INFORMATION NOTE FROM ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN BEIJING TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRSCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationInformation from the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the measures to be taken by the Chinese government as a result of the Tiananmen Square crisis and the possible direction in which China will move as a result"Information Note from Romanian Embassy in Beijing to Ministry of Foreign Affairs," June 03, 1989, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMAE, Telegrame, folder Beijing/1989, vol. 3, pp. 105-107. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113150
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3 June 1989, 07:00 am
Cde. Olimpia Solomonescu, Deputy Foreign Minister
Following our telegrams nr. 015935/31.05.1989 and 015940/01.06.1989, we inform on the following:
1. The resolution of the conflict created among the [party] leadership and the intelligentsia circles involving proposed policy is evolving towards adopting some firm measures [desired] by those factors of decision which presently assumed leadership in resolving this crisis (Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, Yang Shankuna). One set of measures must lead to overcoming the crisis of the governing regime, assuring thus, a solution to the struggle for power being waged at this time. The second set of measures must deal with overcoming the emerging social crisis through [finding] solutions to the problems that occurred in the process of reform. It will be difficult to attempt to resolve both problems [at the same time]. However, it is important to clarify that [it is our opinion that] the first set of problems are immediate and must be resolved without delay. To implement the second category [of measures] a longer time is necessary since medium and long-term policies will need to be put in place.
2. We believe that a solution of the crisis of the state leadership will be reached at the joint session of the State (National Assembly of the People's Republic—NAPR) and Party (Central Committee of the CCP—CC CCP) leadership. In discussions in well informed circles, it was suggested that, at that joint session General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, member of the Politburo of the CC of CCP Hu Qili, and defense minister Qin Jiwei, as well as other officers in the army and members of the party and state leadership will be dismissed from their position. As far as we know, at this time there is an effort to establish the exact motivations that pushed them into the camp of the agitators, and [prompted them to] work in consonance with foreign elements.
It is important to mention the 26 April of this year editorial comment in Renmin Ribao [People's Daily] denounced this group as having anti-socialist, imperialist and anti-governmental motives. Since there is such an association, the seriousness of the accusations and criticism, which will be brought to the accused by the members of the leadership, will be unprecedented.
3. At this time, an analysis of the future can only be based on the little factual data we have available. It is likely that, since the primary accusation are based on the idea that the process of reform and openness, as well as the "One China—Two Systems" policy, were used to undermine socialism and push the country towards capitalism, the new leadership, [which will be named] after the joint session of the CC CCP and NAPR, will take strong action to re-institute the primary thesis of the 13th Congress—the four fundamental principles of building socialism in China, the role of the party as leader of [Chinese] society, and [will] reject wholeheartedly the concepts of plurality and liberal democracy. Bringing this thesis in the foreground implies a re-evaluation of the policies of reform, openness and modernization. [However] it will not be possible to abandon [those lines] completely, at least in its general, strategic sense. A similar position will be adopted in terms of China's relationship with states and groups of states, [based] not only on their immediate reaction to the current situation [and] to the political crisis, but also [based on the] fundamental common interests and political philosophies which govern those relationships, as well as on whether those relationships are beneficial to the new orientation and positions China will adopt as a result of the crisis.
(ss) [Ambassador] Angelo Miculescu
3 June 1989, 07:00 am