fact that Cuba wants to preserve diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Relevant is the Hallstein principle and the presence of FRG diplomats and German Democratic Republic’s Political Commission. (There are two self-governing and independent German states in Cuba.)

  • March 17, 1962

    Intelligence Report on US Plan to Attack Cuba

    Intelligence report on possible US plans to invade Cuba. Forces will invade from Guatemala and Panama, "with support of the armed forces of the USA from their naval base in Guantanamo." The report also mentioned Havana's knowledge of the plan.

  • March 19, 1962

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador Boško Vidaković

    János Beck reports on his conversation with Yugoslav ambassador to Havana, Boško Vidaković. Vidaković notes an increased interest in Yugoslav socialism among Castro supporters. Previously Cuban officials rebuffed Vidaković. Vidaković believes the change is prompted by Cuba’s difficult economic and political situation, in which the latter includes organizational and leadership strife.

  • March 23, 1962

    Letter to Comrade Brisuela

    Letter written to Comrade Carlos C. Brisuela, a representative of the Cuban government. Two annexes are attached. These state that the USSR will provide to Cuba (in addition to the materials provided by the 30 Sept. 1961 agreement) the materials as specified in Annex I. Apart from the provision provided by Annex I, the USSR will provide materials in accordance with Annex II. In all other affairs, the parties are guided by the original Sept. 1961 agreement.

  • March 24, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 March 1962

    Jelen relays information presented by Blas Roca and Emilio Aragones Navarro on the ORI's decision to exclude Anibal Escalante from the leadership of the ORI.

  • April 02, 1962

    Message from the Italian Communist Party to the Cuban Leadership

    The Italian Communist Party sends a message to the Cuban government expressing their hope that the Organization of American States (OAS) will begin to see the Cuban perspective and that "the decisions of the OAS cannot suspend the Cuban truth from the American continent."

  • April 04, 1962

    Soviet Report on Cuban Proposal to Establish a Soviet Intelligence Center in Cuba

    Report on a conversation between the Cuban Minister of Internal Affairs Ramiro Valdez Menendez and the KGB representative in Havana regarding the former's trip to the Soviet Union. The discussion concerns a Cuban proposal to set up a Soviet intelligence center in the country, which the Soviets turned down.

  • April 05, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 5 April 1962

    Jelen continues his report on the ORI's decision to exclude Escalante from the leadership.

  • April 14, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 14 April 1962

    Jelen continues his report on the Escalante affair, with more information that there are no rifts between the members of the former Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the members of the former "July 26th Movement." Jelen also summarizes the personnel changes within the Cuban leadership.

  • April 14, 1962

    Soviet Report on Havana's Plan to Train Latin American Partisans

    Report on a conversation between the Cuban Minister of Internal Affairs Ramiro Valdez Menendez and the KGB representative on Havana's decision to organize the training of partisan groups in other Latin American countries. For the time being the Cuban would do this by themselves without the help of the Soviet Union. Valdez said that although Havana agreed with the principle of peaceful coexistence, that did not mean that they could not help their brothers in the neighbor countries.

  • May 21, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32

    Protocol 32 gives hint to the consternation Khrushchev faced to have his plan of missiles placed in Cuba approved. It took two separate meetings and four days for the Presidium to conceded to Khrushchev's plan.

  • May 24, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued)

    The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

  • May 24, 1962

    R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba

    Zakharov and Malinovsky send to Khrushchev the Ministry of Defense’s proposal to send troops and supplies to Cuba. Zakharov and Malinovsky give further detail as to the nature of material to be sent to Cuba and a timetable for building launch pads and assembling missiles.

  • May 28, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 28 May 1962

    Jelen discusses the new ambassador to Cuba as well as economic relations between Poland and Cuba and other economic concerns, like food shortages in Cuba.

  • May 29, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 May 1962

    Jelen says the newspapers have announced a farewell visit of [Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Sergei Mikhailovich] Kudryavtsev with [President of Cuba Osvaldo] Dorticós [Torrado]. Jelen also reports that the recall of Kudryavtsev coincides with the nomination of [Carlos] Olivares [Sanchez] to the position of the ambassador to Moscow. Although Olivares comes from the “26th of July Movement,” he was closely connected with [Anibal] Escalante

  • May 29, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Foreign Ministry to Polish Embassy, Washington, 29 May 1962

    Ogrodinski tells Drozniak to meet with officials who deal with Latin American relations and take them to an informal lunch. He tells him the conversation should be of an unofficial nature and it should be aimed at getting to know the officials' views on the current attitude and intentions of the US towards Cuba.

  • June 01, 1962

    Bulgarian Defense Minister, Note to Zhivkov Regarding Invitation to Raul Castro to Visit Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Minister of National Defense, Colonel General Dobri Djurov, requests First Secretary Todor Zhivkov’s approval to invite Raul Castro to visit Bulgaria.

  • June 01, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 1 June 1962

    Drozniak replies to Ogrodzinski regarding the information he received from from [Charles E. “Chip”] Bohlen that Cuba has been removed from the list of priorities of US foreign policy. Bohlen also confirms, through Drozniak, that the content of the talks between [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Soviet Ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin. The Americans are assessing that the USSR is not currently in any hurry to resolve the issue of Berlin. When it comes to a next meeting [between the Americans and the Soviets], the US will wait for a Soviet initiative.

  • June 09, 1962

    Soviet Report by Cuban Involvement in Assisting Partisans in Other Latin American Countries

    Report on a conversation between Fidel Castro and Soviet representatives. Castro believed that revolutionary situation has developed in all Central American countries (except Mexico) and a few South American countries. In his opinion, a slight push in the form of armed actions by partisans would rally the peasant masses and bring about regime change. The report also discussed Havana's low opinion of many Latin American Communist Parties. Cuba's bypassing these parties in interfering in the respective countries' affairs worsened the relations between them and Havana.