The Overseas Visits of the Delegations of the North Korean Puppets (Analysis)

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The Overseas Visits of the Delegations of the North Korean Puppets (Analysis)

1. The North Korean puppet regime has dispatched 17 delegations composed of important figures to 48 countries from the beginning of the year 1978 to the end of April, 1978. During the same period of time in 1976, North Korea sent 30 delegations to 63 countries and in 1977, 12 delegations to 25 countries.

These visits are regionally divided into: 6 delegations to 15 countries in 1976, 4 delegations to 11 countries in 1977, and 6 delegations to 21 countries in 1978 to Africa; 6 delegations to 6 countries in 1975, 4 delegations to 4 countries in 1977, and 4 delegations to 10 countries in 1978 to Asia. Therefore, number of overseas visits by the delegations of the Korean puppets has increased significantly this year compared to 1977 (a total of 48 countries: a total of 25 countries). The total number of visits in 1978 represents somewhat of a drop compared to that in early 1976 prior to the 5^th Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State in Colombo (a total of 48 countries: a total of 68 countreis). However, where the visits to Africa and Asia are considered, there has been a increase in the number of overseas visits compared to 1976.

2. The dispatches by the North Korean puppets of delegations in 1978 are divided into the following four categories depending on characteristics of the countries they visited:

a. To sustain and acquire forces supportive of the North Korean puppets within Africa and strengthen bilateral relations

i. Vice Premier Jong Jun-ki’s visit to six countries friendly to the North Korean puppets in West Africa (Mali, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, and Angola)

ii. Vice Chairman Pak Seong-cheol’s visit to four countries friendly to the North Korean puppets in East Africa (Zambia, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Tanzania)

b. To undermine forces supportive of Korea in the international community by visiting countries that have friendly relations with us or are improving their relations with us

i. Vice Foreign Minister Kil Jae-gyong’s visit to three neutral or pro-Korean countries in West Africa (Niger, Ghana, and Gambia)

ii. Roving Ambassador Jo Ki-il’s visit to eight pro-Korean or neutral countries in West Africa (Central Africa Republic, Cameron, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana)

iii. Vice Premier Kong Jin-Tae’s visit to four Southeast Asian countries (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore)

iv. Vice Chairman Kang Ryang-uk’s visit to India and two surrounding countries (Nepal, and Bangladesh)

c. To target a direct influence on the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Conference Coordinating Bureau

i. Vice Foreign Minister Ri Jong-mok’s visit to four main members of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (Yugoslavia, Algeria, Sri Lanka, and Algeria [sic] [The fourth is assumed to be Afghanistan within the context.])

Particularly, Ri Jong-mok encouraged Algeria to submit a separate resolution regarding the Korean matter at the Coordinating Bureau meeting and requested Afghanistan to discuss the Korean matter at the Kabul meeting.

ii. Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry Son Chang-su’s visit to two Latin American countries of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (Jamaica and Peru)

d. To try to promote the proposal for the Confederal Republic of Goryeo and achieve direct negotiations with the United States

i. Director of the International Department of the Korean Worker's Party Kim Yeong-nam’s visit to two Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia and Romania)

ii. Vice Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Ho Jong-suk’s visit to three Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland)

iii. Kim Yeong-nam’s other visit to 4 Western European countries (Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain) is associated with their desire to increase contacts with their socialist parties or communist parties bandwagon on expansion of communist influence in Europe and establish the long-term groundwork for penetrating into the West.

3. Starting the end of this January through the beginning of May, the North Korean puppets have been conducting extensive overseas diplomacy, which is expected to be pursued even more aggressively with Vice Chairman Kang Ryang-uk’s visit to pro-Korean or neutral Western African nations starting on May 5. Below are the common points made by the key figures of the North Korean puppet regime during their visits listed in the above:

a. Based on the so-called “memorandum” that the North Korean puppets announced on February 1, they denounce our efforts for simultaneous entry into the United Nations, cross-recognition, and a proposal for inter-Korean mutual nonaggression pact as attempts to perpetuate inter-Korean division.

b. North Korea condemns the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise, Team Sprit 1978, as warmongering moves, and slanders the announcement of U.S. plans for troop withdrawal from Korea as a deceptive ploy.

4. Considering the frequency of the overseas visits by the North Korean puppets in light of their policy towards the United Nations, their underlying intentions are as follows:

a. The North Korean puppet regime realizes that its supportive forces are dwindling in the Non-Aligned Movement due to our successful diplomacy towards the Non-Aligned Movement bloc.

Accordingly, the North Korean puppets are preoccupied with securing and reviving its supportive forces both on the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau scheduled in May and the Foreign Ministers Meeting of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia at the end of July.

b. The North Korean puppets are expected to devote its diplomatic efforts at the Non-Aligned meetings to have provisions related to Korea adopted, which claim any foreign troops out of the Korean Peninsula, oppose any attempt to perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula (simultaneous entry to the UN and cross-recognition), and propose the Confederal Republic of Goryeo.

c. Depending on the outcome of the two Non-Aligned meetings mentioned above, if the North Korean puppet regime judges that there is a good chance of success in the United Nations General Assembly, they will likely raise the Korean matter for the first time in three years and attempt a confrontation of votes.