Task for the Operational Command Staff Exercise Soyuz-75 for the 4th Army

HQ OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES

Top Secret

Copy Nº 1

Exercise

[Original Polish receipt and

declassification stamps]

TASK FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STAFF EXERCISE SOYUZ-75

FOR THE 4^TH ARMY

MISSION

for the operational command staff exercise being conducted in the Western High Command in March 1975

Map [scale] 1:200 000, 1967 edition

for the 4^th Army

I

GENERAL SITUATION

I. After a sharp aggravation of the military and political situation in Europe at 0600 17 March the "Westerners" unleashed a war against the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Having gone on the offensive the troops of the "Westerners" had no success using conventional means of destruction in a border battle and under the strikes of overwhelming superiority by the "Easterners" were forced to make a fighting retreat 15-70 km into FRG territory.

As a consequence of this the NATO command decided to switch to combat operations using nuclear weapons.

Beginning 0600 on 19 March the "Westerners" first switched to limited and then the mass use of all nuclear means against the troops, control posts, and rear targets of the "Easterners". They were in turn subjected to mass nuclear strikes by the "Easterners", from which missile units, atomic artillery, and nuclear-capable air units suffered especially large losses.

The air forces of the "Westerners" are launching concentrated strikes on the troops and the approaching reserves of the "Easterners", water barrier crossings, airfields, and Warsaw Pact air defense targets. They are conducting aerial reconnaissance up to the BIALOGARD-LODZ-KRAKOW line.

2. By the beginning of combat operations the "Easterners" had brought [their] troops to full combat readiness and anticipated repelling possible aggression on the part of the "Westerns" with part of their troops and weakening their strike groups, and [then] switching to a decisive offensive with the main forces of the front in coordination with Long Range Aviation and allied navies in order to defeat the enemy in the FRG, Denmark, and the Benelux countries.

With the beginning of the aggression, the "Easterners" inflicted a defeat on the "Westerners" in a border battle and went over to the offensive with [their] main forces. Beginning the morning of 19 March they used nuclear weapons and launched mass strikes on enemy troops and rear targets.

The "Easterners" also subjected the "Westerners" to nuclear strikes, from which the greatest losses were suffered by formations and units of the first operational echelon of the fronts and armies, frontal aviation, national air defense [PVO stran] troops, and strike groups of the allied fleets.

The air forces of the "Easterners" are waging an intense battle in the air, launching strikes on troops and rear targets of the "Westerners", and are supporting combat operations by the Ground Forces and fleet forces. The SVD [Warsaw Pact countries], in coordination with the air defense forces, are not permitting strikes by the air enemy on groups of allied troops and rear targets.

As a result of the effect of nuclear weapons large fires have broken out and a large number of zones of destruction, obstructions, and radioactive contamination of the terrain have formed in areas where the troops of both sides, rear units, and establishments are located, [and also] at airfields, population centers, and forests.

II

PARTIAL SITUATION AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

I. The 4^th Army (10^th and 14^th md's [Mechanized Division], the 18^th and 22^nd td [Tank Division]s, and the 4^th rbr [Missile Brigade]) with the 31^st pabr [Gun Artillery Brigade] repelled an enemy incursion, went over to the offensive and, overcoming stubborn resistance from tank and motorized infantry units of the 1^st AK [Army Corps] of the "Browns", are attacking in the direction of UELZEN and VERDEN.

By 0600 19 March formations of the first echelon of the Army had advanced up to 60 km into the territory of the "Westerners".

Formations and units are carrying out their assigned missions.

The 10^th md, launching a strike on BUCHHOLZ, beginning on the morning of 19 March encountered stubborn enemy resistance at the WINSEN-GARLSTORF line.  The left flanking mp [motorized regiment] is continuing the offensive.

The 14^th md, with the 40^th, 41^st, and 42^nd ogadn [Independent Howitzer Artillery Battalions] are repelling a counterattack by the "Browns". Its tp [tank regiment] is developing an offensive on MÜNSTER.

The 18^th md with the 4^th pabr in coordination with the 14^th md is repelling a counterattack on its right flank. The main forces are continuing an offensive on BERGEN.

The 22^nd md is in the second echelon of the Army. The heads of the columns have approached the river Elbe.

The 4^th rbr is in the launch area.

The Army's artillery is supporting the combat operations of first echelon formations.

AAG [Army Artillery Group]- 31^st pabr; the launch area is in the 18^th td's zone.

PTRez [anti-tank reserve] (4^th iptap [anti-tank artillery regiment]) and the POZ [mobile obstacle detachment] of the Army are moving to a deployment area in the 14^th md's zone.

The Air defense troops of the Army in coordination with the air defense resources of the front, the air defense troops of the GDR, and fighter aviation of the 3^rd Air Army are conducting combat operations with the air enemy, concentrating [their] main efforts on protecting first echelon formations, missile units, and Army control posts.

In accordance with a decision Army engineer troops are carrying out missions for the engineering support of combat operations of Army formations and units. Ruined road sections are being restored and control posts are being equipped.

Army chemical troops are in readiness to carry out missions to perform special processing [Translator's note: decontamination] of the troops. Radiation and chemical reconnaissance are being conducted.

The PKP [forward command post] of the 4^th Army is in a forest 6 km southwest of Lüneburg.

The Army command post is in a forest 2 km west of Alt Jabel.

During two days of battles Army first echelon units have lost up to 12% of [their] personnel and up to 8% of combat equipment; the second echelon's [losses are] up to 3% of personnel and 1% of combat equipment.

From 0600 to 0900 19 March Army formations, units, and rear facilities were subjected to a mass nuclear strike by the enemy. The further advance of the Army has been halted. In turn, Army missile troops participating in the front's first nuclear strike, launched strikes on                  the troops, means of nuclear attack, and control points of the "Westerners".

Army formations and units continue measures to restore combat effectiveness and eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear strikes.

[For] the position and condition of the troops [see] appendices NºNº I-II.

2. On the right, the 9^th Army launched a strike on "Western" troops entering its zone and, attacking Neum[ü]nster, moved 15-60 km in two days. Its 31^st md is waging a battle for HAMBURG.

On the left, the 7^th Army successfully repelled attempts by the "Westerners" in its zone to enter GDR territory and inflicted a defeat on the main forces of the 1^st Army Corps of the "Blues" and had advanced 40-70 km by 0600 19 March.

3. The Commanding General of the 4^th Army is aware:

a) The Maritime [Pomeranian] Front is conducting an offensive operation with the goal of defeating the main forces of the SGA [Northern Army Group] in the northern part of the FRG and in the zone of the Baltic Approaches. By launching a strike on the Hannover-Brussels axis on day 7-8 of the operation it will occupy the EMDEN-WESEL-COLOGNE line.

Subsequently, attacking in the direction of BOCHOLT-EINDHOVEN-BRUSSELS it threatens the approaching reserves and on day 11-13 of the operation reaches the shore of the North Sea and the French border in the sector of DEN HELDER-OSTEND-[WERNE]-MONS-(isk [excluding])-BERTRIX. It launches a strike on the direction of Jutland with the forces of a single army.

The 4^th Army had the [following] mission: in coordination with the 7^th Army defeat the formations of the 1^st Army Corps of the "Browns" and on day 3-4 of the operation seize the line HARBURG-SULINGEN. Subsequently, developing the offensive to ASSEN, destroy the approaching enemy reserves and on day 7-8 of the operation occupy the line NORDEN-ENSCHEDE.

On the right, the 9^th Army of the front, developing the offensive in the direction of RATZEBURG-REDENSBURG [SIC, RENDSBURG?]-FLENSBURG, destroys the opposing enemy and on day 7-8 of the operation reaches the line VEJLE-ESBJERG; part of the forces seizes the island of FÜNEN in coordination with assault landing groups.

The boundary with it is NEUSTADT-GLEWE, BOIZENBURG, and then on to the river Elbe.

On the left, the 7^th Army of the front attacks in the direction of HANNOVER, OSNABRÜCK, and WESEL, destroys the opposing enemy, forces the Rhine, and on day 7-8 of the operation occupies the line VREDEN-COLOGNE.

The boundary with it is [RINOW]-/isk [excluding]/WITTINGEN-NIENBURG-DIEPHOLZ-VREDEN.

b) Information about the enemy as of 0900 19 March

Steps are being taken in the formations of the 1^st Army Corps of the "Browns" which were subjected to nuclear strikes to restore combat effectiveness and eliminate the consequences of the nuclear strikes. The replacement of subunits which lost combat effectiveness and their withdrawal to the rear has been noted at the forward edge in the areas of EGESTORF (22 km southwest of LÜNEBURG) and HANSEN (5 km west of UELZEN).

In individual sectors units of the "Westerners" which have retained combat effectiveness are counterattacking with the objective of improving the positions they occupy.

The advance of reserves from ASSEN and APELDOORN in an easterly direction was halted by nuclear weapons.

Beginning at 0700-0730 the volume of radio traffic between the control posts of the 1^st Army Corps dropped sharply. The operation of the radio center of the 1^st Army Corps of the "Browns" in the area 5 km north of SOLTAU has not been observed.

Control of the formations of the 1^st Army Corps of the "Browns" is exercised from the CP [Command Post] of the 3^rd td in the area of a forest 30 km southwest of Hamburg. The operation of personnel, weapons, and combat equipment decontamination points is being noted in the areas of HOLLENSTEDT (25 km southwest of HAMBURG), MEISSENDORF (18 km northwest of CELLE), and also in the regions in which troops of the "Browns" are forming up north of BREMEN. Massive areas of fires in forest ranges are being observed 15 km south of SOLTAU, 25 km southwest of HAMBURG, and 20 km south of BREMEN.

The operation of salvage and rescue detachments to put out fires in the areas of HARBURG and SOLTAU and to clear and restore roads in the sectors of HARBURG-ROTHENBURG and UELZEN-SOLTAU has been noted.

According to interrogations of prisoners from the 11^th mpd [Motorized Rifle Division] of the "Browns" it has been established that its units have suffered large losses. Three hundred to 350 men are left in motorized rifle battalions and 20-25 tanks in the tank battalions.

In view of the large losses the 730^th ibaeh [Fighter-Bomber Aviation Squadron] and the 729^th oraeh [Independent Reconnaissance Aviation Squadron] have been disbanded. Four or five aircraft remain in the aviation squadrons of the 34^th akr [Air Wing] of the "Blues" based at the KLEINBROGEL Airfield.

On 18 March two squadrons of the 49^th Tactical Fighter Wing of the "Greens" arrived at the Wiesbaden and Sembach Airfields. The rail junctions of ROTTERDAM and MINDEN have been destroyed. The movement of trains through these junctions has been halted.

Pumping distribution stations have been damaged and destroyed on the bulk distribution pipelines of AMSTERDAM-BRAMSCHE and BRAMSCHE-OLDENBURG.

The airfields of DIEPHOLZ, HOPSTEN, and GÜTERSLOH and the landing strips on the BREMEN-MÜNSTER highway in the areas of BAKUM, DINKLAGE, and GREVEN have been put out of action.

Civil construction organization personnel are conducting engineering work to prepare defensive lines on the west banks of the rivers VEREZ [SIC, possibly WESER], and EMS.

Bridge and ferry crossings are being prepared on the river EMS in the LEER-LATEN and MEPPEN-RHINE sectors.

Piers, pier operating equipment, and warehouse facilities have been destroyed at the WILHELMSHAVEN Naval Base and at the ports of AMSTERDAM and ROTTERDAM. Fires are being observed.

Four ships of the "Browns" have been sunk in the port of WILHEMSHAVEN in INNENJADE Bay.

III

AIR AND AIR DEFENSE SITUATION

The troops of the 4^th Army are being protected from enemy air strikes by fighter aviation of the 3^rd Air Army within the overall air defense system of the front. The combat operations of first echelon formations and units are being supported by fighter-bomber aviation.

Five regimental sorties have been used in support of the 4^th Army since the start of combat operations.

IV

COMMUNICATIONS SITUATION

1. Control of the forces of the Army is being exercised from the CP, which has [the following] communications:

- with the CP of the Maritime Front: radio - via the radio nets and radio links of the commanding general and staff of the front; radio-relay - through the PKP of the front; landline - secure government VCh [High-Frequency] [communications] telegraph and telephone - via heavy field cable through VUS [Auxiliary Communications Center] Nº 25 of the front; via communications [relay] helicopters;

- with the CP of the 7^th Army: radio - via the [command] liaison radio nets of the front; secure VCh government, landline, telephone, and telegraph through the communications center of the Maritime Front; communications helicopters;

- with the CP of the 9^th Army: radio - via the [command] liaison radio nets of the front, with the possibility of activating a secure radio teleprinter link; radio-relay, landline - secure VCh government, telephone, and telegraph - through the communications center of the front CP;

- with the TPU [Rear Control Point] of the Army, and Army-subordinate formations and units in accordance with the Army staff communications plan.

2. The TPU has communications:

- with the TPU of the Maritime Front; radio - both radio nets and radio links (secure) of the rear of the front; landline - secure telephone and telegraph - through communications centers of the Army and front;

- with the TPU of subordinate formations and units, rear organizations of the Army - in accordance with the Army staff communications plan.

V

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SITUATION

1. The enemy has intensively used electronic warfare equipment in the course of combat operations. Radio- and radio-relay communications are being jammed with equipment of the 51^st oradb [Independent Radio Battalion] and the 120^th ortb [Independent Radiotechnical Battalion] of the "Browns" and airborne electronic equipment of aircraft of the 71^st and 72^nd Radio Regiments of the "Browns". Tactical aviation aircraft are using active and passive jamming of acquisition radars and missile and anti-aircraft artillery [AAA] guidance radars. Jammer aircraft and helicopters are operating from zones over their own territory and from the combat formations of strike groups. The control and guidance of tactical aviation aircraft against ground and air targets is being exercised from fixed and mobile TsUO [Control and Warning Centers] (PUO [Control and Warning Posts]).

Increased Army electronic reconnaissance is being conducting both with the aid of ground equipment as well as from the air. Radiotechnical reconnaissance aircraft regularly make flights along the line of contact of the troops.

Radio communications in enemy first echelon divisions is being conducted in both HF and VHF radio nets. Radiorelay communications have been organized by links down to the brigade [level]. Landline lines of communications have been laid to some units and subunits. Radiorelay and HF radio communications constitute the basis of communications at the army corps-division link.

Limited use is being made of landline communications.

SIGINT has established the operation of HF radio stations in the areas of BUCHHOLZ, SOLTAU, and MEISSENDORF. The operation of air-dropped disposable jammers has been identified in the area of the communications station of the CP of the 10^th md and 14^th md.

2. The 4^th Radioelectronic Warfare oaradb [Independent ?Army? Radio Battalion] deployed in the region of ESCHEDE is conducting operations in order to suppress enemy HF and UHF communications at the tactical level. The battalion CP  is 2.5 km south of BARNSTEDT. The battalion has losses of 15% in equipment and 10% in personnel.

4^th ortb: the first company in the region of DÖMITZ is protecting the crossing, the second company is protecting the 4^th Army's CP, and the third company [is protecting] the 4^th prtb [Mobile Missile Technical Base]. The battalion has losses of 10% in equipment and 5% in personnel.

4^th ovreh [Helicopter Radio Squadron] is operating from the airfield in the area of [WENINGEN].

3. There are 400 OMU [operational magnetic amplifier], 50 "UGOL", and 60 "PIRAMIDA" corner reflectors in engineer units of the Army.

VI

REAR SITUATION

1. In accordance with a decision rear units and establishments of the Army continue to perform [their] mission to provide material, technical, and medical support to the combat operations of the troops.

2. Material support to the troops of the Army is done from unit and Army supplies and also [from] the supplies sent to railheads.

3. The condition and the capabilities of the lines of communications are workable.

4. The evacuation of wounded and sick is being performed by the men and equipment of the troops to front field hospitals and the closest local medical institutions.

5. The composition and status of the rear and the supply of the Army with material resources and medical support are in Appendix Nº 9.

TO DO:

1. Study the task, assess the situation, make a decision to restore of the combat effectiveness of the troops, eliminate the consequences of the enemy nuclear strike, and for future operations.

2. Submit a decision chart of the Army Commanding General, a combat order, and an electronic suppression plan to the Exercise Control Staff by 1300 19 March.

In addition, submit information about losses from enemy nuclear strikes  and also an assessment of the radiation situation made with the use of automated and mechanized troop control equipment.

3. Be ready on 20 March to report a decision about the initial situation to the mission leader.

APPENDICES:

1. A map of the locations of the troops of the sides as of 0600 19 March (1:200 000 - separately).

2. The order of battle of the troops of the 4^th Army.

3. The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4^th Army.

4. Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners".

5. Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives of the "Westerners'" rear.

6. Information about the engineer troops of the 4^th Army.

7. Information about the chemical troops of the 4^th Army.

8. Information about the signal troops of the 4^th Army.

9. Information about the rear of the 4^th Army.

10. The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners".

11. Weather information.

EXERCISE CONTROL STAFF

APPENDIX Nº 2

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE TROOPS OF THE 4^TH ARMY

AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

Notes:

1. The strength of formations and units of the Army by the start of the operation was:

- personnel - 97%;

- weapons and combat equipment - at the authorized level;

- transport equipment - 95%.

2. The numbering  of the remaining units and subunits is according to the number of the Army (division).

Appendix Nº 3

The availability of nuclear warheads and sAMs in the 4^th Army AS OF 0900 19 MARCH

[Translator's note: due to a reproduction error part of the text of the left column is missing]

Notes:

1. In tactical missile battalions and in a missile brigade the delivery vehicles [nositeli] have been fueled and mated with the warheads; in the prtb the OTR [operational tactical missile] vehicles have been fueled and the warheads are in SG-5 [combat readiness five] - and have not been mated.

2. The delivery of missiles is being conducted according to the front's plan.

Appendix Nº 4

Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners" in the period from 0600 to 0900 19 march

[Translator's notes: due to a reproduction error the text of the left column is missing; see Note 5 for the expansions of expressions in parentheses in the right column]

b) by lines of communications

Note: there are obstructions and fires in the areas of the nuclear strikes

c) Nuclear land mines have been detonated

1. on the LÜBECK-HAMBURG highway: 3 km SE of AHRENSBURG - 1 kt, 0605 19 March 4 km east of RAHLSTEDT - 5 kt, 0606 19 March

2. at the highway intersection 4 km SW of [MÖNSEN] (5 km north of SCHWARZENBEK) - 5 kt, 0607 19 March.

3. [BIELENKAMP] (8 km NE of BERGEDORF) -1 kt, 0604 19 March.

4. BRUNSTORF (3 km west of SCHWARZENBEK) - 1 kt, 0608 19 March.

1/4 ps in the area of the Army CP (first position of the communications center) was subjected to a nuclear strike. Up to 60% of the personnel and communications center rooms were put out of action and 40% of the medium-power radio stations and crews.

The enemy put [the following] out of action with nuclear strikes:

- three R-404 radiorelay stations and 50 km of heavy cable in the 4^th rrkps;

- one R-405 radiorelay station in the region of the CP of the 14^th md;

- two radiorelay stations in the 4^th rrkrs at the CP of the 4^th rbr.

NOTES:

1. The epicenters of the nuclear detonations are considered to be: in the center of a column; on troops in the areas of deployment, launch areas, artillery OP [firing positions], areas where CPs are deployed, rear units in the center of the areas, troops in combat formation - in the center of the combat formation.

2. The degree of protection of personnel and combat equipment when they are in the areas is considered to be:

up to 12 hours: 15% of personnel in shelters, 25% in slit trenches; up to 40% of combat and transportation equipment in open shelters;

between 12 and 24 hours: 20% of personnel in shelters; 40% in slit trenches; up to 50% of combat and transportation equipment in open shelters;

24 hours and more: : 25% of personnel in shelters; 50% in slit trenches; up to 65% of combat and transportation equipment in open shelters.

3. The status and protection of personnel and equipment of the command posts of formations (independent units) and large formations:

- first echelon formations' PKP - in armored personnel carriers [APCs] of HQ located in open shelters;

- the CP and TPU of formations on the move - personnel and communications equipment on vehicles and HQ APCs;

- the CP and TPU of second echelon formations - 50% of personnel in slit trenches, 50% of personnel and communications equipment in HQ vehicles concealed in folds of the terrain;

- PKP of armies and the front - 50% of the personnel and communications equipment in open shelters; the remaining 50% in HQ APCs and vehicles concealed in folds of the terrain located 5 km from the main component  [sostav] of the PKP;

- the CP and TPU of armies and the front - 60% of personnel of the corresponding control post in open shelters, 15% in light shelters, 25% in trenches, 60% of communications equipment with the corresponding control post, and the remaining 40% (transmitting equipment) 10-15 km from the main component of the CP (TPU) concealed in folds of the terrain.

4. The status and degree of protection of the rear of formations (independent units) and large formations:

- first echelon divisions - material resources on motor transport, 75% of which are stored in the open in folds of the terrain and 25% in open shelters; 60% of personnel are in slit trenches;

- second echelon divisions and reserve formations - material resources on motor transport located in open shelters; personnel are in slit trenches;

- armies and the front - 70% of the motor transport is in open shelters and 30% of material resources are in cut-and-cover shelters; personnel are in slit trenches.

5. The status of the troops has been designated [as follows]: in combat formation (b); on the move, when moving to pre-combat formation, in a column (m); in an open assembly area, launch area, artillery firing positions, the area in which the CP is located, rear units (po); the same, but in a prepared area depending on the time the troops are located in it (r).

Appendix Nº 5

INFORMATION

about nuclear strikes of the "Easterners" on troops of the "Westerners" with rear targets during the period 0600-0900 19 March

the number of ground strikes is in parentheses

Appendix Nº 6

INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENGINEER TROOPS OF THE 4^TH ARMY

AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

1. As of 0600 19 March the engineer troops and subunits of the Army are supporting the combat operations of the troops of the Army. Engineer reconnaissance is being conducted in the directions of advance, structures are being built at control posts and in areas where troops are deployed, crossings across the river ELBE are being maintained, routes of advance and tactical routes for troops are being restored and maintained, and stocks of construction materials are being created for bridge crossings and roads.

Bridge structural supplies in engineer units consist of: in brigade combat engineer battalions and combat engineer battalions - 40 linear meters; in a pontoon bridge regiment - 120 linear meters; and in the engineer bridge-building battalion - 240 linear meters.

[The following] mines and explosives have been used in engineer units during combat operations: in division combat engineer battalions and brigade combat engineer battalions - 30% of the norm.

The strength of engineer units and subunits of the Army at the start of the operation was: personnel - 98%, engineer equipment and armament - 100%, and motor transport equipment- 95%.

The 4^th isbr is conducting engineering preparations at control posts and in missile unit launch areas, and is also operating in the POZ of the Army.

Losses: personnel - 8%, engineer equipment and armament - 4%, motor transport vehicles - 7%.

The 4^th pomp is conducting engineering reconnaissance of the river ELBE and is maintaining the bridge crossing.

Losses: personnel - 6%, engineer equipment and armament - 2%.

The 4^th odespb is in the assembly area in readiness to perform a mission.

The 4^th imostb is in the assembly area in readiness to perform a mission.

Losses: personnel - 7%, engineer equipment and armament - 2%, and motor transport vehicles - 8%.

The availability of the primary engineer equipment in Army engineer depots is 80% of table of equipment requirements.

2. From 0600 to 0900 19 March engineer troops are carrying out missions to plan engineer support in accordance with a decision of the commanding general of the Army.

Appendix Nº 7

INFORMATION ABOUT THE CHEMICAL TROOPS OF THE 4^TH ARMY AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

1. As of 0600 19 March the chemical troops of the Army, carrying out missions to plan chemical support, are in readiness to reconnoiter contaminated zones and conduct decontamination of the troops.

Units and subunits of the chemical troops have [the following] strength:

personnel - 94%, special vehicles and reconnaissance instruments - 96%, two loads of decontamination agents.

Chemical troops of the Army:

- the 4^th brkhz is in the assembly area in readiness to carry out special missions. Losses: personnel - 6%, special vehicles - 3[%].

2. Beginning 0600 19 March the chemical troops of the Army are carrying out missions regarding the chemical support plan in accordance with a decision of the commanding general of the Army.

3. Troops of the Army have been 96% supplied with chemical troops equipment and means of defense. Mobile reserve supplies are at 90% of the table of equipment norm.

Appendix Nº 8

INFORMATION ABOUT THE SIGNAL TROOPS OF THE 4^TH ARMY AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

1. Front Auxiliary Communications Center Nº 14 is deployed in the area of DAHLENBURG 20 km SW of LÜNEBURG.

The repeater connection points to the GDR state cable network are workable.

2. Signals units continue to carry out the missions to support the Army command with communications.

The enemy is creating strong radio interference in the radio net and radio links of the Army commanding general; radio communications with the PKP of the 10^th md have been disrupted. The enemy is creating radio interference in VHF radio nets in the area of the communications center of the 14^th md with the aid of air-dropped disposable jammers.

3. The strength of signals units in personnel, communications equipment, and property is in accordance with their tables of equipment and organization and are practical.

4. The location and status of signals units [is as follows]:

The 4^th ps  - the 2^nd battalion (position P) is on the move; the head of the column has reached ZIEGENDORF (15 km NW of PUTLITZ).

The signal company of the PKP is providing command and control from the PKP of the Army.

The 4^th rrkrs is providing communications over the main axis and links from the CP and PKP of the Army to the CP of the division and the TPU of the Army.

The reserve radiorelay stations is in the area of DAHLENBURG (20 km SE of LÜNEBURG).

The 4^th bst is providing communications to the TPU of the Army. The communications equipment of the second position of the communications center is concentrated in the area of [VOSSMER] (15 km NW of DÖMITZ) in readiness to carry out the next task.

Losses: a radio station in the radio net of the front rear and a secure telegraph communications van have been put out of commission.

The remaining signal units and subunits are providing communications at the decision of the exercise participants [igrayushchie].

Appendix Nº 9

INFORMATION ABOUT THE REAR OF THE 4^TH ARMY AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

AS OF 0600 19 MARCH

I

The composition of the rear

II

Material supply

III

Medical losses of the troops of the Army

Note: The evacuation of wounded is being done to the 27^th FGB [Front Hospital Base] and fixed hospitals allocated by the front.

The ORDER OF BATTLE and identified formation and units numbers of the "Westerners" as of 19 March 1975

I. GROUND FORCES