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Digital Archive International History Declassified

August 27, 1963

TELEGRAM FROM CZECH EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG TO FOREIGN MINISTRY

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    "Telegram from Czech Embassy in Pyongyang to Foreign Ministry," August 27, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea, Signature 51, Box 5, Translated for NKIDP by Vojtech Mastny. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112409
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Telegram from Pyongyang

Arrived: 8/27/63 4 : 00 pm

Processed: 8/28/63 8 : 00 am

Issued: 8/28/63 8 : 30 am

Further information from Bodnerash

Having returned from the PRC with a delegation headed by Choe Yong-geon [Choe Yong Gon], minister Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol] told Bodnerash that Chinese were showing them only arms factories (10plants). They were boasting that they make 96.5 % of arms themselves. (According to Pak Seong-cheol, common types of weaponry, often obsolete). There were also remarks that the DPRK shares 800 km border with the PRC while only several tens of km with the USSR, and that is even inaccessible mountains or sunken in the sea. Pak Seong-cheol (known for his pro-Chinese bias) was apparently disillusioned and perhaps even intimidated. Bodnerash then expressed his opinion about the PRC leadership – allegedly a band of swindlers deserving only contempt. They have nothing in common not only with Marxism but with conduct of honest people either. There is no dirty trick too low for them. Their goal is world dominance that they expect to achieve with the help of nuclear weapons. That is allegedly the root of their hatred towards the USSR. He says he admires Khrushchev because he has so much patience when dealing with them. “As long as the current leadership of China is at the helm, do not expect it to be any different.” Further details about the visit with KIS (Kim Il Sung): KIS is said to be very upset, especially with the Chinese but also with the USSR. He blames his attitude towards the both on a major disappointment he experienced as early as 1951. While he allegedly went “with a hat in his hand like a beggar” to all our countries and asked for help with building the country, a conspiracy was set up in the DPRK with the help of some high officials of the USSR and the PRC. He allegedly swore that he would never again go begging. The Korean people can lead their country from poverty with their own efforts. Further, he repeated the already relayed facts. Again about KIS, that he is very wise, does not spare his health, travels around the country, directs, helps, gives advice. Supposedly, it is not right to talk about a cult. It is supposedly necessary to see that at stake is Asia that is just awakening from deep feudalism. “Don’t be surprised he is a god for the Korean people; he lead the people from terrible humiliation and oppression.” About the Korean press: That, he says, is irrelevant; it only matters what KIS says.

About celebrations of the 15th anniversary of founding of the DPRK: Huge celebrations whose objective supposedly was to strengthen people’s confidence in their own capabilities, and to give them courage for further building. About high participation of foreigners: To show the South Korean people the firm international position of the DPRK, and to neutralize numerous proclamations of Park Chung Hee and other representatives of the military junta in SK that only they are internationally recognized. Supposedly, there is no need to exaggerate participation of Liu Shaoqi. KIS will allegedly be sick again and will not take part. All will happen at the level of Choe Yong-geon. People will supposedly be able to understand the absence of KIS. About the latest attacks of the KWP against the Yugoslavian revisionism:

Bodnerash fully agrees with the KWP. A correction of the Moscow declaration hasn’t been done, and Tito did not change in any way either. Allegedly, he knows Tito very well and does not believe he will change. In conclusion he appealed that now an agreement and assignment of tasks among our Embassies is necessary, how to isolate the DPRK from Chinese influence as much as possible, and to strengthen the DPRK’s position in our camp. He emphasized namely the economic aid from China and excursions of delegations of the DPRK professionals to the PRR. He also informed that Korean students are again enrolling in the PRR’s universities this year. I will inform the Soviet friends and after a detailed consultation, I will relay our position.

Moravec  93