HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GAO GANG AND KIM IL SUNG TO STALIN, WITH 13 JUNE 1951 HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM MAO ZEDONG TO GAO GANG AND KIM IL SUNGCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationLetter from Mao to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung, conveyed to Stalin, on a strategy for approaching and terms for an armistice. Issues considered include Taiwan, China's entry into the UN and the establishment of a neutral zone."Handwritten letter from Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung to Stalin, with 13 June 1951 handwritten letter from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung" June 14, 1951, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110365
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To Comrade Stalin, I.V.
We have received a reply telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to receive it and if time allows also to receive us today. We very much ask you to show us such a high honor. Then we will have the possibility to depart tomorrow to resolve all the questions in accordance with your instructions.
With communist greetings!
Kim Il Sung
14 June 1951
[attached handwritten letter].
“To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung:
I received your telegram of 13 June.
Concerning how to raise the question of negotiations about an armistice, we consider it inadvisable for Korea and China themselves to advance this question today, since the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops must occupy a defensive position for the next two months.
It is better to act in this way:
1. To wait for the enemy to make an appeal.
2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the statement of [State Department official envoy George F.] Kennan, the Soviet government would make an inquiry to the American government about an armistice.
It is possible to bring this about in two ways simultaneously, which are that from one side the Soviet government makes an inquiry, and from the other—if the enemy puts forth the question of an armistice, then Korea and China will express their agreement to this. We ask you to share opinions about which is more advisable and decide with Comrade Filippov [Stalin].
3. Conditions for the armistice: restoration of the border at the 38th parallel; to apportion from both North Korea and South Korea an insignificant strip [to serve] as a neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral zone come only from the territory of North Korea will by no means be accepted. North and South Korea [should not] interfere with one another.
As concerns the question of the entrance of China into the UN, we consider that it is possible not to raise this question as a condition, since China can refer to the fact that the UN has in fact become an instrument of aggression, and therefore China does not at the present time attach a special significance to the question of entrance into the UN.
You must think about whether it is worth raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. In order to bargain with them, we consider that this question should be raised.
If America firmly insists that the question of Taiwan be resolved separately, then we will make a corresponding concession.
In the interests of the cause of peace we will resolve first of all the question of Korea. I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and to receive orders from him.
4. We have ordered Deng Hua and the commander of the armies of the 13th army group immediately to return to the front and to hold firmly the present line of the front. In June and July preparations will be carried out intensively. In August we will carry out a larger operation. If the enemy does not make a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy does not send new reinforcements to Korea and does not make an amphibious landing, then in August we will be significantly stronger than now.
5. Right now we are planning the transfer of our aviation units to the front.