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Digital Archive International History Declassified

April 11, 1973

TELEGRAM FROM PYONGYANG, NO.061.119, URGENT, SECRET

This document was made possible with support from the ROK Ministry of Unification, Leon Levy Foundation

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    Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.
    "Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET," April 11, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114047
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To the First Direction, Relations

After a conversation Aurelian Lazar had with the Soviet counselor I. Fadeev, we noted the following matters:

  1. Soviet diplomats in Pyongyang concluded that certain shifts had occurred with respect to Korea’s unification in the position of the DPRK, which was slowly renouncing the path of ample and direct contacts with Seoul, maintaining only a form of dialogue that did not have any practical results, between the South-North Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross delegations. I. Fadeev said that the DPRK was counting on an increase in external support for its position, which it has increasingly received lately; on the increasingly pronounced isolation of South Korea; and on the aggravation of internal contradiction in Seoul. He said that in the given circumstances, the South Korean authorities would take countermeasures meant to grant them support from the outside and to avoid the aggravation of internal difficulties.
  1. As for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, I. Fadeev said that this was a long-term process, and that the DPRK, while initially very optimistic with respect to the support the People’s Republic of China had promised it, now started manifesting certain fears and suspicions towards the honesty with which Beijing acted to determine the Americans to pull out of South Korea and to renounce using the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea. He backed up his position by pointing out that Heo Dam [Ho Tam], the DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his recent conversations with A. Gromyko at the end of March, had hinted at a statement [Chinese] Premier Zhou Enlai made in front of some Japanese parliamentarians, according to which the People’s Republic of China was not yet interested in the withdrawal of American troops from Asia.

From all the matters mentioned above, we gathered that the Soviet diplomats in Pyongyang take note and amplify all the aspects which reveal the suspicion or the lack of trust of the DPRK towards the sincerity and the good intentions of the People’s Republic of China.

  1. With respect to the University Olympics to be held in Moscow in August [1973], the DPRK representatives asked the Soviets not to allow the South Korean team to take part in the games. Given that the University Olympics are organized by an international forum, with the USSR being just the host of these games, the Soviets foresee certain obstacles in precluding the South Koreans from participating. However, the Soviets will do their best not to allow the South Koreans to enter the USSR. For the time being, the Soviets asked the DPRK to consider the possibility of forming a joint team made up of North and South Koreans with a view to taking part in the games. As I. Fadeev put it, although the Soviets received no answer to their proposal, it seems that the DPRK does not like it.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

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수신: 제1관계국

Aurelian Lazăr 와 I. Fadeev 소련 참사관의 대화 후, 우리는 다음의 문제들에 주목하였다:

1. 평양의 소련 외교관은 한국의 통일문제에 대해 서울과 다수의 직접적 접촉 방안을 점차 포기해오던 조선민주주의인민공화국의 입장에 일부 변화가 일어나 남북조절위원회와 적십자 대표단에서 실질적 결과가 없는 형식적인 대화만을 유지하고 있다고 결론지었다. I. Fadeev는 조선민주주의인민공화국이 최근 눈에 띄게 증가한 것과 같이, 그들의 입장에 대외적 지지와 눈에 띄게 공개적인 남한의 고립, 서울의 내부갈등 고조에 대해 신뢰하고 있다고 말했다. 그는 현재 상황에서 남측 관료들은 내부의 어려움을 악화시키지 않기 위해 대외적으로 지원을 구하는 방안을 취할 수 밖에 없다고 말했다.

2. 남조선에서 미군 철수에 관해, I. Fadeev는 이것이 장기적인 절차이며 중화인민공화국의 약속에 따라 매우 긍정적인 시각을 가지고 있던 조선민주주의인민공화국이 이제 미국의 남조선 철수를 유도하고 유엔통일부흥위원회의 이용을 막겠다는 북경 관료들의 진실성에 대해 의구심과 두려움을 가지고 있다고 이야기했다. 그는 조선민주주의인민공화국 외무상 허담이 3월 말 A. Gromyko와의 대화에서 [중국] 수상 저우언라이가 일본 의회 앞에서 중화인민공화국은 아시아에서 미군의 퇴각에 아직 관심이 없다고 한 발언에 대해 이야기 했다는 것을 지적하며 자신의 의견을 뒷받침하였다.

위에서 말한 모든 내용을 통해 우리는 평양주재 소련 외교관이 중화인민공화국의 선의와 진심에 대해 조선민주주의인민공화국은 신뢰가 없고 의심을 하고 있다는 사실에 주목하고 있다는 것을 알았다.

3. 1973년 9월 모스크바에서 열릴 유니버시아드에 대하여 조선민주주의인민공화국 대표단은 소련에게 남한 대표의 불참을 요구하였다. 유니버시아드가 국제 포럼을 통해 구성된 것이며, 소비에트연방은 단지 이 행사의 주최국이기 때문에 남조선의 참가 저지에는 장애가 있을 것으로 예상된다. 그러나 소련은 남조선이 소비에트연방국에 입국하는 것을 최대한 저지할 것이다. 현재 상황에서 소련은 조선민주주의인민공화국에 북과 남을 통합한 단일선수단을 구성하여 행사에 참가하는 방안을 고려하라고 요구하고 있다. I. Fadeev의 표현에 따르면 아직 이 제안에 답을 받지는 못했지만 조선민주주의인민공화국이 이를 달가워하지 않는 것 같다고 한다.

서명: Dumitru Popa