CIPHERED TELEGRAM, SHTYKOV TO STALIN ON THE POLITICAL MOOD IN NORTH KOREACITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationTelegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) describing the successes of KPA forces in the South. He also relays the concern of some of the DPRK cadre regarding American intervention."Ciphered telegram, Shtykov to Stalin on the Political Mood in North Korea" July 01, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110688
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Ciphered telegram No. 405809
From Pyongyang.Sent 2.7.50 04.00.
Received 2.7.50 05.47.
Sent to the 8th Administration of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55
To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]
To No. 362.
I report about the political mood of the northerners in connection with the intervention of the Americans.
With the beginning of the successful military operations of the People's Army, and especially after the liberation of the city of Seoul, the mood of the population was characterized by great general political enthusiasm.
The population of the liberated regions in the main greeted the People's Army warmly and in every way cooperated with the measures it took. Organs of power are being created everywhere--even the reactionary elements did not take action against the measures of the government of the DPRK and the People's Army.
The successful attack of the People's Army activated the partisans, at present the partisan movement is developing widely in the rear of the South Korean army.
However, in connection with the widespread American propaganda over the radio, which is directed against the DPRK, and the frequent attacks by American planes on population points, industrial and military sites in North and South Korea, the political mood of the population is somewhat worsening.
Individual attitudes of lack of belief in the final victory have appeared, and in the liberated regions a certain (small) portion of the population is taking a wait and see position.
The leadership of the DPRK and the People's Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Heon-yeong [Pak Hon Yong], Pak Il-u [Pak Il U], Kim Baek, Choe Yeungeun [Choe Yung Un], Kang Geun) correctly evaluate the complicated military-political situation in Korea, believe in full victory and are directing all efforts toward a subsequent broad attack on the south of Korea.
KIM IL SUNG and PAK HEON-YEONG understand the difficulties for Korea elicited by the entrance of the Americans into the war against the DPRK and in connection with this they are taking the necessary measures to stabilize human and material resources for the war.
KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about forming additional infantry, tank, and naval units and formations. They intend to introduce universal military service in the DPRK.
However, some portion of the leading figures, including KIM DU-BONG [Kim Tu Bong], GWON MIN-GI [Kwon Min Ki] are speaking about the difficulties of conducting a war against the Americans with the forces of Korea and in a cautious way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG reported to me these facts, about a conversation of KIM DU-BONG and GWON MIN-GI with KIM IL SUNG.)
The rightist and centrist figures that are entering the government of the DPRK are supporting all measures of the government, but so far are not displaying the necessary direction of activity in the mobilization of their parties in the south of the country.
I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that the government of the USSR has satisfied his request for arms and ammunition.
The general situation in the KNP [Korean People's Republic, apparently a misspelling of DPRK] continues to remain favorable and makes it possible to continue the active offensive of the People's Army.
No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV.
Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria,
Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin,
File of 8th Department.