REPORT TO L. P. BERIA ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ROMANIA
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get citationNKGB/NKVD report on the political situation in Romania, describing the negotiations and maneuvering among the various political parties to form a coalition government."Report to L. P. Beria about the Political Situation in Romania" March 05, 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, GARF, fond 9401, op 2, d 93, ll. 264-267. Document No. 51 in Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1. Translated for CWIHP by Svetlana Savranskaya. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118444
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Report to L. P. Beria
About the Political Situation in Romania
March 5, 1945
Moscow, People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR -- to comrade BERIA
Below please find our information about the political situation and developments in
Romania by March 4, 1945.
The question of forming a democratic coalition government is still open.
The King's camarilla, which includes Counts Shtirbei, Styrche and colonel Ulea, has a strong influence on the King, arguing against sanctioning the formation of Petre Groza's cabinet.
On March 2, late at night, they held a conference in the King's palace, at which the King presided, and Nedjel, Shtirbei, Maniu and Brutianu participated. At that conference they decided to continue postponing the formation of the government of a democratic concentration. With this purpose Tatarescu, who is a tool of that clique, met with Petre Groza on March 3, and proposed new demands, disregarding the agreement on the issue of the distribution of ministerial seats, and the participation of the Tatarescu group in the government, which was reached on March 2.
On March 3, the King saw Petre Groza three times in the evening. The King stated to Petre Groza that in accordance with the Constitution, he wants all the parties, including the Tsaranist and the Uberal, to participate in the government, even though it was not reflected in an appropriate proportion in the governmental list presented to Petre Groza.
Petre Groza responded that taking into account the political situation, there was no other solution except for creating a coalition democratic government. There are no opportunities for cooperation between National-Democratic Front and the historical parties either.
They received the composition of the government suggested to Petre Groza negatively, according to the leaders of the historical parties, because in their opinion there were no Tsaranists and Liberals on that list.
In spite of the sharp manner, in which Petre Groza raised the issue of the need for immediate finalizing of the formation of the cabinet, the King told him that he would call him back.
Therefore, the King has succeeded in postponing the final decision on this question until Monday, March 5.
A large rally of the National-Democratic Front in Bucharest, which was supposed to take place today with the demands to finalize the formation of the cabinet headed by Petre Groza, is moved down to Monday.
In the case if the King does not agree to the composition of the cabinet, the leadership of the Zemlyaki is ready to form a cabinet with Petre Groza as planned and is going to do it as fait accompli making an appeal to the people.
We are undertaking appropriate organizational measures.
The leadership of the Allied Control Commission continues to make further reductions in the Bucharest garrison and confiscates weapons rather energetically.
We are expecting three of our divisions to arrive to Bucharest suburbs during March 4-5.
The situation in the capital as well as in the regional centers remains tense.
The leadership of the Tsaranist party believes that for the future of Romania it would be better if it is occupied by the Soviet troops than if the King willingly agrees to confirm the composition of the government presented by Petre Groza.
On March 2, Dinu Brutianu stated that he could not take part in the collaborationist government, not because of his party pride, but because the Zemlyaki would get the majority. Then they would make a number of decisions in which the historical parties would have to participate—in other words, exactly what the Liberals do not want.
The King, Maniu and Brutianu are extremely upset by the fact that the British and the Americans are not getting involved in the events unfolding in Romania.
In the evening of March 3, allegedly there was a telegram sent from the King's Palace to London, the substance of which we do not know. Simultaneously, allegedly, telegrams were sent to Benesh with the request to get involved in the Romanian affairs, and to inform comrade Stalin about that.
Waiting for a response from London, the King, Maniu and Brutianu, allegedly, decided to drag out the formation of the new government. Since, in their opinion, this would create a tense situation in the country, the Russians would have to take some decisive measures, and this would show their active interference in the internal affairs of Romania.
According to the information of our agents, in the case if comrade Vyshinsky categorically demands to form a government quickly, the King is inclined to continue the formation of N. Lupu cabinet.
N. Lupu would have to accept all the suggestions of the National-Democratic Front, but he will not implement them.
Deputy chief of the Secret Information Service Kintesku received instructions for immediate selection and creating a list of 200 members of intelligentsia who are not involved in the politics.
We could guess that by doing this they would select people in order to create a "government of specialists".
Officers of the Romanian Army are involved in propaganda among the soldiers, telling them that the internal political situation in the country is very dangerous, because the Romanian independence is in question, and are calling them to be ready to use their weapons.
Soldiers who are inclined in favor of the National-Democratic Front are systematically abused in the Romanian Army units.
On March 1, during the unloading of echelons with industrial equipment that is sent to the USSR, they found an aviation bomb in Constansa. The echelon was loaded on February 22 at ''Malaksa'' factory.
During the night of March 1, in Ploeshti, workers' committees of oil processing factories continued to disarm the gendarme security service. By the morning of March 2, the security was disarmed at all the factories.
In factories ''Romana-Americana'', ''Lachea-Romana,'' "Ksenia," "Vega," "Orion," and "Columbia" the following number of weapons was confiscated: hand machine guns - 6, automatic rifles - 25, grenades - 171, rifles - 26, pistols -14, boxes with bullets - 23.
In "Astra-Romano" factory the workers confiscated 3 trucks of weapons and ammunition from the gendarmes.
In spite of the armed resistance of the gendarme security of that same factory, who began shooting, they were disarmed.
Workers of the oil-processing factory in Ploeshti are in a fighting mood
They mentioned reactionary statements on the part of officers and engineers.
In Leva city the National Tsaranists distributed their leaflets through gendarmes, in city Karakal the population took over the building of prefecture, expelled the old prefect and appointed Zemlyak Olteanu in his place.
There was no resistance on the part of the gendarmes.
In Tumu-Severin City the population elected a new prefect - a proponent of the National Democratic Front attorney Bazelai, instead of old prefect Ionesku - who was an appointee of
Ovakimyan, Timofeev, Kuznetsov 
. Copies sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, G. Malenkov
. As in the original. Should be Bratianu.
. Meaning "Communists"
. G. B. Ovakimyan-Director of the 3d Sector of the 1st Department of the NKGB. A. S. Kuznetsov-Director of the 1st Secret Department of the NKVD. P. P. Timofeev-Director of the 1st Sector of the 2nd Department of the NKGB USSR.