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Digital Archive International History Declassified

January 01, 1962

CABLE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN INDIA, 'OVERVIEW OF INDIA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1961'

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    The Chinese Embassy in India reported on Indian foreign relations for the year 1961. In the report, the following issues are mentioned: Indian dependence on the United States, capitalism, opposition to China and communism, imperialism, and Indian-Pakisti relations.
    "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in India, 'Overview of India’s Foreign Relations in 1961'," January 01, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 105-01519-01. Translated by Anna Beth Keim. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116482
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Overview of India’s Foreign Relations in 1961

There have been extremely clear revelations of the growing rightist and reactionary tendency of India’s ruling circle in India’s foreign relations over the past year.  Indian monopoly capitalists’ dependence on American monopoly capitalists [trans. note—i.e., capitalism] grows deeper by the day, and American aid has become the lifeblood with which they maintain reactionary rule.  Indian monopoly capitalists’ fear and hatred of Communism (especially China’s influence) and of Asian and African national independence movements is growing as the situation of the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind [trans. note—this refers to socialism’s anticipated global triumph over imperialism] develops; [India’s] demands for foreign expansion are also growing as its economic power increases and the domestic market shrinks.  After taking office this year, Kennedy increased the wager on India’s monopoly capitalists. For these reasons, India is a willing tool of the American imperialists [trans. note—i.e., imperialism] in politics.

Opposition to China and Communism, dependence on America, and foreign expansion are the Indian ruling circle’s long-term guiding principles for foreign policy; a focal point of these guiding principles is long-term hostility toward China.  Nehru also makes no attempt to conceal the importance and long-term nature of opposition to China.  He said in Parliament that China and India are hostile [to each other], that these kinds of clashes will continue for a generation or more, and that with the exception of the world breaking out in and being destroyed by war, nothing is more important than the Sino-Indian dispute.  Compared to the past, India’s opposition to China is more comprehensive and thorough; [its] tactics are baser, its attitude more rude and unreasonable.  All important diplomatic activities are viewed from the angle of opposition to China.  It seeks to use opposition to China to block Communism’s influence and weaken anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles; to use opposition to China to ingratiate itself with America, and at the same time win the favor of the world’s revisionists, in order to gain all kinds of foreign aid and various kinds of support for its expansionist ambitions.  The anti-China wave that India started following the Soviet Communist Party’s 22nd Congress and Nehru’s visit to the United States is a main component of the international anti-China chorus.

The scope of India’s work for the American imperialists expanded in 1961 to include nearly all major international issues.  Nehru actively publicized the Kennedy policy’s “new direction” in order to deceive and confuse the world’s people, and at the same time served as a tool for Kennedy’s two-handed policy [trans. note—or dual track policy] of “false peace, real preparation for war” and new colonialist policies; especially on the issues of Laos, the Congo, etc., [he] plays an irreplaceable role.  The increasing closeness of the Indo-American relationship has sparked a series of new problems in India’s foreign relations.  Due mainly to the fact that India was “first into the breach” (Nehru’s words) in the Congo as a hatchet man for America’s new colonialism, Indo-British disagreements have obviously intensified.  And because America has taken a policy of preferring India to Pakistan, India sometimes uses America to pressure Pakistan.  The Indo-Pakistani relationship, which improved for a time in 1960, began to deteriorate again in 1961.

India is more brazenly wooing and influencing the Soviet Union and dividing the socialist camp; this kind of tactic both serves the needs of international anti-Communism and is intended to isolate and attack China.  The Soviet Union also has its own requirements for India, using India to support Soviet-American talks, disarmament and to pressure China.  The two countries’ political and economic relations have both grown closer.

India employs all kinds of shameless tactics to sabotage anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggles, and there have also been new developments in its tendency toward foreign expansion; it especially seeks to use the approach of depending on America and expanding in Asia and Africa, to get a share of the spoils [trans. note—literally, “leftover soup and rice”]. All this has made India ever more isolated and infamous in Asian and African regions.  The continuous success of China’s policy of peace and good-neighborliness, and of isolating and exposing India, has deepened India’s isolation.  In order to change this situation, and gain [political] capital in the election, Nehru sent troops to reclaim Goa at the end of 1961.  But this was clearly only an expedient measure; India has not at all changed its basic policy of opposing China, opposing Communism, depending on America, and foreign expansion.

Several main aspects and issues of India’s foreign relations in 1961 are summarized as follows:

India’s economic and political dependence on America clearly deepened, and there have been corresponding new developments in America’s economic infiltration and political use of India.

The comprador [trans. note—originally a reference to Chinese businessmen who acted as the middlemen in trade between China and Western powers from 1800 to 1910] nature of India’s monopoly capitalist class has clearly been enhanced, and [they] have become tightly wedded to foreign monopoly capitalists in such areas as capital, technology, markets, equipment updates and even raw materials; in the past few years [they] have very obviously taken the road of pursuing development through dependence on America, seeking with unbridled ambition to use America to build India into the economic center of Asia and Africa.  American private investment in India has grown rapidly in 1961, and is estimated to reach 1.1 billion rupees by the end of the year — ten times more than in 1948, when it was 111.7 million rupees.  More noteworthy is the trend of rapid growth in Indian-foreign joint venture companies; over the past five years, more than 1,000 have been newly approved by the government and established.  This type of company is usually controlled by foreign capitalists; this is the most conspicuous manifestation of Indian monopoly capitalists becoming more compradorist.  According to statistics, among the enterprises owned by the five major financial groups Hua-la-chang-de, Ma-fa-de-la, Ta-ta, Ma-heng-de-la and Birla [trans. note—names are Romanized from the Chinese], foreign joint venture enterprise assets comprise an already astounding proportion of the financial groups’ total assets; those [with the highest proportion], like Hualachangde, reach 75 percent.  America is particularly active in the area of joint ventures.  Eighty of the 405 joint ventures approved by the Indian government in 1961 were American joint ventures.  Apart from the issue of capital, Indian monopoly capitalists seek to master modern industrial technology through Indo-American joint venture companies, and even use the international marketing systems of major American companies in joint ventures with India to expand India’s foreign markets.  In the last few years, the Indian government has not even been making a pretense anymore about absorbing foreign capital but instead broadly solicits it, throwing the door open wide, not hesitating to betray the interests of the people even more, and “creating an excellent climate” for foreign investment by, for example, establishing investment centers to attract foreign capital, reducing dividend taxes and royalty taxes for foreign companies, allowing foreign investment in heavy industry sectors like iron, steel and electric power generation, and further relaxing the rule that the Indian investor must own a majority of joint ventures’ stocks.  In October 1961, more than 50 American industrialists and bankers representing 35 major companies came to consult with the Indians, and make preparations for a large-scale invasion of American investors.

In order to pursue development and deceive the people so it can maintain its reactionary rule, India’s ruling circle, under the circumstances of increasingly serious difficulties in the Indian economy and depleted foreign exchange reserves, has put forward a relatively enormous third five-year plan.  Of the 26 billion rupees needed in foreign aid, [they] are looking to America for a very large portion.  To this end, Nehru once wrote a letter to Kennedy begging for aid.  According to what Indian newspapers have disclosed, India must basically depend on regular allocations from foreign countries for its day-to-day foreign currency needs.  American grain and cotton have also become necessary elements of the economy.  It is thus evident that India is on its last legs [trans. note—literally, “at the end of the road as daylight fades”] and is already dependent on America to live.  And America, in order to further control India economically and politically, stated with a deliberate show of generosity that it would give an enormous amount of aid to India, and in an effective manner.  America announced that from January to May, 1961, it gave India approximately $127.9 million U.S.D. (505.4 million rupees) in aid. In early June, America and the international financial institutions it controls announced loans to India of $1.045 billion U.S.D. and $400 million U.S.D. (a total of 6.8638 billion rupees) for the first two years of the third five-year plan.  In all, a total of $1.57 billion (7.37 billion rupees) in aid was promised over the whole year.

India and America maintain close cooperation on international issues.  After Kennedy took office, [Dean] Rusk, [Lyndon] Johnson, [W. Averell] Harriman and [Chester] Bowles came successively to India for talks with Nehru; of these, Harriman has come here four times.  In early November, Nehru visited America himself.  India conforms to the needs of American imperialism on almost all international issues.  The most conspicuous example of this is India serving America’s policy of gobbling up the Congo, sending 6,000 various types of armed forces and planes, and not hesitating to let Indian soldiers die unjust deaths in Katanga, or to have open clashes with England. India has also got the fresh blood of [Patrice] Lumumba on its hands.  When the American imperialists’ armed invasion of Cuba met with universal condemnation, Nehru alone maintained a shameful silence; [he] only made a few vague complaints about America after the fact, then immediately corrected himself and said India cannot judge “who’s right and who’s wrong,” and Kennedy’s promise not to interfere in Cuba should be trusted.  On the issue of Laos, India displays a certain dual character, but basically still uses its status as chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control to serve the American imperialists; [it] actively offers America suggestions and advice, and urges America to buy off Phouma and other nationalist elements.  India used that same status in South Vietnam to provide cover for the American imperialists conducting armed interference.  Concerning the issue of West Berlin, India at first played a double game; at the same time that it attacked the Soviet Union, it also said that Western [nations] going in and out of West Berlin was not a right but a concession on the part of the Soviet Union  — but when called to account by American ambassador to India [John Kenneth] Galbraith, actually cowered submissively [trans. note—literally, “lowered his head and flattened his ears” (describing a dog when it sees its master)] and allowed the American ambassador to state on his [trans. note—most likely Nehru] behalf: Western [nations’] right to enter Berlin should be preserved.  Later on, the communiqué issued jointly by Nehru and Kennedy stated that the two sides agreed on the “legal and necessary right” to enter Berlin.  As to the issues of disarmament and prohibiting nuclear testing, India not only fell back from its original stance, but also sought to use these issues to weaken international anti-imperialist anti-colonialist struggles.  When the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing, it used repeated criticism of the Soviet Union to convey its loyalty to America, and [this] finally developed into attacking the Soviet Union for pursuing colonialism in Eastern Europe.

Another new development in Indo-American relations is that the two countries have already established some preliminary military contacts.  Indo-American cooperation on a communications satellite is in fact India providing America with a military observation stronghold and military intelligence.  It is rumored that India purchased new types of weapons (including air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles) from America, and America also plans to directly assist India in establishing small factories to manufacture military materials for export to Southeast Asia.  It is also said that India sent observers when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization held military exercises; if this is true, the situation is even more serious.

There has also been a slight change from the past in Kennedy’s specific approach to India.  Earlier on [he] did his utmost to woo [India], and put somewhat less pressure on it.  In recent months, despite continuing to woo, and to flatter Nehru (for example, Kennedy mentioned him together with Roosevelt and Lincoln), [the American approach] appears not so respectful; [it] demands much of India, and sometimes behaves like its master.  It seems that America sees through to India’s weakness of already-profound dependence on America, and now more often uses the tactic of pressure to get India to submit.  For example, [when] India did its utmost to serve America at the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State, America still expressed dissatisfaction; America has also strongly criticized India’s attitude toward the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and other issues.  To coordinate with the struggle of extreme rightists within and outside of the National Congress Party against the Nehru and Menon faction on the eve of the Indian election, America made a special concentrated attack on Menon.  The Indian government also cannot conceal its disagreement with America on some issues involving its own interests.  For example, America’s supplying new types of weapons to Pakistan makes India uneasy, and in particular America’s position of openly siding with Portugal, and stopping India from taking [back] Goa, has had a definite impact on the Indo-American relationship, which this year has reached its highest point yet. India pleads intently with America and strives to ease conflict, acting like a slave.

Strengthening Indo-American relations have already severely weakened India’s traditional links to England.  Right up until the beginning of 1961, the atmosphere of closeness between India and England was still relatively strong, as manifested in India’s grand reception for the Queen on her visit.  But as the life-and-death struggle of new and old colonialism in the Congo has continuously intensified, there have also been sharp clashes between India, as an active tool of the new colonialism [trans. note—or “new colonists,” i.e. America], and old-brand colonialist England.  First of all, [UN Secretary General] Hammarskjöld’s special envoy to the Congo, the Indian Dayal, was forced to resign under pressure from England; up until September, when UN troops launched a large-scale offensive, Nehru publically criticized as shameless England’s support of the Tshombe Group, and Indian newspapers also attacked England as responsible for Hammarskjöld’s death, while England criticized Indian troops for committing atrocities.  The two countries’ disagreements grow more apparent by the day, and the rift is deeper than ever before.  Additionally, England supports Portugal on the issue of Goa, shows prejudice against Indian emigration to British territory, and persists in applying to enter the European Common Market (if this becomes a reality, India’s exports to England will be severely affected).  All of this has sharpened the contradictions between the two nations.  Nehru stopped to visit England in early November at [the latter’s] invitation, [but] there has been no clear improvement in the two countries’ relations.

England retains a strong economic influence in India, but a trend toward America replacing [it] is also developing.  America has already vaulted to first place in India’s imports for January to August of 1960 and 1961.  India also took certain measures in trade that were detrimental to England, like eliminating the difference between U.S. dollar area and British sterling area import licenses, stipulating that certain mineral products may only be imported from America, etc.  From now on, new problems are sure to emerge in Indo-British relations, reflecting the rivalry between the two imperialisms in India.

The value of India — this big country sporting a non-aligned label — to America, has already surpassed that of ally Pakistan, which joined the military bloc.  The Kennedy government has a policy of favoring India over Pakistan in Indo-Pakistani relations.  Pakistan, feeling that it has lost its support and its advantage is suddenly gone in the struggle against India for supremacy on the Indian subcontinent, both envies and hates India, and is also more guarded.  This is the main reason that Indo-Pakistani relations grew tense in 1961.  Pakistan complains that Indian development poses a threat to Pakistan, and criticizes India for not being sincere about solving problems, while India ridicules Pakistan’s internal political system as undemocratic and censures Pakistan for aggression. Already-shelved issues between the two countries once again sparked quarrels; for example, Pakistan submitting the Kashmir issue to the United Nations.  New problems also continuously occurred, like Pakistan organizing crowds to destroy the office of the High Commissioner of India in Pakistan to protest against India’s persecution of Muslims.  Although the “Indus Waters Treaty” has already been signed, other disputes over the waters have emerged.  Border incidents also continuously occurred, the most prominent of which was Pakistan arresting a high-level Indian intelligence officer at the border and sentencing [him or her] to prison.  On one hand India relies on America to pressure Pakistan, its attitude sometimes quite tough, claiming it will “recover” Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.  On the other hand, it fears antagonism between the two sides, and sometimes also expresses willingness and a relaxation [in its attitude].  In December Nehru reiterated that [India] is willing to hold direct negotiations with Pakistan, and resolve the Kashmir issue based on the current circumstances.  It is very sensitive about Pakistan’s requests to negotiate border issues with China.

America also has it side of taking care of Pakistan and using it to curb India.  After Ayub Khan visited America, America provided Pakistan with new types of weapons, and India felt very uneasy; America seized the opportunity to come out and say that if India suffers aggression from anyone, America will definitely offer support and help.  India has expressed willingness to accept such assurances.

(2)

Although India has taken a blatantly pro-American, anti-Soviet stance in major international struggles, there are still developments in the Indo-Soviet relationship, due to the fact that each wishes to gain certain things and make use of each other.  This manifests itself: Politically — the two countries’ leaders maintain close contact; in 1961, Nehru and Finance Minister Desai visited the Soviet Union, while Soviets visiting India included Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov (to participate in the Indian Communist Party Sixth Congress, but they had talks with Nehru).  Nehru and Khruschev also often exchange letters about international issues.  Economically — the Soviet Union has already promised to provide 2.4 billion rupees ($500 million U.S.D.) in aid for India’s third Five-Year Plan.  In February 1961, when Soviet Foreign Economic [Relations] Committee chairman Skachkov came to visit, he signed an agreement concerning the use of 600 million rupees of [this aid]; aid projects included expanding the Bhilai Steel Plant and building large-scale oil refineries, power stations, heavy machinery factories and electrical equipment factories.  In October the two countries signed an agreement in Vienna on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  In mid-November, the Soviet vice-minister of foreign trade came to India to discuss the question of expanding trade. Soviet and Eastern European socialist countries’ trade with India was understood to be approximately 1.35 billion rupees in 1961, twice as much as the year before.

There are some developments in Indo-Soviet relations worth noting.  On major international issues, India always stands on the side of imperialism, particularly America; on the other hand, it makes eyes at the Soviet Union, and states that it wants to win the Soviet Union’s friendship and understanding [trans. note— the word used here for “understanding” () implies forgiveness and acceptance].  The Soviet Union does its utmost to support India on all fronts.

India is especially wantonly arrogant in making use of Sino-Soviet discord and dividing the socialist camp.  It constantly exultantly broadcasts the Soviet Union’s neutral stance on the border issue, and mentions Sino-Soviet discord together with Sino-Indian disputes in order to attack China and the Indian Communist Party left wing.  The Soviet Union also encourages and cooperates with India’s anti-China [stance].   The helicopters and transport planes that the Soviet Union gave India are not only used militarily on the Sino-Indian border, but are also capitalized on publicity-wise for anti-China [purposes].  Nehru on the one hand vilifies China for encroachment and pursuing expansion, and on the other praises the Soviet Union for opposing war and desiring peace.  Especially after the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, India felt it had an opportunity, and became even more swollen with arrogance.  Nehru makes much of how the Soviet Union’s liberalization is good for peace, and the great significance of the Soviet Union and Albania breaking off diplomatic relations, and at the same time vilifies China for being rigid in its thinking.  Gagarin and Brezhnev happened to be visiting India while it was beginning the anti-China wave, and the two sides highlighted Indo-Soviet friendship together.

India and the Soviet Union delight in dwelling on and serenading each other [trans. note—literally, “one begins a song or poem and the other joins in”] with certain points of like-mindedness, like the horror of war, [desiring] a world without war and disarmament, etc. India very actively plays matchmaker in U.S.-Soviet relations and influences the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union also intends to use India as a bridge for contact with America.

In terms of economics, the Soviet Union’s aid to India is mostly heavy and advanced [equipment], and also fairly large in quantity, and it furthermore strives especially hard to train Indian technicians and provide technical knowledge; thus, one should see this kind of aid already having a definite effect on India.  In addition to American aid, it is also very difficult for India to do without Soviet aid for the time being.  At the same time, India is correspondingly growing ever more important in the Soviet Union’s foreign economic relations.  Another noteworthy new situation is: the Soviet Union and many Eastern European socialist countries have started to establish contacts with Indian private business [sector] monopoly capitalists; for example, tycoon C.D. Birla visited the Soviet Union on invitation, and many Eastern European socialist countries also have established a large number of joint venture enterprises in the private sector; over the past year, the number of joint ventures between Indian private capitalists and Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and German [partners] approved by the India government reached 12 in total.

(3)

India is already basically in a position of mutual antagonism with anti-imperialists and anti-colonialists, and uses all kind of shameless tactics to sabotage [them].  First of all, it strives to distract attention with issues like war and peace, and easing relations between East and West, and plays down the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle.  Nehru’s attitude toward the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State was at first very cool and indifferent, but at America’s urging, [he] colluded with Yugoslavia and plotted to draw in more pro-Western nations to participate in the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State, and to make the conference develop in a direction predetermined by them.  At the conference, Nehru openly and blatantly propagated such fallacies as “the age of colonialism is past; [it] is dead,” and preached that the current main problem is just one of war and peace, but those who responded were scarce, and he only isolated himself further. Another tactic is doing all it can to conceal the savage face of America’s new colonialism; this is especially true in the case of the Congo and Cuba.  India seeks to turn the spearhead of the struggle against just a small number of old-brand colonialists like Belgium and Portugal.  Another sabotage tactic is influencing and cajoling the leaders of national independence movements to abandon armed struggle.  India still refuses to recognize Algeria; on the contrary, it welcomes France’s “ceasefire” suggestion and acts on its behalf to lure [the opposition] into surrender.  After the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State, India organized a “Portuguese Colonies Forum,” seeking to influence African national [liberation] leaders, and at the same time to redeem its isolated position.  But sharp differences of opinion with African leaders on the question of violence and non-violence led to new isolation for India.

India has stepped up its expansion into Asian and African regions.  It has interfered more blatantly in certain neighboring countries.  After the Nepali king took the throne, India not only publically criticized Nepal’s royal family and meddled in Nepal’s internal affairs and relations with China, it harbored and actively supported anti-king fugitive elements in using India as a base for armed subversion against the royal family.  In recent years, India has concentrated its efforts on building roads in Bhutan to better [grasp] military control; it is rumored that India troops have already begun to enter and be stationed in Bhutan, and its military control of Sikkim has also strengthened.  But these countries’ struggle against [Indian] control has grown more apparent.  Nepal has strengthened its guard against India; it continuously resists all kinds of pressure from India, and develops relations with China despite various obstructions from India.  When the Bhutanese king and Sikkimese prince visited India in 1961, they also each separately demanded the restoration of a certain degree of diplomatic and domestic autonomy.

Another form of Indian expansion is the provision of aid, which includes providing and assisting in the training of administrative and technical personnel, as well as economic aid.  At present it is focused particularly on African countries, and has successively provided or made preparations to provide this kind of aid to countries including Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika.  In Southeast Asia, India has also provided certain technical assistance for building chemical fertilizer plants in Malaya, oil refineries in Ceylon, and Mekong River dams in Cambodia.  Over the past two years, India’s various kinds of economic aid to the three countries of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan has reached more than 98.2 million rupees.  An especially noteworthy new trend is India attempting to benefit from providing technical personnel, etc., to Asian and African countries in coordination with American aid.  America expresses appreciation for India’s assistant role.  When American vice-president Johnson visited, he especially emphasized that India could play a large role in helping undeveloped countries.  There are already indications, in America and India’s separate aid to Nigeria, of America providing the money while India provides the people.

India is doing its utmost to contend for Asian and African markets.  In 1961 there were again all kinds of trade delegations going to the Middle East and Africa to open up markets.  A new practice to emerge in 1961 is India seeking, at America’s instigation, to collude with Japan to control Asian and African economies.  The two nations sponsored and established the “Asian Productivity Organization,” and together prepared and agitated for regional economic cooperation through such international organizations as the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.  India expressed interest in establishing a common Asian-African market.  In addition, India’s private business capitalists are also exporting — for example, the Birla Group signed another agreement with Nepal to assist in building a textile factory — and India capitalists are also infiltrating such countries as the Arab League, Ethiopia and Somalia.

But the policies India has adopted which go against the tide of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and are disadvantageous to the independence and autonomy of other nations are already making India increasingly isolated in Asia and Africa.  When Nehru denied that India was in this kind of predicament, it was difficult for him to produce one counter-example of a country that has truly close ties with India.  Nehru has boasted that India and Burma have a friendly relationship.  Burmese prime minister U Nu does indeed have a very solid personal friendship with Nehru and is influenced by him to a certain degree, but the two countries’ relations are lukewarm, and there is still friction on the Indian diaspora and other subjects.  After Madame Bandaranaike of Ceylon took office, she was also influenced by Nehru, but for a year there has been no improvement in Indo-Ceylonese relations.  When upheaval [concerning] the Tamil people occurred in Ceylon and the Indian government put pressure on the Ceylonese government through the newspapers, it affected the two countries’ relations, and such subjects as Ceylon’s Indian diaspora and Indo-Ceylonese trade also frequently spark unpleasantness.  Indonesia’s Sukarno, too, sings in the opposite key from Nehru on the subject of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism; especially on the subject of holding the second Asian-African Conference, one of them leads the way in advocating it while the other actively hinders it.  Before the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State, India invited the heads of state of Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma and Nepal to first hold consultations in India, but only U Nu and the Nepali king visited India on their way.  And at the conference, only U Nu went along with Nehru.  In Southeast Asia, India has grown somewhat closer only with Malaya; Malaya’s head of state visited India at the end of the year.  With regard to African countries, India focuses on strengthening diplomatic activities, and has sent full or adjunct diplomatic envoys to nearly all of the newly independent countries; Madame Indira Gandhi and others have also visited East Africa to woo [people there].  In the cultural arena, India has earmarked an additional 500,000 rupees for scholarships for African students [in India], and donated one million rupees to UNESCO for training African teachers.  But in reality there has not been much progress in India’s relations with African countries; its relations with Ghana have on the contrary grown more distant, an example being Ghana’s prohibition of 14 Indian films.  African students in India, too, are full of anti-Indian sentiment.  India has also met with great resistance to its economic expansion in Asia and Africa.  In addition to India’s opposition to the anti-colonialist struggle being its Achilles’ heel, the development of the national economy in Asian and African countries, competition from old colonialist countries, and conflicts of interest between India and Japan are all disadvantageous factors for India.  India’s exports to Asian and African regions, which comprise one third of its total exports, have in fact been slipping over the past two years.  In order to escape its current isolation and passiveness on the international front, and to strengthen the National Congress Party’s Nehru and Menon factions prior to the election at home, India took military action at the end of the year to reclaim Goa.  It made full use of the trump card of the Goa issue’s conflict of interest with colonialism to conceal its own [true] face and gain political capital in Asia and Africa, also giving the world’s revisionists an excuse for praising Nehru.  This fully demonstrates Nehru’s craftiness and cunning.  Because India still sports the non-aligned label, it retains a dual character to some degree; especially with the white-washing [job] that revisionists in India and abroad continue to do for Nehru, his deceptiveness cannot be underestimated.  But the Goa issue also exposed India’s national conflict with imperialism; objectively, India’s recovery of Goa will have some good effects on the anti-colonialist movement in Asia and Africa, and this runs contrary to the subjective wishes of India’s ruling circle.  India’s basic policies of opposition to China, opposition to Communism, reliance on imperialists and outward expansion will not change; on the contrary, they will be taken even further, and in the end Nehru’s whole reactionary face is sure to be known to all.

[Chinese] Embassy in India

January 1962