TELEGRAM FROM PYONGYANG TO BUCHAREST, SECRET, REGULAR, NO. 061.497
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get citationFollowing the end of the inter-Korean dialogue, Zhivkov observes increased antagonism in the rhetoric of the North Koreans regarding unification paralleling the increasing tension between the two Koreas."Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497," November 03, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1973. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114076
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To: Comrade Director Ion Ciubotaru
Following the latest international events and the [evolution of the] situation in South Korea, we noticed that there were new noteworthy elements in the attitude of the DPRK concerning the unification of the country, such as:
Thus we noticed that the frequent references to the “peaceful and independent unification” started to be replaced, depending on the circumstances, with expressions like “the independent unification of the country” or purely with “the unification of the country,” which in the current circumstances, seem to have a totally different connotation.
Also, we noticed that internally, in closed-doors meetings, in political education [classes], etc. ideas used in previous years spring up, such as “driving the Americans out of the South of the country and achieving the unification [of the homeland],” “let us achieve the unification during the lifetime of the current generation,” “[let us consolidate the defenses of the country at the same pace with the development of the national economy,” etc. These ideas are increasingly used, especially after the recent meeting of the superior party leadership with the military cadres and the political commanders (20,000 people) in the armed forces.
Generally, there is a noticeable state of tension and antagonism. After interrupting the dialogue with the South, both parties, but especially the North, vehemently attacks South Korea, which basically leads to the state of tension preceding the signing of the Joint Communiqué from 4 July 1972.
According to press reports and radio broadcasts, party and community organizations, all the cadres in all the units discuss the speech of Comrade Kim Il Sung at the rally in Pyongyang organized on the occasion of Todor Zhivkov’s visit to the DPRK. These press reports and broadcasts contain strong ideas that peace in the Korean peninsula is endangered, that the peace announced by the American imperialists and the South Korean puppets is nothing else but a façade behind which the enemies of the Korean people are preparing a new war against the North, that peace must be conquered and defended with weapons, etc.
In a recent discussion between the Romanian Ambassador and the Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Heo Dam [Ho Tam], the latter expressed his skepticism regarding the capability of the United Nations Organization to bring something new [to the table] to solve the Korean problem, showing that history demonstrated that plenty of the resolutions and decisions of this organization were ignored.
Regarding the situation described above, at their turn, the South Korean authorities are manifesting a lot of concern regarding the “warmongering agitation and the provocations of the North,” regarding the frequent infiltrations in the South of some elements that prepared and supported the recent student movements in Seoul.
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: Ion Ciubotaru
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