THE ANOSHKIN NOTEBOOK ON THE POLISH CRISISCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationNotebook of General Victor Anoshkin, aide of Marshal Victor Kulikov. Anoshkin kept records of Kulikov’s meetings, phone calls, and conversations in Poland in December 1981."The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis" December 01, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Personal collection of General Victor Anoshkin. Obtained and translated by Mark Kramer. Published in CWIHP Bulletin 11. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112001
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V. I. ANOSHKIN
Embassy of the USSR in Poland
Cde. Boris Ivanovich Aristov
Cde. Vasil Vasilevich Spirin
KGB Station in Poland
Cde. Vitalii Georgevich Pavlov
Cde. Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov
C O N T E N T S :
(1981 - 1982)
(1) Trip to Poland (7-17.12.1981) during the introduction of "Martial Law"
(2) Trip to the CSSR for the "Druzhba-82" Exercises (Czechoslovak People's Army, Central Group of Forces, and the Hungarian People's Army), 25-30.1.82
Meeting with Cdes. Husak and Dzur and the Armed Forces of the Central Group of Forces
3. Trip to Other Warsaw Pact Countries1
(Up to 20.3.82)
[ . . . ]
Cde. S. S. Gurunov
— We arrived from the Embassy. Meetings with Aristov and Pavlov. The news is that no teleg. has
yet come. We sent a 2nd ciphered teleg. under three signatures. . . . . . .2
— Senior officers/generals are working in the Gen. Staff bldg.3
1. Simultan. they are stepping up their attacks against Poland's allied ties with the USSR.4
They are pressing demagogic demands about Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and
CMEA, as well as about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory
for alliance purposes.5
Individual provocateurs are raising doubts about the existing
Soviet-Polish borders6 and are maliciously defaming the
history of the Soviet Army's role in liberating Poland from
the Hitlerite occupiers.
All of this has caused legitimate consternation among the Soviet people.
1 1 D E C E M B E R
From 7:30 a.m. (Moscow time) VG7 gathered the generals to size up the situation. We reported it to DF8 — the tone of the conversation was moderate!!
After breakfast we went to the Embassy.
Cde. B. I. Aristov raises the following:
Questions: — working out the withdrawal of families;
— aircraft to Brest for an evacuation;
— kitchens to the Embassy to feed the Emb. guards;
11:30 Talks Between VG and Siwicki. They exchanged views. Siwicki requested that we come for
lunch at around 14-15:00 today.
Cde. Pavlov requested VG to speak with
D. F. Ustinov about receiving Vladimir
Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov in Poland.
"At this stage there will be no Soviet presence" — that is the answer we gave to
Com. Milewski in Moscow9 (see the telegram of B. I. Aristov on 10.12.81)
— "You are distancing yourselves from us" - Jaruzelski
9:00 a.m. (Moscow time) 10.12.8110
Instructions of D. F. Ustinov.
When you hold negotiations with the Polish side, it
is essential to emphasize that "the Poles themselves must resolve the
"We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland."11
This is terrible news for us!!
A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on—now everything has disappeared.
What is Jaruzelski’s situation now?!12
16:35 ?! VG arrived from the residence of Cde. Aristov, who reported on an extremely confidential basis that:
1. As instructed — Called - Jaruzelski and Milewski and raised questions:
(1) — We request that someone from the political leadership come to our country.
Who will and when?
(2) — To send a message of support to us. Aristov said that representation at the Center has been arranged.
(3) — Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR? (about the additional sending of troops)
(4) — What sort of measures of economic aid can the USSR provide to Poland?
1. No one will be coming.
2. Measures will be taken.
3. No troops will be sent.
4. Baibakov is providing an answer.13
For the Decision of the WTO C-in-C:14
(My suggestions) — 11.12.81
1. To find a position with a site in the Embassy (work, relaxation, eating)
2. "Bulava" communications in the Embassy.15 From where to put it. A crew, eating, toilet facilities . . ., etc.16
Borisov is to drive the commander along the route on 12.12
3. Guards and defense — Armored pers. carr. . . . Shilka artil.17
Polish identification marks. Merezhko Must remove their own unit's marks.18
4. Merezhko —> Oliwa, a unit for the guards of the Embassy
5. A kitchen — one for meals. Groceries Fedorov —> to get them
6. To Borisov —> Molczyk, Gen. Staff, via Oliwa
Scheme of communications District, Representative Zarudin, Rembertow19
7. Transport for conveyance —> a site in the DefMin 1-2 armored tank regiments
8. Pilots — to stay at Solnewice on the night of 12-13.12
An-24 — on alert at the airport
9. One more office — Anoshkin
10. To 7 offices — "end of Bulava"
Allocation of people:
V. G. Kulikov Send To:
Lakna20 To hotels:
— Nazarov - on duty
11. Zarudin — groceries for meals!
12. Supply of maps — Grechiko
Instructions of the C-in-C:
2 An-26 — in Brest
2 An-26 — in Krzywa21
1. 1 An-24
Il-78 as a liaison — Brest (Krzywa)
2. To have physicians: from Zarudin.
3. Regarding weapons for the officers corps? Request in the Gen. Staff
Report to Def Min D. F. Ustinov
17:35 (Moscow time) 11.12.81
The report overall is the same. Without any sort of changes. In the volume of ciphered telegrams and supplements
Discussion with Cde. Siwicki
from 19:40 (Moscow time) 11.12.81 Very Important!
VG put forth a request to focus on arrangements for unloading meat.
There are some occasions when even meat is being incinerated — subversion.24
Siwicki. The date of the Actions is set for the eve of Saturday-Sunday.
Until this decision is implemented, it will not be made known.
Only a narrow circle of people know about it.
The situation is getting complicated. A session of "S"25 at the factory. Roughly 200 young thugs gathered.26
Per Jaruzelski's instruction, he reported:
When everything is prepared for the culmination, he
requests that the following questions be answered:
(1) The Soviet side would send for consultations on political matters in the plan for the introduction of martial law.27
(2) later - a request to consult on economic matters. The economic
situation is dramatic. He thanked Baibakov. We understand
the inconvenience in the USSR, but we are counting on the provision
of aid in accordance with the decisions that were adopted
— we also viewed your arrival favorably.
For us this gives support in the matter of introducing martial law and struggling to overcome the crisis.
WW28 is very worried that no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale economic and military aid.
Just 24 hours remains until the very painful moment.
But we aren't having political consultations on the
part of the USSR.
At this stage In a conversation via secure telephone
there can be no with Cde. Andropov, we understood
consideration at that we could count on assistance at
all of sending a 2nd stage of our operations.29
But we don't know how the Soviet Union
understands the 2nd stage.
WW raises this question because even though it was clear earlier, the
situation recently has changed.
The adversary is supported from outside and is making the situation more tense.
The church — whereas earlier it took a neutral position, it now is creating tension.31
It might join forces with "S" and draw young people to its ranks, forcing a confrontation.32
A week ago we appealed to the Sov. leadership — but there is no answer.
Cde. Jaruz. met yesterday with Aristov and raised questions of a political and economic nature. What is the reaction now of the USSR to our actions?
But we received no answer.
— We are very worried about what the ambassador's adviser on economic relations (trade) is reporting today to the Min. of Foreign Trade (of 30,000 tons — 12,000 to be sent to Legnica).33
This concerns only the deliveries that are already coming to us.
Summing up these problems:
— have had no meeting at the level of
Very the leadership. Consultations
Imp. — the economic question
and we cannot embark on any adventurist actions if the Sov. comrades do not support us.34
Whereas Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov earlier would
come and see us, now no one is
coming. We aren't receiving an answer to our questions.
Politb memb. W Wlad is very upset and nervous and put forth a
Econom aid 35 request that while there is time they receive an
Sending of troop answer by 10:00 a.m. on 12.12.
Otherwise we can extend the schedule for initiating it
by one day, this is the most we can wait.
"We are soberly evaluating the situation, and if there will be
no politic., econ., and mil. support from the USSR, our country
!! might be lost" (for the WTO)"36
Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step.
Psychologically, WW's state of mind is very nervous.
With a heavy heart I report all of this to you.
— The leadership is resolute, but it's necessary
to decide matters.
WW wanted to travel to the USSR. But the time wasn't suitable for us. I suggested traveling a bit earlier.
But the situation did not permit it.
We transmitted the requests to the ambassador, but have received no answer.
With what sort of polit. slogan must we act against the adversary. "The mechanism is operating; the bow is stretched tight." — This is along military lines.
We can defer the schedule for starting by a day: from Sunday to Monday (13./14.12). But no later.
VG I am not fully informed about what you transmitted to the ambassador.
I know what sort of work you carried out in preparing the introduction of martial law. It is very significant.
You do have the forces. That much we know.
If the church is stepping up its activity, that's because you did not give a rebuff to the enemy. And the church is continuing to exert pressure on the leadership.37
The leading officers for martial law are in good spirits, and there is no need to speak about any sort of adventurist action.
You have real strength. You insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own. The friends spoke to you about this matter, and you remember it.
We also spoke a lot about this at the DefMin Comm. mtg.38
It's now time to act. The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement is now impossible.
I don't know what Andropov was saying.
But friends remain friends.
I will report all the questions to my leadership, and you must act decisively.
If the Church had caused tension, you obviously would feel your weakness. Evidently, that weakness lies at the
center of this deterioration.
Yes, the mechanism has been neglected. We understand, and the leadership in Moscow understands. But does this mean that Cde. Jaruz. has not made a final decision?? Is that so? We would like to know this.39
As far as the arrival of Baibakov is concerned, he examined
all the questions and said that the gov't will consider them.40
Siwicki About "Adventurism." We link this word with polit. consultations.
We don't want to show the role of the party in this conflict
How does the Soviet leadership assess our polit. our line.41
We are embarking on this action under the slogan "Salvation of the Motherland" and "National Salvation."
It was in this sense that the term "adventurist action" was being used.
VG Why has the question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law.
Siw. The decision has been made. The premier requests that you look upon these matters with understanding. And again reminds you about his requests. Without help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles.
The enemy has said his final word. The sides have clearly staked out their positions. Now what is needed
is a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution.
A "Military-Revolutionary Council of National Salvation" has been formed and is already beginning to act.
"They want to arrest 50 people from the old leadership."
Mutual thanks and greetings.
P.S.42 Siwicki left here dissatisfied. He got nothing new and heard nothing new from V.G. The WTO C-in-C has been restrained by Moscow!!
1 2 1 2
9:30 The WTO C-in-C held talks with Cde. Gurunov and gave an explanation along the lines of our telegram
of yesterday under three signatures: Aristov, Kulikov, and Pavlov
The ciphered message is very bad. The introduction of martial law is made dependent on the fulfillment of four points. Jaruzelski is demanding a meeting at the highest level, an answer about the provision of military assistance, etc.
Cde. M. V. Proskurin (10:00 a.m. Moscow time) — on duty by group (of ours)
Assault front at 6:30 a.m. — moved out to 3 command pts.
together for 1.5-2 km
Warsaw Mil. Dist. at 20:00 —
Pomeranian Mil. Dist. at 2:40 a.m. in the vicinity of Bydgoszcz
(to the north) 3 command pts.
Silesian Mil. Dist. at 22:00 toward Wroclaw 3 command pts.
55th mot. reg. of 16th tank div. at 5:00 a.m. on 12.12 concent. south
13th mot. reg. of 5th tank div. at 5:30 a.m. on 12.12 was in the vicinity
at 14:00 awaiting a concentra.
During the night, the district commanders brought to combat readiness:43
34th mot. reg. of 7th mech. brig.
32nd mot. reg. of 8th mot. div.
49th mot. reg. of 20th tank div. (Kolobrzeg)
12th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div. (Gorzow Wielkopolski)
17th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div.
42nd mot. reg. of 11th tank div. (Zary)
33rd mot. reg. of 2nd mot. div. (Nysa)
25th tank reg. of 10th tank div. — Opole
In all, 10 regiments
The remaining formations and units for martial law — at their sites
— at 10:00 (Moscow time) Operational Groups from the Northern Group of Forces will be sent to the Pomer. and
Sil. Mil. Dists. linked by a communications hub
8 divisions brought to combat readiness
9:15 10 people from the United Armed Forces Staff flew in from Moscow.
My disagreements with VG about
the possible composition of our gov't
group at the request of Jaruzelski
Gosplan (one of the Deputies)
The suggestions were
justified (see next page)44
Conversation with D. F. Ustinov
VG briefly reported on the situation.
D. F. informed them that the following
have flown to Poland at the
request of the Polish side.45
1 3. 1 2. 8 1
23:30 — communications
24:00 — 00 — introduction of "Martial Law"46
5:00 13.12 — beginning of deployment of communications
Mil. Coun. of National Salvation — 15 people
During the night, information came in that a "Revolutionary Council of National Salvation" has been formed, consisting of 15 people. M. V. Proskurin also relayed this information to me, though there are other reports that the title of this council included 16 — but others!!47
analyzing it — in the title and
by surnames, of whom does it consist?
At 6:00 a.m. (local time) on 13.12.81 — Cde. Jaruzelski addressed the nation on radio and TV48
Siwicki All tasks regarding
Molczyk the capture
+ 3 commdrs., navy
?! At 3:00 — signal for troops to shift to military alert,
with departure to regions of concentration
!? Walesa (Bujak, Michnik) have fled from Gdansk. Some of the leadership of "S" have been arrested.
5:25 Zarudin: Police in Legnica did not act.
5:50 N. V. Ogarkov — about communications
— covering the coastline?
Departure of Troops — at 5:00 departure to the Wars. Mil. Dis.
— at 6:00 all the rest
Walesa + captured (Siwicki reported)
The navy — begins coastline operations at 6:00 (at 3:00 it was assigned the mission)
!? Mikhailin — must be redeployed and sent to the front (here)
— They handled the situation with the Main Operations Directorate
Tereshchenko — based in Legnica; reported
Legnica— work is proceeding. They began with the detention of as many as 20 people.
A signal — to Rapacewicz, Uzycki
— Uzycki 8th Mech. Div. — to Gdansk
20th Tank Div. — to Bydgoszcz
11th Tank Div. — Wroclaw
Merezhko reported that they have everything in order. In Wroclaw and Legnica, crowds gathered. Wroclaw — 250-300 people. But no resistance was shown. The radio stn. has been placed under guard.
5:00 — 10,000 soldiers move into Warsaw
Bujak and Michnik — have left
Lublin — scuffles with the police
Bialystok — all have been detained In Warsaw, 60-70 % have been detained
LISTS of the Oper. Grps. in the Mil. Dist. Navy, Air Def., Air Force
II. Solov'ev — 15 peop. / 25 peop.
Economic (Shupov, Dept. Frnt. Hosp.).
COMMITTEE OF "SOLIDARITY"
First Session of the
Military Council of Nat.
Salvation, from 11:00 to 19:30
1.5 hours W. Jaruzelski (Dep. Min.)
To let the people know that the Army has saved the nation and the country
The moment is chosen — successful, there were no such things, and it is impossible to delay it any further
Ideally taking account of the public mood and other factors.
I. there is success, but difficulties lie ahead.
The West will boycott, but the allies will help.49
Martial law can be extended by several months. But in accordance with measures to restore order in the provinces, they must display resolve, careful organization, and exactingness
Sympathy for the Army and Navy is growing.
I thought about dispatching a unit of honor guards — square caps
A profound change50 of cadres is necessary: a purge in the PZPR and the gov't.
Carry it out immediately; all unworthy officials will be removed from their posts.
Comdrs. alloted by zones. He believes they must allot zones for the commanders
— Gdansk — Janczyszyn
— Katowice — Lozowicki
— Poznan — Krepski
Appoint Gen. Zielinski — a secretary
WRON. (head of Main Pers. Direct. in Min. of Nat.Def.)
Remove the Katowice governor; appoint Gen. Paszkowski (former ambass. to Mongolia)
Operation has begun — in Warsaw
In Khust Lenina — measures were taken to restore order.
20 commissars at the Ministry
Repeated — (all the generals), repeated for everyone what was earlier
I explained that it all would be in a historical sense
My Assessing the behavior of W. Jaruzelski:
ment many "I"s; the army is forgotten
a certain ostentatiousness and bombast came through
personal Walesa — this is the politic. map
opinion "We are still using him."
Walesa today declared a hunger strike
Krepski gave a speech. The content?
Siwicki spoke and gave instructions to every
Draft of a Ciph. Teleg. to Moscow
II. The Military Council of National Salvation will concentrate all polit.
power in the country, but the nature of its activity so far in our view is
not that of a collegial leadership.
Cde. W. Jaruzelski has preserved for himself all aspects of political and military leadership.
Preliminary results of the struggle to wipe out the counterrevol.51
confirm that there are sufficient forces to destroy it
successfully on their own without the provision of any
sort of military help from outside.
The active work of the MVD and State Sec. organs in detaining the leaders of the
counterrevolution has strengthened the position of the military-political leadership
of the country, and this creates the necessary preconditions for the stabilization of
the social-polit. situation in the country. The alignment of forces is gradually
shifting in favor of the leadership of the country.52
The Economy see Oleg Nikonov
Foreign Policy Activity — N. S. Leonov
In addition to this, the participation of a large proportion
of the working class in strikes shows that the ideas of the
counterrevolution are still alive among the broad popular
masses. For this reason, the only way to prevent the
remaining part of the leading core from resorting to an
illegal situation and launching a variety of anti-government
actions is by thoroughly destroying the counterrevolution.
1. Translator's Note: A slight grammatical error in the original has been corrected in the translation.
2. Translator's Note: These ellipses were in the original. The three signatures on the ciphered telegram were those of Boris Aristov, Vitalii Pavlov, and Viktor Kulikov (see entry below). Pavlov, the KGB station chief in Warsaw, wrote in his memoirs that his "close contact with the Soviet ambassador, B. I. Aristov, who kept in constant touch with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, enabled me to have a good sense of how the MFA was assessing things. I also was aware of the close relations among Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, and the defense minister, D. F. Ustinov. Grasping this, the ambassador and I began to prepare joint reports under two signatures. This practice facilitated a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of all the circumstances and facts that became know to us both through embassy channels and through the KGB residency's channels. My closest contact of all was with the representative in Poland of the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Army-General A. F. Shcheglov, who naturally had a good sense of how our Military High Command viewed things. He sometimes added his efforts to the joint reports that the ambassador and I sent back to the Center, especially when they dealt with military issues. During the most critical phases of the situation in Poland, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, would come here to meet urgently with the ambassador and me. I gave him thorough briefings on the most important aspects of the situation, naturally without referring to the sources of my information. The marshal and I had a very good rapport, and I retain a good impression of him to this day. . . . Only with the military attache, Major-General Fomenko [it should be Khomenko — M.K.] did I somehow fail to develop close relations. Perhaps this was partly due to the well-known rivalry between the GRU, which he represented, and the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB." Pavlov added that Khomenko's reports were "not sufficiently competent and did not always take account of the social and economic dimensions of the Polish crisis." See Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), pp. 186-187.
3. Translator's Note: The General Staff building was the hub of the martial law operation. It was also the site where Jaruzelski and other top military commanders made a final decision on 9 December to proceed with martial law.
4. Translator's Note: From here to the bottom of the page, Anoshkin records sentences that appeared the next day as a paragraph in a scathing Soviet article about the situation in Poland. See "K polozheniyu v Pol'she," Pravda (Moscow), 11 December 1981, p. 5. On the 11th, Anoshkin added a brief reference to this article in the left-hand margin below. The Pravda article diverges very slightly from what Anoshkin records here, as indicated below.
5. Translator's Note: In the Pravda article, the latter part of this sentence reads: ". . . about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory to exert pressure on Poland's allies." —CMEA is the acronym for the "Council on Mutual Economic Assistance."
6. Translator's Note: The Pravda article refers to just the Soviet-Polish "border" rather than the plural "borders."
7. Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Viktor Georgievich Kulikov.
8. Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov.
9. Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981, the Soviet KGB chairman, Yurii Andropov, noted that he had "spoken yesterday with Milewski." Andropov expressed puzzlement that Milewski "doesn't know about 'Operation X' [the martial law operation] and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 g.: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 6, List (L.) 7, which I translated in Issue No. 5 of the CWIHP Bulletin, pp. 134-138. Because of unavoidable ambiguities in the Russian language, it is possible that the "we" in this sentence from Anoshkin's notebook should be translated as "they," but the meaning in either case is the same.
10. Translator's Note: This entire page is in Kulikov's handwriting.
11. Translator's Note: These comments are fully in line with the CPSU Politburo's decisions on the 10th. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," esp. Ll. 5-12.
12. Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (in a conversation at the Jachranka conference on 11 November 1997), these lines report what Jaruzelski said after being informed of Rusakov's response.
13. Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, Soviet leaders instructed "Cdes. Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying the issue of economic aid to Poland, taking account of the exchange of views at the CC Politburo session." (See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 14.)
14. Translator's Note: Diagonally across the upper left-hand corner of this page is the following: "Reported to the WTO C-in-C at 14:45 (local time). Approved. I will take action."
15. Translator's Note: "Bulava" is the Russian word for "mace."
16. Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original.
17. Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original. The nickname "Shilka," derived from a famous battle, was used for the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense artillery system. The Soviet Army deployed thousands of ZSU-23-4s, and the East European armies also possessed large quantities.
18. Translator's Note: These lines indicate that Soviet armored combat vehicles in Poland, when moved out to various sites, were to be disguised as Polish vehicles.
19. Translator's Note: Rembertow, on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, was a key Soviet military base and military communications center. It is currently the site of the Polish National Defense Academy, the Polish Military Staff College, and—most important of all—the Central Military Archive.
20. Translator's Note: Two additional names, Saventsov and Grechiko, were listed here but then crossed out.
21. Translator's Note: Krzywa is an airfield in Legnica Province, some 33 kilometers outside the city of Legnica in southwestern Poland near the Czech and German borders. Legnica was the headquarters of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of Forces, and Krzywa was the main air base for those forces. With a 2,500-meter airstrip, the Krzywa airfield can accommodate any type of aicraft.
22. Translator's Note: There is no fourth point listed after the number.
23. Translator's Note: Helenow is a small village approximately 100 kilometers south of Warsaw, which was used by the Polish government. In a castle there, Kulikov frequently held meetings with Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders during the 1980-81 crisis.
24. Translator's Note: Kulikov's concern about this matter can be better understood in light of remarks made at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December by Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Administration, who had been in Warsaw from 8 to 10 December: "In accordance with the [Soviet] Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. . . . The produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. When the produce is being transported to the Polish stations, blatant sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing outrageously obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep track of all the insults that have been directed against us." See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4-5.
25. Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Solidarity.
26. Translator's Note: These two sentences recapitulate a passage in the 11 December Pravda article (cited above), which reads: "As Polish television reports, the leaders of local 'Solidarity' organizations have begun to create 'fighting groups' at enterprises. Each shock group includes up to 250-300 people. . . . Young thugs from the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland' have shown up on Polish streets sporting symbols of the Homeland Army, which in its time, as is known, took up arms in a struggle against the establishment of a people's-democratic order in Poland."
27. Translator's Note: This is the way the sentence reads in the original. The word "someone" appears to be missing after the word "send."
28. Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Wojciech Wladyslawowich—that is, Jaruzelski. Patronymics are used only in Russian, not in Polish. However, Soviet leaders often referred this way to their closest Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts.
29Translator's Note: The "2nd stage" of the operation, slated to begin as early as 14 December, would have been gravely complicated if the initial crackdown had not prevented widespread turmoil and resistance.
30. Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (conversation at Jachranka, 9 November 1997), these remarks at the left were Andropov's response to Jaruzelski's request.
31. Translator's Note: Anoshkin's comments here are very similar to remarks by Andropov at the CPSU Politburo session on 10 December: "The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of 'Solidarity.'" That view was echoed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who declared that "there are no longer any neutrals." (Both cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 6, 8.) The same point was made in the 11 December Pravda article (cited above), which reads: "Church circles and organizations have noticeably stepped up their activity. The number of sermons in the churches aimed at discrediting the government's efforts to defend socialism has increased."
32. Translator's Note: Baibakov reported to the CPSU Politburo on 10 December that Jaruzelski "was deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as you know, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorites." (Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 4.) Archbishop Jozef Glemp had met with Lech Walesa on 5 December 1981 and then, two days later, sent separate letters to Jaruzelski, Walesa, all the deputies in the Polish Sejm, and the National Students' Union. In the letters to Jaruzelski and Walesa, the primate called for the resumption of tripartite (government-Solidarity-Church) talks. In the letters to Sejm deputies, he urged that Jaruzelski not be granted "extraordinary powers." In his letter to the National Students's Union, Glemp called for an end to the recent spate of university strikes. In none of the letters did he even remotely call for anything tantamount to "a holy war against the Polish authorities."
33. Translator's Note: This again refers to the 30,000 tons of meat that the Soviet Union had promised to ship to Poland. At the Politburo meeting on 10 December, Baibakov indicated that 15,000 tons of the meat had already been sent. (Suslov later cited the figure of 16,000 tons already sent, but Baibakov's figure is probably more reliable.) See ibid., Ll. 4-5, 13.
34. Translator's Note: The word translated here as "adventurist action," avantyura, can also be translated as a "dangerous" or "hazardous" action, but the word "adventurist" is more appropriate for reasons that will become clear below.
35. Translator's Note: The three points to the left of this vertical line are the three issues raised by Jaruzelski. Scrawled diagionally to the right of the vertical line is: "4 questions—a request."
36. Translator's Note: This sentence in Anoshkin's book contained two quotation marks at the end, as indicated.
37. Translator's Note: Evidently, Anoshkin means that the church was continuing to urge caution and restraint on the Solidarity leadership.
38. Translator's Note: This refers to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December 1981 in Moscow. Jaruzelski was Poland's national defense minister (as well as prime minister and PUWP First Secretary), but because he was so preoccupied at home, Siwicki attended the meeting in his place.
39. Translator's Note: Kulikov was aware that a "final" decision to proceed with martial law had been adopted on the night of 9 December, but his comments here suggest that he was beginning to worry that Jaruzelski might try to back away from the decision.
40. Translator's Note: Baibakov, as noted earlier, had recently been in Warsaw to consult with the Polish leadership. When Baibakov returned to Moscow on 10 December, he briefed the Soviet Politburo. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 1-4.
41. Translator's Note: The extra "our" is in the original.
42. Translator's Note: Anoshkin rendered this abbreviation for "postscript" in the Latin alphabet.
43. Translator's Note: All troop deployments listed here and on the next page refer exclusively to Polish, not Soviet, units. The two Soviet divisions in Poland were ordered to keep a low profile throughout the martial law operation. In addition to the units mentioned by Anoshkin, three other Polish army regiments —the 2nd Mechanized Regiment of the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Air Regiment of the 6th Airborne Division in Krakow, and the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin—took part in the operation, performing administrative tasks and providing support for the Mechanized Detachments of Civil Police (ZOMO) and other security forces that actually carried out the crackdown. Siwicki later noted that these army units constituted an elite force selected for their "outstanding level of political readiness"—that is, their willingness to use force on behalf of the Communist regime. See "Pelna gotowosc obrony socjalistycznego panstwa: Konferencja sprawozdawcza PZPR Instytucji Centralnych MON," Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 25 February 1983, pp. 1-2.
44. Translator's Note: Anoshkin drew a curved arrow from these lines to the names on the right.
45. Translator's Note: This sentence and the four names were crossed out with a diagonal line running downward from left to right. It is unclear why Ustinov would have claimed that these officials had already flown to Poland. It is also not known why they ended up not coming to Poland. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in 1981, has claimed that the Soviet Politburo proved unable to reach a consensus on whether to send this high-ranking delegation to Poland as a gesture of solidarity—see Gribkov's "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 56—but he provides no specific evidence to support this claim or to explain why a consensus was infeasible.
46. Translator's Note: Just below this line, written diagonally from left to right, is the following:
"1) to Merezhko
2) to Borisov
The word chasy in this last line might also be translated as "wristwatch." The context leaves open either possibility.
47. Translator's Note: In fact, the Military Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, or WRON) consisted of 21—not 15 or 16—high-ranking military officers, chaired by Jaruzelski. The other members were Jozef Baryla, Kazimierz Garbacik, Miroslaw Hermaszewski, Tadeusz Hupalowski, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Michal Janiszewski, Jerzy Jarosz, Czeslaw Kiszczak, Tadeusz Krepski, Roman Les, Longin Lozowicki, Tadeusz Makarewicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, Wlodzimierz Oliwa, Czeslaw Piotrowski, Henryk Rapacewicz, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, Jozef Uzycki, and Jerzy Wlosinski.
48. Translator's Note: For the full text of the speech, see "Ukonstytutowala sie Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego: Przemowienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego," Zolnierz Wolnosci (Warsaw), 15 December 1981, pp. 1-3.
49. Translator's Note: Soviet and Polish leaders expected all along that Western countries would adopt sanctions against Poland (and perhaps against the Soviet Union) if martial law were imposed. Gromyko had noted on 10 December 1981 that "of course if the Poles deliver a blow against 'Solidarity,' the West in all likelihood will not give them [further] credits and will not offer any other kind of help. [The Poles] are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind." (The actual sanctions that materialized were probably less severe than Soviet and Polish leaders had feared.) In early December 1981, Polish vessels were ordered to avoid entering foreign ports and to stay in neutral waters so that their property could not be seized. Baibakov had assured Jaruzelski on 9 December that Poland's requests for economic aid to offset the sanctions "will be given due consideration in Moscow," but at the 10 December meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Soviet leaders displayed relatively little willingness to consider large-scale economic assistance for Poland. Andropov remarked that "as far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give." He accused the Polish authorities of being "insolent" and of "approaching things this way merely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they will be able to lay all the blame on us." The Soviet Politburo decided simply to give further consideration to the "question of economic assistance to Poland." All quotations here are from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 6, 8-9.
50. Translator's Note: This word was inadvertently omitted by Anoshkin, but the context and the adjectival endings make clear that "change" or "replacement" (smena or peremena or zamena or perestanovka) should be here.
51. Translator's Note: The preceding line was inserted by Anoshkin to replace the following words, which he had crossed out: "Supervision of the struggle against the counterrevolution in locales around the country . . ." Initially, he had replaced this with "An analysis of the situation in the country . . .," but then he chose a third way of phrasing it. Anoshkin crossed out "An analysis of," but he neglected to cross out the words "situation in the country," which are squeezed above crossed-out lines.
52. Translator's Note: Anoshkin had another brief sentence here —"The authority of the leading organs has been strengthened" —which he subsequently crossed out.