SOVIET COMMUNICATION TO THE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP ON THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTANCITATION SHARE DOWNLOAD
get citationThis document provides an overview of the Soviets concern regarding instability in Afghanistan. Such an unstable state of affairs was the basis for Soviet invasion into Afghanistan; Hungary's support is requested."Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Events in Afghanistan" December 28, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives of Hungary (MOL) M-KS 288 f. 5./790.o.e. Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontari and Zsofia Zelnik. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113162
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Budapest, 28 Dec. 1979
Seen by Comrade János Kádár
for Comrades János Kádár, Károly Németh, Imre Gyori, Mihály Korom, János Berecz and György Lázár, György Aczél and Frigyes Puja
In the name of the CPSU CC Political Committee, on behalf of János Kádár, Comrade Pavlov Vladimir, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary informed Comrade Imre Gyori - giving highly confidential and exclusively private information, about the following concerning the events in Afghanistan:
"We consider it necessary to inform the leaders of our friends with full frankness about the action we executed facing the heavily strained situation concerning Afghanistan. Under the present circumstances, the foundations of the April 1978 revolution, the democratic and progressive achievements of the Afghan people have become endangered. The rude interference of some powers in the matters of Afghanistan does not cease, moreover its extent is increasing; armed formations are directed to Afghan territory, weapons are sent to counter-revolutionary elements and gangs, whose actions are governed from abroad. The purpose of this interference is quite obvious: to overthrow the democratic and progressive system created by the Afghan people as the result of the revolution.
The danger threatening the Afghan people is increasing despite the fact that the people and armed forces of Afghanistan have been beating off the military interventions of imperialist and reactionary forces heroically for a long time. All this is closely related to the fact that Amin and the small group supporting him have cruelly and treacherously done away with T. Taraki, the leader of the Afghan revolution and many other outstanding personalities, they have subjected to mass repression hundreds and thousands of communists faithful to the ideas of the revolution, including the Parchamists and Khalqists.
This way, the external intervention and the internal terror developed by Amin threaten with a real danger of destroying everything given to Afghanistan by the April revolution. Considering all these circumstances, the Afghan forces that are faithful to the cause of the revolution, staying at present within the country or - for the known reasons - abroad, are making steps to put out of the way the usurper, to defend the achievements of the April revolution and the independence of Afghanistan. Considering all this and the new Afghan leadership's requesting us to give support and aid to beat off the external aggression, the Soviet Union - governed by her internationalist obligations - took the decision to direct military troops of restricted strength to Afghanistan. These forces will be withdrawn after the cessation of causes making the action necessary.
The Soviet Union would like to make all the countries maintaining diplomatic relations with her understand that executing this inevitable, provisional measure she is obeying the request of the new, just formed leadership of Afghanistan, turning to the Soviet Union for aid and support in the fight against external aggression. Concerning this, the Soviet Union starts from the fact that, in matters of security, the interests of Afghanistan and our country are identical, what was laid down in our pact of friendship and cooperation of 1978, and that they should defend the interests of peace in this area of the world.
The Soviet Union's affirmative answer to this request of the Afghan leadership results also from the statement of Provision 51 of the UN Charter, which interprets collective and individual self-defense applied to beat off aggression and restore peace as the inseparable right of states.
Just like our friends, we also count on the fact that both in the West and East there will be circles initiating a propaganda campaign against the support and aid given by the Soviet Union to revolutionary Afghanistan. But, as it has already happened before, the fault-finding of our class and ideological opponents cannot prevent us from doing our best to defend the global interests of our security and protect our allies' and friends' safety, including states like Afghanistan, whose people are firm in expressing their will to progress resolutely along the path of cooperation with socialist countries, of revolutionary social changes taking place on progressive and democratic grounds.
We are convinced that our friends will interpret in the right way the reasons dictating the necessity of definite help to Afghanistan in the present situation and fully support this internationalist action of ours. Our friends will naturally also understand that the development of events did not make a preliminary exchange of opinions possible for us."