TELEGRAM FROM MAO ZEDONG TO STALINCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationMao Zedong writes Stalin on the Chinese position for a ceasefire in the Korean War which the Chinese side will propose at an upcoming meeting with the UN negotiators. Mao asks Stalin for his opinion on the Chinese position."Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin" July 03, 1951, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 339, ll. 8-10. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110022
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SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405
Copies: Stalin (2)
From BEIJING Received 13:55 3.7.1951
SERIES "G" T
To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]
During the meeting of military representatives of both sides we intend to advance the following 5 main points:
1. "Both sides must simultaneously issue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air forces of both sides, after the issuing of the order on a ceasefire, must within all the borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other hostile actions."
This point will possibly be accepted by the enemy without qualifications.
2. "Land, sea and air forces of both sides must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a distance of 10 English miles and create a buffer zone in the region 10 English miles to the south and to the north of the 38th parallel. The civil administration of the buffer zone must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other words to the north of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the Korean People's government and to the south of the 38th parallel under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean government."
It is possible that there will be some divergences [from this proposal] among the enemy but we consider that our proposal is extremely just and it will be difficult for the enemy to refute it.
3. "Both sides must cease the transport of arms, troops and reinforcements (including land, sea and air transport) into Korea from outside the country and also the aforementioned transports to the front line on the territory of Korea."
We think that the enemy for his part will also advance a proposal on this question, and we therefore intend to take the initiative in this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the last part of our proposal?
4. "To create a control committee of neutral states which would supervise the fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this committee there must be an equal number of representatives of neutral states that have not taken part in the Korean war and that have been selected by both sides."
We think that the enemy also will advance an analogous proposal, therefore we intend to show initiative in this. However, there will be numerous difficulties in the fulfillment of this point.
"Members" of the control committee proposed by the enemy will monitor our military transport on the Chinese-Korean border and at important communications points in Korea. Or should we not take the initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to advance his proposal, after which we will accept it?
I ask you to communicate your opinion about how to proceed expediently. To completely refuse to create a
control committee seems also inadvisable.
5. "Both sides must carry out repatriation of prisoners of war. In the course of four months after the cessation of military operations to conduct a full mutual exchange of them, in separate batches."
The enemy will possibly propose to conduct a one for one exchange. We must demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. However, the enemy has taken prisoner a relatively larger number of North Koreans, who have already been included in the ranks of the South Korean troops, and therefore this situation will possibly elicit an argument.
In our opinion the 5 basic points indicated above must be accepted at the meeting of military representatives of both sides.
In addition there are some other points:
1. "All foreign troops including Chinese volunteer troops must completely leave North and South Korea within a specified period of time (for example within three-four months), in separate batches.
This is also a very important point. However, the representatives of the enemy possibly will think that this question belongs among political questions and should not be resolved at this meeting.
I ask you to study and communicate whether our side should advance this point.
2. "Within a specified period of time (for example in several months) refugees of North and South Korea must be returned to the areas where they lived previously."
Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on advancing this point. However, to bring this about is very difficult. It is apparent that with regard to this question many differences of opinion and many arguments will arise between the representatives of North and South Korea, which can have an influence on the resolution of other important questions.
Or is it possible to advance this proposal?
If it leads to arguments and is not resolved, then transfer it for discussion at an international conference of a political character.
I ask you to communicate your opinion on the points indicated above. Furthermore, yesterday we sent Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade Li Kenong and his assistant to Korea. He will arrive approximately on 5.7.1951 and will discuss with Comrade KIM IL SUNG and other comrades various questions concerning the peace negotiations.
After this he will go to the area of Kaesong, whence he will secretly lead the negotiations.
I am also sending you the telegram which lays out the opinion of Comrade KIM IL SUNG on this question.