CABLE TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN RE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTANCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationThis document provides a statement to the UN Security Council, explaining the Soviet position on Afghanistan. The Soviets justify involvement in Afghan affairs--citing UN Article 51, which, in the context of this document, legalizes national defense efforts in response to the presence of outside forces."Cable to the Soviet Representative at the UN Re: the Development of the Situation Around Afghanistan" December 27, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Boris Gromov, “Ogranichennyy Kontingent (“Limited Contingent”)”, Progress, Moscow, 1994 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113146
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NEW YORK, TO THE SOVIET [UN] REPRESENTATIVE
In case there are attempts by anyone to raise the issue of our action regarding Afghanistan in the Security Council, firmly insist that this issue not be included on the UN Security Council's agenda. Stress that this is an issue of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which handle [their relations] themselves, and that in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has the internationally recognized right to turn to the Soviet Union with a request for aid and assistance in repelling aggression and the Soviet Union [has the right] to grant such aid and assistance.
If this issue is included in the Security Council agenda then make the following statement when it is discussed:
As is well known everywhere in the world, including the governments of member nations of the UN Security Council, for a long time there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including the direct use of armed force. It is completely evident that the purpose of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic system established as a result of the victory of the April Revolution of 1978. The Afghan people and their armed forces are actively repelling these aggressive acts and giving a rebuff to assaults on the democratic achievements, sovereignty, and national dignity of the new Afghanistan.
However the acts of external aggression continue in ever wider scale; armed formations and weapons are being sent from abroad to this day.
In these conditions the leaders of the government of Afghanistan have turned to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in the struggle against foreign aggression. Proceeding from the common interests of both countries on security issues which have also been recorded in the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation and in the interest of preserving of peace in the region, the Soviet Union has responded this request of the Afghan leadership with approval and has decided to send limited military contingents to Afghanistan to carry out missions requested by the Afghan government. These missions consist solely of giving assistance to Afghanistan to repel foreign aggression.
It is also necessary to stress in this regard that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are using the right of states to individual and collective self-defense to repel aggression stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. As everyone knows, in the interest of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, many states, including permanent members of the UN Security Council, have more than once resorted to exercising this inalienable right.
The Soviet government also considers it necessary to state that when the reasons which prompted this action of the Soviet Union no longer exist, it intends to withdraw its military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.
The Soviet Union again stresses that, as before, its sole wish regarding Afghanistan is to see this state be independent and sovereign, conducting a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and carrying out its international obligations, including those according to the UN Charter.
If necessary, give a firm and well-reasoned rebuff to statements in which attempts might be made to cast a shadow on our policy, on the measures we are undertaking, and on Soviet-Afghan friendship and cooperation.
During the discussion be guided by the statement presented above and other documents which might be published by either us or the new Afghan government.