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Digital Archive International History Declassified

August 29, 1968

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE 15 PLENUM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM CENTRAL COMMITTEE

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation

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    Lengthy briefing for the Central Committee on the status of North Vietnamese diplomatic efforts during the first eight months of 1968 and future plans.
    "Report Presented to the 15 Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee," August 29, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Party Central Committee, Hanoi. Translated for CWIHP by Merle Pribbenow http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113979
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Report Presented to the 15 Plenum of the Party Central Committee, 29 August 1968

On Our Great Victory on the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities Front from Early 1968 to the Present

In early 1968 our people’s revolutionary war shifted into a new era, the era of the general offensive and simultaneous uprisings in order to advance toward winning a decisive victory.

Our diplomatic struggle and international activities operations during this era have been assigned the mission of coordinating more closely and intimately with the military and political struggles on the battlefield in order to support our goal of securing a decisive victory.  In addition, our diplomatic operations also are making preparations so that we are ready for the time when it becomes possible for us to talk to the enemy.  

During the last eight months, our diplomatic operations and international activities have secured great victories that provided excellent support to and coordinated well with our military and political activities, pushing the enemy into a position of being forced to “fight and talk” at the same time, even though in the past the enemy has always tried to avoid such a position.  This is a new situation and a very favorable foundation for us to continue to attack the enemy on the diplomatic front and to advance forward to score new victories in order to accomplish our heavy but glorious mission in this new era.

Part One

The New Situation – Our New Victories and the Enemy’s New Defeats on the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities Front

I.  The New Situation

During the last days of 1967 and in early 1968, the soldiers and civilians of South Vietnam, exploiting their strong posture and holding the offensive initiative, attacked and won great victories on all battlefields throughout South Vietnam, especially in Eastern Cochin China, the Central Highlands, and Tri Thien, and they began to pin down enemy forces in Khe Sanh.  The enemy was forced back into a strategic defensive posture.  Ever since the beginning of the General Offensive and Simultaneous Uprisings, the battlefield situation in South Vietnam has completely changed, the enemy’s war of destruction against North Vietnam has been bankrupted, and the enemy’s posture of defeat has become increasingly clear.

On the diplomatic front, our 28 January 1967 announcement placed the US completely on the defensive.  The only significant American effort was their presentation of the San Antonio formula in early in the 1967-1968 winter-spring season.  This was a poor and a stubborn effort, however, because the US still demanded “reciprocation” by insisting that we must not be allowed to take advantage of a cessation of their bombing campaign.  We made a series of attacks against the Americans during the first days of the new year by reaffirming our position as expressed in the 28 January 1967 announcement, by deciding to suspend military attacks in South Vietnam during the Tet holiday, and by releasing three American pilots who were being held in North Vietnam.

1.  Johnson’s 31 March 1968 Announcement

Facing defeats in both North and South Vietnam, facing great difficulties in all sectors caused by the war of aggression in Vietnam, and facing increasing pressure from the people of the world and from progressive Americans to unconditionally end the bombing of North Vietnam, on 31 March 1968 Johnson was forced to announce that the US would “restrict the bombing of North Vietnam,” that it would agree to negotiate with our government, and that Johnson was withdrawing from the Presidential election (he would not seek another term as President).

This was a great defeat and a strategically significant change for the US  It was also a very devious trick by Johnson: on the one hand he readjusted the bombing of North Vietnam to block the flow of our support to South Vietnam in order to reduce the US’s military losses and to resolve a number of internal problems, while on the other hand he appeared to demonstrate “good will in unilaterally deescalating the war” in order to deceive public opinion and win public support.  He believed that we would completely reject his offer because he had only “restricted” the bombing of North Vietnam and had not fully complied with our demands and with the demands made by public opinion.

The reaction of the American people, of American political circles, of the general public around the world, and of many foreign governments, including the governments of a number of socialist-bloc nations, was to applaud Johnson’s stance.  This action demonstrates that this American trick is capable of placing pressure on our side.

2.  Our 3 April 1968 Announcement and the “fight-talk” posture

We had a plan ready to continue our diplomatic attack against the enemy with the goal of exploiting our victorious military posture and the strength of our public announcements (we allowed a CBS correspondent to come in [to North Vietnam] for an interview).  After Johnson’s 31 March 1968 announcement, we seized the opportunity by announcing that we were prepared to send a representative to meet with a representative of the United States to confirm that the US would unconditionally end the bombing and all other acts of war directed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to be able to begin official talks. Two days later we clearly stated our ideas about the location of the meeting and the rank of the representatives who would attend the meeting.  Our goals were to further isolate the enemy and force him to agree to talk to us, to win the support of international public opinion, and to support our preparations for a new wave of military attacks.

The enemy was completely surprised by our action.  He became increasingly confused and defensive.  The enemy tried to use the question of the location of the meeting to delay the talks, but this only revealed more clearly his stubborn nature.  On 3 May we proposed Paris as the site of the talks and at the same time raised the issue of beginning official talks.  This was another surprise blow that put the US further on the defensive, and the Americans were forced to agree to begin talks with us on 13 May 1968.

  • We created a situation of “fighting and talking at the same time” with the goals of:
  • Winning the support of public opinion;
  • Causing additional problems for the enemy in order to support our troops on the battlefield;
  • Directing the enemy onto the path of settling the Vietnam problem through negotiations after we win a decisive victory.

In this new situation, both sides have tried to exploit the talks to support their military objectives.

The enemy has been forced into a position of fighting and talking at the same time.  Although he is in a passive, defensive posture, the enemy still wants to use the talks in Paris to try to restrict our powerful attacks and in that way reduce his military and political losses on the battlefield (for instance, by bringing up the issue of restoring the status of the Demilitarized Zone, by demanding that we reduce infiltration and that we reduce our shelling attacks on Saigon, etc.).

As for our side, we are using the talks to conceal our preparations to make powerful attacks in South Vietnam.  On the one hand we resolutely denounce the US for continuing to stubbornly commit aggression against our nation, for continuing to intensify the war in both North and South Vietnam, and for continuing to commit a host of horrendous war crimes, while on the other hand we wave our banner of independence and freedom and forcefully insist on our entire population’s sacred right of self-defense.

Fighting and talking are intimately connected to one another.  Fighting can facilitate progress in the talks, or it can cause the talks to be broken off temporarily.  Conversely, the talks can affect the fighting, for instance by creating public pressure on both sides to make mutual concessions in order to reach a speedy settlement for the Vietnam problem.

We are making powerful attacks in South Vietnam, and the size and power of our attacks will continue to grow with every passing day.  In the current talks we are able to provide excellent support for the implementation of our military plans in South Vietnam, but we will not allow the talks to affect our combat operations because our cause is just, because we are now on the road to victory, and because we have the right strategy.

From the overall perspective, in this new situation of talking and fighting at the same time our posture and the enemy’s posture are totally different.

In North Vietnam, we have defeated the American war of destruction.  In South Vietnam, we can attack the enemy at any time, at any place, and with every possible method, and the enemy can do nothing to ward off our blows.  The military and political struggles in South Vietnam are the factors that will decide victory on the battlefield and that will form the basis for victory on the diplomatic front.  The tremendous and comprehensive victories being won during the South Vietnamese people’s General Offensive and Simultaneous Uprisings are giving our diplomatic struggle operations and our international activities added strength, they are giving us the initiative, and they are putting us increasingly on the offensive.

As for the United States, since the beginning of the General Offensive and Uprisings the US has suffered tremendous military losses, but its political losses have been even greater.  The Americans constantly boasted of their economic and military strength, and in early 1968 Johnson and the US generals issued propaganda statements saying that the situation in South Vietnam was very good and that in 1969 US troops might be able to start coming home.  However, at the end of January not only was the US unable to protect the cities and military bases in South Vietnam, it could not even protect the US Embassy in Saigon. The American public and international public opinion clearly sees that:

  • Although the US is the strongest nation in the capitalist world, it has suffered a painful blow and it faces the prospect of total defeat in Vietnam.
  • The US’s economic and military resources are very great, but they are not limitless.

America’s prestige has seriously declined throughout the entire world.

The war in Vietnam has caused many insoluble problems for the American ruling clique and has added to the pre-existing problems the US already was facing.  During this election year it will be increasingly difficult for the Americans to conceal and overcome these problems.  

The US no longer is able to launch “peace campaigns” as it did in the past, and all it can do is to present patched-together little meaningless initiatives on the diplomatic front.

Although we are in a stronger position than the enemy, we have not reached the point where we can force the enemy to accept a settlement that meets our requirements.  For that reason, it is inevitable that the Paris talks will last for quite some time.

II.  The Enemy’s New Defeats and Our New Victories on the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities Front in this New Situation

For the past several years our Government’s four-point position and, for the past year, the Political Program of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam have continuously raised high our banner of independence and peace.  The US has been thrown increasingly on the defensive and it has been unable to achieve its basic diplomatic goals, which are to try to defend and conceal its crime of aggression against Vietnam, to preserve and elevate the status of the puppet government in the international arena, and to entice a large number of its allies and its satellite nations to send troops to participate in the fighting in Vietnam.

Since the beginning of the General Offensive and Uprisings in South Vietnam, on the diplomatic and international activities front the US has suffered new defeats, and we have scored new victories.

1.  The true face of American aggression and stubbornness is being increasingly revealed.  We have proclaimed our people’s sacred right of self-defense and have increasingly clarified and promoted both the four-point position of our Government and the Political Program of the National Liberation Front.

The US continues to use the slanderous argument of “North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam” and the “promises” it has made to the Saigon puppet government to try to justify the presence of more than 500,000 American troops in South Vietnam and the American air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam.  However, their twisted arguments have not deceived the public.  They say that they respect Vietnam’s independence and sovereignty, but they blatantly demand conditions before they will agree to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam and halt the bombing of North Vietnam.  They say they respect the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam, but they continue to support the puppet clique in Saigon and refuse to recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.  They say they want to “return to the 1954 Geneva Agreement,” but they only talk about the cease-fire provisions of that Agreement and ignore the fundamental principles of that Agreement.  They boast that they have “restrained themselves,” but in reality they have continued to intensify the bombing of North Vietnam and to intensify the war in South Vietnam.

We have resolutely exposed the face of American aggression, proclaimed our people’s sacred right of self-defense, and clarified and illuminated both our Government’s four-point position and the Political Program of the National Liberation Front.  In this new era of the revolutionary war in South Vietnam, the defeated posture of the Americans is increasingly clear, so the demand that the US halt the bombing of North Vietnam and withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and the search for a way to settle the Vietnam problems have become major issues.  As our four-point position and the Front’s Political Program gain greater and greater visibility, they on the one hand clearly demonstrate our attitude of constantly and steadfastly clinging to the basic principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, and on the other they help the world to see the possibility of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem.

The US has been unable to hide its true character as a stubborn aggressor.  We continue to maintain our position of principle while at the same time we demonstrate our good will, and in that way we have been able to win great sympathy and support from world opinion, even after we launched powerful attacks on Saigon and other cities in South Vietnam.

2.  Since Tet, the US has not been able to hide its strategic failure in South Vietnam, and for that reason the internal situations of the US, its allies, and its lackeys have become increasingly splintered and divided.  We quickly exploited our victories, and because of that the international peoples’ front supporting Vietnam and opposing the American aggressors has grown and expanded.

Ever since Tet, people have clearly seen that the US was being attacked by the Liberation Army in Saigon and throughout South Vietnam, but it could not retaliate by bombing Hanoi or by expanding the war into North Vietnam, and even the number of additional troops that the US threw in to reinforce South Vietnam was limited.  After the Lao rightist army’s major defeat at Nam Bac, after the capture of the spy-ship Pueblo by North Korea, and after Soviet and allied troops marched into Czechoslovakia, people have increasingly seen the weakness of the Americans, a weakness that totally contradicts the propaganda arguments being put out by the White House and the Pentagon.

For that reason, the US has tried to make light of its losses and has fabricated claims of heavy casualties among the forces of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army.  It has sent representatives to conferences held by the South East Asian bloc [SEATO], the ANZUS bloc, and NATO, and to travel through Africa and Latin American spreading propaganda about the situation in South Vietnam.  In spite of these efforts, the US has been unable to conceal the strategic defeats it has suffered in South Vietnam since the Tet Offensive began.

The situation in Western nations and in US lackey nations is becoming increasingly unfavorable for the Americans.  France helped to pressure the US to enter into negotiations with us by suggesting Paris as the site of the talks.  During the NATO conference the US was unable to persuade its allies to make any greater contributions to the war in Vietnam.  Italy, Austria, Norway, and Denmark have invited us to send representatives to visit them.  The US satellite nations that have troops fighting in Vietnam are afraid that the US will lose and that it will abandon them, so they have all grown anxious and have lost confidence in the Americans.

On our side, we quickly informed the fraternal socialist nations of our victories in both North and South Vietnam and of our positions on the issue of negotiating with the US  We gave a clear briefing to some of the countries about our use of the stratagem to coordinate our diplomatic struggle with our military and political struggles.  To a few of the countries that were not particularly sympathetic to our use of the stratagem, we tried to make these allied countries understand our resolve and understand our positions so that they would not openly criticize us in the event they talked to the Americans.  This year Comrade Le Thanh Nghi led a delegation to visit the socialist countries to hold discussions about sending their aid shipments earlier than they have in past years in order to try to create more favorable opportunities for us after we score a victory and to help us win a decisive victory.

As a result, the fraternal socialist nations all increased their political support and at the same time strove to meet our requests for military and economic aid for the 1969 calendar year.  We also worked to build and develop a citizens’ aid movement in the socialist countries, with the primary focus being on Eastern Europe and Cuba. In comparison with the period when we first advanced forward to seek a decisive victory, and in light of the capabilities of the socialist nations, the assistance we have received from our friends has not been particularly ample, and sometimes it has not been timely.  However, generally speaking, the sympathy, the political support, and the material assistance our friends have given to our people have been very large and very precious.  In those areas where there are complications in the situation, we have employed a policy of independence and self-determination, so we still have been able to win support from the socialist nations, and in some respects that support has increased.  Because of this situation, the more victories we win, the more powerful attacks we make, the more we must firmly maintain our policy of independence and self-determination while at the same time remaining flexible and staying extremely vigilant.

We have strengthened and further consolidated the Indochina Peoples’ Front.

Our relations with the Neo Lao Hak Sat [Lao Patriotic Front] and with the patriotic neutralist forces in Laos are growing increasingly tighter.  Both sides are increasing their support, encouragement, and assistance to one another, and we are increasing cooperation with one another in the battle against our common enemy, the American imperialist aggressors.  This is a very important factor in our success, as well as in the success of the Lao nation.

Cambodia continues to maintain its policies of stalwart opposition to the US, support for the people of both North and South Vietnam in their struggle against the US, and solidarity with the peoples of Indochina.  However, in the face of the tremendous victories won by the National Liberation Front and under pressure from the rightist faction in his country, [Cambodian leader Prince] Sihanouk fears that we will not respect the current borders or the neutrality of Cambodia and he wants us to support the domestic policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia.  As for relations with the Neo Lao Hak Sat, there are tensions between Cambodia and Laos about the border problem.  Sihanouk is also facing both internal and external problems.  While he supports us now, because of his class interests he wants to limit the size of the victory that our people will win.  In order to support the requirements of our revolutionary role in South Vietnam, we have worked patiently to win over Sihanouk.  We have strongly supported every action Cambodia has taken against the American imperialists and their lackeys.  We have supported the Popular Socialist Community [“Sangkum Reastr Niyum” – Sihanouk’s political party/political movement].  We suggested Phnom Penh as the location for our talks with the US  We also asked China to help in the effort to win over Sihanouk for the sake of Vietnam’s struggle and for the benefit of the revolution in this entire area.  Currently, relations between Cambodia and North Vietnam are good, and Cambodia’s support has had an extremely important practical impact on our battle against the Americans to save the nation in South Vietnam.

We have further expanded the World People’s Front supporting Vietnam and opposing American aggression.

Even though there are extremely serious disagreements within the socialist camp and within the international workers and communist movement, in practical terms a World People’s Front supporting Vietnam and opposing American aggression has taken shape, is continuing to grow, and has had a major impact on our people’s struggle against American imperialist aggression.

During the past several months we have sent representatives to Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, and Northern Europe and have campaigned for our cause with the fraternal nations and in the meeting of world peace and democratic organizations on 20 July in order to win additional support and to further expand the World People’s Front supporting us.  As a result, the movement continues to grow stronger in its old locations and at the same time has made rather major strides forward in a number of nations that are under American influence, including the nations of Central America, the Philippines, and Thailand.  The slogans of the movement are focused on demanding that the US unconditionally end the bombing of North Vietnam, that it withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, and that it begin talks with the National Liberation Front.

In the current situation, with the American defeats in Vietnam and with this being an election year in the United States, the anti-war movement in the United States has a favorable environment to grow and expand.  However, Johnson has exploited the “restriction of the bombing” and the beginning of talks with North Vietnam to claim that he has demonstrated “good faith” and he has used the American defeat in South Vietnam to appeal to the nationalistic spirit of the American people.  For that reason, after the talks in Paris began, the anti-war movement in the United States temporarily quieted down.  More recently, the American military situation in South Vietnam has continued to worsen, the negative effects of the war have continued to place heavy burdens on the daily lives of the American people, and the US’s stubborn attitude in Paris has become abundantly clear.  In this situation, we have increased our contacts with Americans who are opposed to the war in Vietnam.  We released a number of captured pilots and used this opportunity to highlight and praise the American anti-war movement.  This movement is growing and it has prospects for further growth from now until the Presidential election, but its impact will still be limited.

In general, the movement supporting our cause continues to grow stronger in all countries, and the World People’s Front supporting the people of Vietnam and opposing the American aggressors is expanding further.

3.  On the international stage, the US has not been able to restore the prestige of the Saigon puppet government, while the prestige of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam has never been as high as it is today.

Since the end of last year [US Ambassador Ellsworth] Bunker has organized three rigged elections: an election for the President and Vice-President, an election for the Senate and the Lower House, and an election for village councils.  These elections were held to give the Saigon government the outward appearance of “constitutionality” and of being “democratically elected,” and to make the situation in South Vietnam appear to be more stable.  During the past six months the US has worked to strengthen the puppet government and to “pretty up” its outward face.  Johnson held a conference with Thieu in Honolulu and invited Thieu to visit the United States, and he played the old trick of pretending that the puppet government was demanding to talk directly to North Vietnam.  The puppet government also sent many delegations out all over the world to spread the propaganda message of the so-called “Republic of Vietnam.”

A number of countries in the American camp have now recognized the puppet government, but it is clear that the US has not been able to restore the so-called “international prestige” of that government.  The broad range of public opinion recognizes that it is a puppet of the American imperialists.  The International Lawyers Conference in Grenoble called that government a “tool used by a foreign power to govern South Vietnam and to use military force to enslave South Vietnam” and said that the government completely lacked effectiveness (effectivite), representative character (representativite), and independent authority (independence).

On the other side, our people have won the deep sympathy and support of the people of the world.  

In the past, the people of the world knew that we were fighting and defeating the American imperialist aggressors, but they did not know in concrete terms how far our victories had progressed.  After the glorious victories won by the soldiers and civilians of South Vietnam during the General Offensive and Uprisings, the people of the world clearly saw that Vietnam, a smaller nation whose economic and military resources were much weaker than the US, had struck a blow that shook the United States and stunned the entire world.  After the US was forced to enter into talks with us in Paris, the people of the world saw again that we had won a great diplomatic victory by forcing the US to agree to something that it had been trying to avoid.  The respect that our people’s military, political, and diplomatic victories has won from the fraternal socialist nations (although some nations have not expressed it in public), from the people of the world, and from all people of conscience has raised the prestige of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of the National Liberation Front, and of our people to unprecedented heights, terrifying our enemies and filling our friends with enthusiasm.

4.  The US has been unable to conceal its heinous crimes and we have made our battle against the Americans to save the nation shine with the light of our just cause

Two sessions of Bertrand Russell’s International Court of Justice held in Sweden and in Denmark, the conclusions drawn by dozens of investigating delegations from different organizations and different nations, and the activities of the Committee to Investigate American War Crimes against both halves of our nation [North and South Vietnam] have clearly exposed the fact that the American imperialists have committed the crime of aggression against Vietnam and that they are committing genocide against our people.

From the beginning of Tet up to this very moment, to counter our military attacks and mass uprisings in South Vietnam, the US has insanely rained bombs, shells, poisonous chemicals, and poisonous gas down on South Vietnam.  The Americans have bombed and strafed Saigon, Hue, and virtually every other city in South Vietnam.  Recently they have used bombs, artillery shells, and military sweep operations to establish the so-called “rocket belts” around Saigon and US military bases.  In North Vietnam, the American “limited bombing” is in actuality just a readjustment of the bombing targets so that their bombs are now savagely pounding Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Vinh Linh.

The US has tried to claim that they only attack military targets and at the same time has issued slanderous statements claiming that we have attacked civilians in order to try to conceal their own crimes.  However, the strength of the public’s denunciations of these crimes grows with every passing day.  The International Lawyers Conference in Grenoble, the meetings of the International Information Center on US War Crimes in Paris, the World Congress of Youth and Students in Sofia, etc. have all resolutely exposed the war crimes committed by the United States.  

As for our side, the more we fight, the more we attack, the brighter the light of our just cause shines, and the greater sympathy and support we win.

For many years the people of the world have praised the international significance of our people’s battle against the Americans to save the nation.  However, since this year’s General Offensive and Uprising and in view of the clear influence the Vietnam War has had on US domestic policy and U. S. foreign policy in general, the public has seen even more clearly that we are not fighting solely for the independence and freedom of our Fatherland.  We are also fighting for the security of the socialist camp, for the cause of all nations that are now struggling against the American imperialist-led forces of imperialism, old-style colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and for the good of the world peace movement.  Every victory won by our people strongly and profoundly encourages the nations and peoples who have risen up against the American imperialists.  Many chiefs of state have told us that we should not thank them, but that they should thank our people.  A number of African chiefs of state have told us that we have opened the eyes of the peoples of Africa and Asia.  Many of our friends have told us directly that they are proud of our people.  All of these precious words of thanks demonstrate that our people’s just cause of fighting the Americans to save the nation grows brighter with each passing day and that it is winning us more and more friends all over the world.

III.  A Few Observations

1.  The “talking and fighting at the same time” situation is beneficial for us and not for the enemy.

On the American side, the US has achieved a few of their goals:

  • On the battlefield, the Americans have concentrated their aircraft and warships to conduct continuous attacks on the four southern provinces of the old Region 4, thereby causing a number of problems for our effort to send support to South Vietnam and at the same time reducing their losses in aircraft and pilots in comparison with the losses they suffered when they were attacking all of North Vietnam.
  • Domestically, it has enabled them to obtain Congressional passage of their war budget, to pass a 10 percent tax increase, to mobilize a number of military reserve units, to obtain Senate approval for the extension of the military draft law for another year, and it has reduced the level of criticism of Johnson’s Vietnam policy.
  • Internationally, the US has created the illusion of peace and has caused a portion of the world’s public opinion to believe that the US is demonstrating “good will,” and for that reason for a time the movement demanding that the US stop the bombing and stop its aggression quieted down.

However, the above benefits that the US has achieved are only temporary, because the factors that threatened the US are still there: the bombing of North Vietnam and the aggression in South Vietnam are exacting a toll in US lives and property.  As time passes, the US’s true colors are being exposed by its stubbornness in Paris and its intensification of the war in Vietnam, and opposition to the Johnson Administration in the US and throughout the world is growing.

As for our side, through our overall diplomatic struggle and international activities and through the struggle waged by our delegation in Paris for the past three months, we have achieved the following results:

  • We have forced the US to enter into a “talking and fighting at the same time” situation.
  • We have been able to denounce the US in a systematic fashion for a relatively lengthy period of time about subjects that are the US’s greatest weaknesses and in an international forum that has a very powerful effect.  The primary subjects of our accusations have been: The US’s aggression in Vietnam and its sabotage of the 1954 Geneva Agreement; American bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the Saigon puppet government as a tool of American aggression; and that the US is guilty of war crimes.
  • We have been able to present and explain more clearly the basic positions of our Government and our people – our four-point position and the Political Program of the National Liberation Front.  We have highlighted the role of the National Liberation Front.  We have proclaimed the sacred right of our people to defend themselves.
  • We have probed the US’s plans regarding a political settlement for the Vietnam problem and the US’s ideas on specific subjects.
  • Generally speaking, we have basically achieved the goals set for us, which were:
  • To win public support and isolate the US to the maximum extent possible.

The struggle over the site of the talks ended in complete failure for the US, and its deceitful tricks were exposed for all to see.  The US was placed totally on the defensive when we proposed Paris, and they immediately entered into official talks with us.  After entering into the talks, the US has been forced to respond to our accusations and thereby further exposes its stubbornness and its warmongering nature.  As for our side, we are being applauded by international opinion because we have a just cause and because we are resolute but are demonstrating good will.  The movement opposing US aggression in Vietnam and supporting our people, which had temporarily fallen silent for a short period of time, has now again begun to expand and grow.

  • To make it difficult for the enemy to expand the bombing of North Vietnam (although we cannot totally exclude that possibility) or to further intensify the fighting in South Vietnam; in other words, to make the US hesitant.

At a time when the US is being forced to consider changing its policy in Vietnam and in the midst of the arguments and debates of the American presidential campaign, our offensive on the talks has caused additional pressure to prevent the US from intensifying and reinforcing the war – pressure from international public opinion and from the American people, pressure from the “dove” faction (during this period the “hawk” faction has remained virtually silent), from financial circles (who demand that international accounts be balanced in order to protect the dollar), from the industrialists (the steel capitalists have increased the price of steel), etc….

Even though the enemy has tried to probe us during the talks, he still has not been able to learn our military intentions.

  • To sow division in the ranks of the Americans and their lackeys.

To the American people, the fact that the US has “limited the bombing” and is now talking to us in Paris is a victory for the side of peace and a defeat for the side of the warmongers.  For that reason, this “talking and fighting at the same time” situation is intensifying the divisions within the American domestic political scene, the divisions between the US and their puppets, and the divisions between the US and its satellite nations.

  • To gain a relatively more detailed understanding of US plans and intentions.

Through both the public talks and the backstage [private] discussions in Paris, we have now a gained a clearer understanding of American intentions regarding a settlement of the Vietnam question in two phases; of the way to resolve the issue of the participation of the NLF and the puppet government in the talks; of the US desire for a simultaneous settlement of the problem of Laos; and of their intention to use economics in the future to dominate and control Southeast Asia.  We have also seen that the US does not dare to break off the meetings in Paris.  Naturally, these are the American concepts and plans at this time, and they could change in the future.

The situation over the past several months has shown us that our predictions of the future steps in the diplomatic struggle were fundamentally correct, and it has helped us to gain a clearer picture of the struggle process in Paris and to prepare better struggle plans for use in the future.

We can conclude that our decision to begin talks in Paris was correct and that the situation of “talking and fighting at the same time” is basically good for our side and bad for the Americans.

2.  According to the US ruling class, the interests of American imperialism are worldwide, and not just in Vietnam, even though at present Vietnam is their central problem.  Because they are tightly tied down by the problem of Vietnam, the US is very afraid that there will be a “second Vietnam,” and it is now confused and awkward in its handling of many other US problems in the international arena.  The Americans did not dare intervene more strongly in the Middle East after Israel’s war of aggression, or in Laos after their greatest defeat ever in Laos (the Nam Bac affair), and they backed down in a humiliating fashion in the Pueblo incident.  More recently, they were taken by surprise by the move of the Soviet Army and allied forces into Czechoslovakia and were openly unable to take any strong action in response to this move.  It is clear that in deciding how to solve the Vietnam problem the US must consider Vietnam’s effect on other international problems.

3.  A number of issues that need to be resolved properly

  • We have pushed the US into a situation of “talking and fighting at the same time” at a time when disagreements within the socialist camp and within the international communist and workers movement are becoming increasingly serious, especially following the recent problem in Czechoslovakia.  The big question for us is how to win the maximum material support (military and economic) and the political support of our fraternal socialist nations, and at the same time win powerful sympathy and support from Communist parties all over the world.
  • With respect to world public opinion, the “talking and fighting at the same time” situation carries with it a number of negative elements that could affect the world people’s movement supporting us.  Another major problem is how to stimulate and strengthen the world people’s movement supporting us and at the same time to crush all the deceitful arguments made by the American imperialists about the Vietnam problem.  We must pay special attention to the anti-war movement in the United States.
  • At present, we need to gain a firm understanding of the US’s strategic intentions and plans.  For that reason, our delegation in Paris must develop a plan to probe the enemy during the backstage [private] discussions in order to confirm whether or not the US truly wants to reach a political settlement for the Vietnam problem.
  • Gradually our struggle operations against the enemy must be regularized: Struggle in Paris, international propaganda activities, coordination between North and South Vietnam, and at the same time carrying out the work of studying and perfecting plans in preparation for future steps forward.  In particular, we need to improve coordination and support from the National Liberation Front and we need to study the possibility of increasing the external [foreign] activities of the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace forces of Vietnam.

Part Two

The Missions of the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities during the General Offensive and Uprisings Era, Securing a Decisive Victory, and Advancing to Gain Complete Victory

I.  The New Situation and New Missions on the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities Front

1.  Our revolutionary war has victoriously shifted into a new era, the era of the General Offensive and Uprisings.  Our greatest and most pressing mission is to mobilize the greatest possible efforts of our entire Party, our entire army, and our entire population in both North and South Vietnam and to exploit the tremendous and comprehensive victories that we have won since the beginning of the year in order to move our revolutionary war forward to win a decisive victory and then advance toward securing complete victory.

The enemy’s current posture is weakening on all fronts, and his will to commit aggression has been shaken. Our posture is continuous strategic attack on all fronts.  

The Politburo has concluded that the situation will develop along one of the following two possible scenarios:

  • The US will send in a limited number of military reinforcements, strive to consolidate and strengthen the puppet army, continue the current limited war strategy, hold onto strategic locations, and maintain their forces, and then from that foundation it will seek a settlement to get out of the war.  Depending on how the military situation develops, especially on whether or not our attacks are powerful enough, and on the political and economic situation in the United States, the US will either have to end the war in a relatively short period of time or else prolong the war within the confines of South Vietnam before finally admitting defeat.
  • The US will send in a large number of additional troops, will change its strategy, and will expand its limited war to encompass all of Vietnam [i.e., invade North Vietnam].

At this time the US is now in scenario one.  Scenario two is unlikely, but we must be vigilant and on guard.

However, for the immediate future, and from now until a new President takes office, it is most likely that the US will not escalate the war, although the Americans will step up their efforts to prevent the situation in South Vietnam from worsening for them.  That is the substance of the military strategy of “clear and hold.”

2.  In our view, within the framework of their worldwide strategy the American imperialists have three objectives in their plot to occupy South Vietnam:

  • To turn South Vietnam into an American neocolonialist possession;
  • To oppose the national liberation movement;
  • To prevent socialism from successfully spreading throughout Southeast Asia.

The primary and the highest measure used by the American imperialists to carry out their plans of aggression is the use of military force.  Even though they have suffered extremely heavy defeats in both halves of our nation [North and South Vietnam], they still have tremendous economic and military resources, so we cannot exclude the possibility that they might rashly take the course of intensifying and expanding the war in order to resolve the Vietnam problem. However, we believe that at present this possibility is unlikely.

However, in the current situation of military stalemate, for the sake of their interests in South Vietnam and their interests throughout the rest of the world, the Americans are now being forced to consider a political settlement in order to hang on to South Vietnam and to continue to carry out their plan of aggression under another form.  If there is a government “in which neither side has the advantage” in South Vietnam ([US delegate Cyrus] Vance disclosed to our comrades in Paris the American desire to have a government equally divided between the puppets and the National Liberation Front), the US, backed by the continued presence of US military forces in Vietnam, will use “economic assistance” and international inspection to control the government.  At the same time, it will seek to sow divisions among ethnic groups and religions and use reactionary parties to implement “peaceful evolution” and to eventually overthrow that government, perhaps even by a coup.  That is the type of “honorable peace settlement” that the Americans usually talk about.  It is in fact the slogan of: “gain an initial success in order to work toward a complete victory” [un success initial pour arrivor ra une victoire eventuelle].

Why must the United States choose a political settlement for the Vietnam problem?

First, the US might be defeated on the battlefield.  Many American politicians have realized that “there is no possibility of ending the war with a military victory.”  Johnson, and even pro-victory elements like Nixon, now realize that they must seek “a peace with honor.”  The American will to commit aggression in our country through military means is becoming increasingly shaky, and in the end it will be defeated.

Second, Vietnam is the key to the solution of all the US’s current problems.  The scale of their war of aggression in Vietnam has exceeded the expectations of the American ruling class in terms of its duration, its cost, and the number of troops committed there.  For that reason it has had a serious and profound effect on all aspects of the US’s domestic and international situation.  The American people realize that only by resolving the problem of Vietnam will they be able to resolve the other problems confronting the United States.  The American leadership realizes that it must choose between Vietnam and the US’s other problems.  Vietnam has become the Number One issue in this year’s presidential election in the United States.

Third, the US’s worldwide strategy is much more important than the Vietnam problem.

The United States plans to rule the world through the use of dollars, aid, and absolute superiority in modern weaponry.  However, because of the current war in Vietnam the dollar is in crisis and is no longer the currency that symbolizes the capitalist world.  US aid to foreign countries has fallen from the previous level of 3-4 billion dollars a year to only 1.9 billion dollars a year.  In 1965 funding for modern weapons made up 70 percent of the US defense budget, but now it composes only 53 percent of the budget, while the other 37 percent goes for conventional weapons [ares, conventionnelles].  From the standpoint of the entire globe, Western and Eastern Europe are still vital locations for the United States.  If the US stubbornly continues its military aggression in Vietnam, it will not be strong enough to deal with America’s other important problems in other locations.  The American leadership must choose between their worldwide strategy and Vietnam.

Fourth, the US believes that it could save American interests in South Vietnam if there was a solution in which, according to the US’s calculations, “neither side holds the advantage.”

The US has had a great deal of experience in overthrowing governments, peaceful evolution, and organizing coups.  To give only one recent example, we saw the Americans sabotage the tripartite national coalition government in Laos and install in its place a government that also wore the robes of “peaceful neutrality” in order to carry out an American plan of intervention and aggression in Laos.  The very bad trend of developments in Czechoslovakia is a classic example of the US peaceful evolution scheme.  The internal situation of a number of other socialist countries and communist parties has increased the US leadership’s belief in something John Kennedy once said: “The communist world is no longer a unified bloc, and the iron curtain is no longer an impenetrable barrier.”

In their calculations, the American imperialists would like to have a government similar to the coalition government of Laos in 1962, because they think that they would control that government and would even be able to recapture South Vietnam through the use of economic and political schemes.

Fifth, our stratagem is correct.

As far back as 1960 we put forward a stratagem with a tactical slogan: a peaceful, neutral South Vietnam.  For the long term, we envisage a peaceful, neutral South Vietnam as part of a peaceful, neutral Indochina (in accordance with the military provisions of the 1954 and the 1962 Geneva Agreements) and advancing toward a peaceful, neutral Southeast Asia.

To reach a concrete settlement, with a correct stratagem we should and we can make the US:

  • Harbor the illusion that it can still retain at least a portion of its interests in South Vietnam;
  • Believe that it can withdraw from South Vietnam without “losing face”;
  • Believe that it can withdraw from South Vietnam without worrying about creating a domino effect in other places, and most immediately in Southeast Asia.

3.  Up to this point, Johnson has not expanded the bombing back north of the 20 Parallel, but he has also not yet abandoned his irrational demand that we “restrict our actions.”   In our probes and feelers in Paris, the US still demands that we reduce our aid to South Vietnam, that we reduce our military activities in South Vietnam, and it demands that we allow the Saigon puppet government to participate in the talks before it will agree to end the bombing of North Vietnam.  Our immediate prospects for ending the bombing of North Vietnam are slim.  However, because of the failure in South Vietnam, because of the problems that the US is facing, because of the pressure of public opinion, and because he must ensure that the Democratic Party defeats the Republican Party in the upcoming elections, it is possible that at some point Johnson will consider either ending the bombing of North Vietnam or at least of deescalating the bombing another notch, moving it south one more parallel of longitude, for example.

In the event the US decides to end the bombing of North Vietnam or to impose additional restraints on the bombing, the American scheme will be:

  • To demand that we shift the Paris talks into Phase 2, and the content of Phase 2 will be a conference between the two sides engaged in the fighting, a demand for a ceasefire in South Vietnam, and a “total package” solution of the entire Vietnam problem.
  • To continue to demand that we must take some action in response to the American de-escalation, and they might even blatantly announce that they reserve the right to resume the bombing if we do not reciprocate.
  • To concentrate all their air and naval forces that had previously been used to bomb and shell North Vietnam to increase the bombing in South Vietnam and to continue to block the flow of our support to South Vietnam while still appearing to have “shown unilateral good faith by de-escalating the war another notch.”

An American cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam will be a strategic defeat for them because it will show that their war of destruction against North Vietnam has been totally bankrupted.  This will be a strategic victory for the people of our entire nation, North and South, and a common victory for all the socialist countries and for the World People’s Front supporting Vietnam and opposing American aggression.

If the US ends the bombing of North Vietnam, on the one hand we will have to strive to accomplish our military and political plans on the battlefield while on the other we will have to shift the talks in Paris to discussions of “other problems involving the two sides.”  The war will be concentrated in South Vietnam, while the diplomatic struggle will concentrate on resolving the problem of South Vietnam and reaching a “package” settlement for the overall Vietnam problem.

Our struggle against the enemy will involve very tense and difficult arguments over two major issues:  the withdrawal of US troops and the question of a coalition government.  The talks in Paris will have to be prolonged in order to support our actions on the battlefield.

This scenario will demand that we must maintain excellent coordination between the military and the political struggles inside our country and the diplomatic struggle abroad.  We will have to skillfully coordinate the activities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with the activities of the National Liberation Front and the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces in Vietnam.

  • In Paris, we will conduct the public struggle while at the same time actively probing and feeling out the US to make the US hesitant in its military actions and plans.  We will gain the sympathy of the peace-loving governments and peoples of the world for the battle being fought by our people and secure their support for the demands of the National Liberation Front, which are that the US must withdraw all US and satellite troops from South Vietnam and that the US must talk to the NLF.
  • In South Vietnam, in parallel with intensifying combat operations and the political struggle in general, we will incite a powerful mass movement in the cities to demand that the government be reorganized and that a coalition government be formed that truly represents the South Vietnamese people.
  • We will increase our international propaganda activities to gain widespread sympathy in these new conditions and, using that as a foundation, work to secure greater political and material support.

From the foreign relations standpoint, the American cessation of the bombing could also give rise to a number of negative factors.  Generally speaking, the people of the world continue to support us, but at some level, and at some point in time, some of them may develop mistaken illusions about the United States, and that would affect the Front struggling against American aggression in Vietnam.

4.  The new situation demands that the diplomatic struggle and our international activities be more closely integrated and coordinated with the military struggle and the political struggle on the battlefield in order to provide active, positive support to our goal of gaining a decisive victory and advancing forward to bring the war to a victorious conclusion.  At present, we must concentrate our efforts on supporting the task of winning a decisive victory.  Meanwhile, if the US wants to settle the Vietnam problem on terms that are consistent with our position before we win a decisive victory, we will not fail to grasp such an opportunity.  Consistent with our position means that we could give the Americans a settlement with honor with the following conditions: The US must withdraw all American and satellite troops within a specified period of time; we will control the rural countryside, we will control the grass-roots organizations, and we will maintain our political forces and our armed forces; a broad-based coalition government will be formed in which the National Liberation Front and other patriotic forces will participate, and it could even include a number of people who are part of the current pro-American government.

In the diplomatic struggle, we must take maximum advantage of the forum provided by the talks in Paris to further confuse and isolate the enemy in the eyes of the public, especially during the final months of the US Presidential campaign.  We must use that forum to deceive the enemy and make him complacent while at the same time opening the door to allow the enemy to reach an “honorable settlement.”

We need to increase our international activities to win greater international sympathy and support from, first of all, the fraternal socialist nations, from nationalist countries, and especially actively nationalist countries, and from peace-loving people throughout the world.  Our goals are to persuade the fraternal socialist nations and the world people’s front to give us stronger support and assistance and to focus pressure on the US to force it to unconditionally and permanently end the bombing of North Vietnam, to end its aggression in South Vietnam, to withdraw American and satellite troops from South Vietnam, and to recognize and talk to the National Liberation Front.  If the US should stop the bombing of North Vietnam, we must make sure to devote attention to overcoming the negative factors this could create within our own camp, within the world movement, and within the movement inside the United States.

II.  A Number of Issues Regarding the Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities Aimed at Supporting our Effort to Win a Decisive Victory

1.  Exploit our victory, coordinate more closely and more intimately with the military and political struggles on the battlefield, and actively support the effort to win a decisive victory

We need to exploit and proclaim our great and comprehensive victory more powerfully and more widely around the world and inside the United States.

At this time, in parallel with continuing to demand that the US end the bombing of North Vietnam, we need to direct public attention to the following demands:

  • That the US must withdraw US and satellite military personnel from South Vietnam.
  • That the US must recognize and talk to the National Liberation Front.

To parallel our waves of military operations, we will work out a plan for a diplomatic offensive aimed at winning over world public opinion to oppose every American trick designed to obstruct and limit our military operations.

We must exploit the tremendous power of our forum in Paris and we must prolong the talks in order to create favorable conditions to help us win a decisive victory.

We must actively work to cause splits in the US leadership, we must exploit the US Presidential election to the maximum, and we must also help to cause the puppets to disintegrate, to deepen the contradictions between the US and the puppets, and to encourage the growth and development of the urban movement in South Vietnam.

Particular close attention must be devoted to winning the support of the socialist countries.  With respect to the Soviet Union and China, we must pay attention to new complications in their relationships with us when we intensify our “fighting and talking at the same time” effort to a new level.  We will continue to ask the Soviet Union to coordinate with us to put stronger pressure on the United States.

In our efforts to win over neutral countries, we must pay special attention to Cambodia and France in order to exploit and build on the positive aspects of our relationship with them while at the same time limiting the effects of negative aspects that may grow stronger.

We need to further intensify the struggle movement of the American people.

2.  We will have no illusions, but we will not miss the opportunity if the US wants to resolve the Vietnam problem in a manner consistent with our position.

In parallel with the battles on the military and political fronts, we must conduct difficult, intense, and complicated probes, feelers, and bargaining in the backstage [private] contacts if we want to reach an agreement about a political solution at the official conference talks.

At this time, before we have won a decisive victory, it is very unlikely that the US will want to resolve the Vietnam problem on terms consistent with our position.  However, if the US agrees to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, the possibility of such a settlement will increase.

In Paris, we must make the US clearly see our resolve, but at the same time we must be ready to give the US an honorable settlement if the US agrees to end its aggression and withdraw all American and satellite troops from South Vietnam.  In parallel with our struggle in the public forum, we need to intensify our probes and feelers to gain a clear understanding of American thinking about each specific element of a political settlement.

We must be extremely vigilant, because the US also wants to probe us to learn our intentions, and it might exploit the feelers conducted backstage [the private contacts] to create mistaken illusions and to sow suspicion.  We must deceive the enemy, but we should also let them see the possibility of reaching an honorable settlement.

No matter what scenario should develop, the backstage [private] feelers and bargaining must be tightly linked with the situation and the operations on the battlefield.

3.  If the US halts the bombing of North Vietnam

We will need to exploit this new victory won by our people, proclaim our continued resolve, and expose the fact that the Americans are still being stubborn and devious.  Depending on the concrete situation at the time, we will present appropriate demands regarding our insistence that the US permanently and unconditionally end all other acts of war throughout the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  We will intensify the political struggle on the primary slogans [demands]: that the US withdraw all American and satellite troops from South Vietnam and that the US recognize and talk to the National Liberation Front.  We will continue to reject American demands for “reciprocation” from our side.

North Vietnam and the NLF will issue statements that clearly express the above concepts, and these statements will serve as program statements that will guide our entire struggle in the international arena after the US ends the bombing of North Vietnam. Depending on the situation at the time, we might consider having the NLF publicly announce its position on a political settlement for South Vietnam and consider when the Front should announce its attitude regarding talks with the US

The talks in Paris will shift to other subject involving the two sides.  There will be three types of subjects:

  • Completely and permanently ending all US acts of war against North Vietnam and repairing the damage caused by the US war of destruction [the bombing of North Vietnam].
  • Problems related to a political solution for the Vietnam problem based on the 1954 Geneva Convention, such as that the US must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, that it must respect the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people, and that it must recognize the National Liberation Front.  As for other matters, such as reducing military activities and establishing a cease-fire in South Vietnam, we will insist that the US must talk to the NLF about those subjects.
  • Matters related to a broad international conference aimed at resolving the Vietnam problem.  These matters will primarily involve the issue of who will attend the conference.

In the backstage [private] contacts, we will intensify our feelers and bargaining with the US about a solution for the Vietnam problem.

4.  Intensify the external [foreign] activities of the National Liberation Front and study increasing the activities of the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces of Vietnam.

The NLF must increase its external activities in order to emphasize and elevate its role.  It must demand a voice on the major questions, reduce the prestige and standing of the puppet government, and reject the right of the puppet government to represent South Vietnam.  When the US ends the bombing of North Vietnam, the war will be concentrated in South Vietnam.  At that time, among the various subjects for discussion between our side and the US there will be general [common] subjects and there will be South Vietnamese subjects.  The NLF will have to have a voice on all of those subjects, which means that the NLF will have to intensify its external activities even more.

  • The Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces of Vietnam should increase its activities in order to stimulate the struggle movement in the cities, including the movement demanding a reorganization of the puppet government.  It should raise the issue of holding a conference between all the political forces in South Vietnam in order to form a national coalition government.  It should hold discussions with the NLF and with other organizations, discussions in the form of two-party or multi-party conferences.

5.  Strengthen the leadership of the diplomatic struggle and international activities Front and carry out all preparatory operations properly

Our struggle on the diplomatic and international activities front will be extremely complex.  The enemy’s forces have tremendous military and economic resources, and they have tremendous capabilities and extensive experience in the diplomatic arena.  Our use of our diplomatic stratagem must be handled extremely delicately and meticulously, because the subject itself is very complicated and because the situation inside our [socialist] camp and the overall international situation are also very complicated.  Because of that, it is extremely vital that we strengthen the party’s leadership of the diplomatic struggle and international activities front.  The Party must guide and direct the face-to-face battle in Paris, it must direct the international propaganda campaign, it must direct the coordination between North and South Vietnam, and it must direct study and research operations.

In addition, with the military, political, and diplomatic battles between our side and the enemy developing and expanding as they are at present, we must constantly be ready to respond to every change and every development.  For that reason, from this moment on we must conduct studies of specific, concrete plans to prepare for a comprehensive political situation.  At the same time we must make organizational preparations and prepare personnel for the struggle delegations of North and South Vietnam [the North Vietnamese and NLF delegations to the formal peace talks].

*    *    *

Our diplomatic struggle and our international activities during the era of the General Offensive and uprisings will face a difficult and complicated battle.  The talks in Paris will have to be prolonged, we must coordinate our public struggle with our backstage [private] probes and feelers, and at times the situation may become very tense.  With respect to the battlefield situation, we must provide good support to our military and political plans aimed at winning a decisive victory, and we will have to coordinate closely with the mass movement in the cities demanding the reorganization of the government, demanding that the enemy talk to the National Liberation Front, and demanding the formation of a truly representative national coalition government.  With respect to the United States, we must clearly demonstrate our resolve to the Americans while at the same time letting them see that there are prospects for an “honorable settlement,” and we must induce additional splits and contradictions within their ranks.  With regard to the socialist countries and the peoples of the world, we must win greater political support and material assistance no matter how the situation might develop.

CONCLUSION

We are living in very seething and exciting times.  We are a small nation living on a small piece of land, but we have dared to fight against the United States, the leading imperialist power, and we have won one victory after another.  Since the Tet Lunar New Year, the magnificent attacks and the universal uprisings of the soldiers and civilians of Heroic South Vietnam have brought added glory to our race and our Fatherland.

We have won victory on the military struggle and political struggle fronts.  On the diplomatic struggle and international activities front we will also win victory because:

  • Our Party’s policies of fighting the Americans to save the nation and of maintaining international solidarity are correct.
  • The military and political victories we have won since the beginning of the General Offensive and simultaneous uprisings have shaken the United States and have stunned the entire world.
  • The diplomatic struggle and international activities operations of both North and South Vietnam have strongly promoted and exploited the tremendous victories of this new era, quickly and continuously attacking the enemy on the diplomatic front, striking precisely at the enemy’s weakest points, pushing the enemy’s back to the wall and forcing him to accept the situation of “fighting and talking at the same time,” a situation that he previously had greatly feared.

The soldiers and civilians of our entire nation are building on our posture of victory and strength, resolved to overcome every hardship and sacrifice to score a decisive victory and advance toward securing complete victory for our people’s cause of fighting the Americans to save the nation and to contribute to the preservation of peace in Asia and throughout the world.

In the general tide of enthusiasm, our diplomatic struggle and international activities front must strive to support our effort to score a decisive defeat, exploiting its positive, aggressive role to help to achieve victory, while simultaneously working for both our immediate and our future needs.  It must prepare the way for North Vietnam while simultaneously preparing the way for our entire nation.

Our responsibilities are heavy, the problems are complex, and the situation is complicated.  However, we have faith that, under the enlightened leadership of the Party Central Committee and of our beloved Uncle Ho, the diplomatic struggle and international activities front will certainly make a worthy contribution to the glorious victory of our nation and of our Party.