Ciphered Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Report from Hungarian Ambassador in Delhi Péter Kós to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on India's increasingly flexible position on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Memorandum of conversations between Hungarian delegate to the UN with Soviet, Yugoslav and Romanian counterparts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Report on the results of Indian President Zakir Hussain's visit to Moscow, including discussion of Soviet-Indian relations broadly and India's relations with Pakistan, as well as on Soviet efforts to pressure India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Five days after India's first nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that Indian foreign policy experts speculate that the test could lead to closer Indian-Soviet relations.

Five days after India's 1974 nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that the Indian government was grateful that the socialist countries had not confronted India on its nuclear explosion.

Discussion of the importance of internal stability and the concept of independence in guiding India's foreign policy following India's first nuclear test.

A telegram from the Hungarian mission to the UN in Geneva stating that the Indian government had provided the Soviets advance notice of their May 1974 nuclear test and that one of the purposes of the test was to reinforce then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's flagging position.

An extended Hungarian Foreign Ministry memorandum explicating the development of India's policy on nuclear arms and disarmament from the 1960s as well as a discussion on the reasons that the socialist countries--including Hungary--have chosen not to condemn India for its May 1974 nuclear explosion.

A summary of the results of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's visit to India. Discussions touched upon Soviet-Indian economic relations and a request by the Indians for Soviet arms.

The Hungarian Embassy in Pakistan reports that according to the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan, the Pakistani government was able, in 1979, to build a nuclear explosive device within one and a half years. In the view of the Soviet ambassador, because of the perceived inevitability of a Pakistani test, the socialist bloc must consider means of stopping the Pakistani nuclear program.

A report from the Hungarian Embassy in India explaining that in the view of the Indian government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatens regional stability as it could invite American and/or Chinese intervention.

Discussion with the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the direction of India’s foreign policy. Topics covered include Indian opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; India’s position on the escalating tensions between Egypt and Israel; the possible establishment of a new Asian regional economic bloc; and the recent decision by the United States to eliminate military aid to both India and Pakistan. Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan is also discussed, including the possibility of providing military supplies to Pakistan.

Comments by Robert Alston of the British Foreign Office on the State Department's "non-paper" on Pakistan. He questions the list of countries and expresses concern about the response of states with their own covert nuclear programs, like South Korea and Taiwan.

Comments by French advisor Jacomet on the State Department's demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. Jacomet stated that the French government was planning a similar demarche. He was most concerned about the response of Italy and West Germany.

The State Department asks for information on a letter sent by IAEA Director General Eklund to Munir Khan of the Pakistani atomic energy commission. IAEA inspectors in Pakistan should also be alert to "any questionable use of facilities or disposition of safeguarded material."

Summary of conversation with IAEA official Davi Fischer. Fischer stated that Director Eklund had not yet written to the Pakistani atomic energy commission. He also reported a number of "troubling bits of information" on the situation in Pakistan.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

Australian response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development, agreeing to cooperate fully.

United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.