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Digital Archive International History Declassified

July 25, 1975

PRIME MINISTER MIKI – PRESIDENT FORD MEETING DISCUSSION OUTLINE

This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation, Kyungnam University

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    An extensive overview of international issues bearing on the US-Japan relationship, including the situations in the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
    "Prime Minister Miki – President Ford Meeting Discussion Outline" July 25, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Obtained for NKIDP by Kyungwon Choi (Kyushu University) and translated for NKIDP by Ryo C. Kato. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118654
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Showa 50 (1975) July 25th  

Prime Minister Miki – President Ford

Meeting Discussion Outline

(Politics, Culture-Science and Technology Sections)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Table of Contents

1. Politics

(1) Japan-US Relations

(A) Overall

(B) Security

(i) Points to confirm regarding Minister for Foreign Affairs Miyazawa’s April visit to the U.S.

(ii) Defense Cooperation

(iii) The Korea Clause

(2) The State of Asia after Vietnam1

(A) Indonesia1

(B) Trends among ASEAN nations

(C) The role of Japan and the U.S.

(3) Security of Northeast Asia

(A) The Korea Issue

(i) Japan-U.S. cooperation for détente on the Korean peninsula

(ii) U.S. Republic of Korea policy

(iii) Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation (including economic cooperation)28

(iv) North Korea

(B) China

(i) Ford visit to China

(ii) Japan-China Relations

(C) Soviet Union

(i) Trends in Soviet activity in Asia

(ii) Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty (Territorial Issue)

(iii) Siberian Development Cooperation

(4) Miscellaneous  

(A) State of the Middle East

(B) East-West relations in Europe

(C) Arms Control, etc.  

(i) NPT issue

(ii) Japan-U.S. Uranium Enrichment Program Issue

(iii) SALT II

(D) Various issues regarding the U.N.

2. Culture-Science and Technology0

(1) Promoting cultural-educational exchange

(2) Cooperation on science and technology

(1) Japan-US Relations

     (A) Overall

(i) Without pending problems requiring immediate attention between Japan and the U.S., we are blessed to be able to speak freely without concern to outstanding issues. The President’s visit to Japan was an important symbol of the tightness of our nations’ bond that has been cultivated through the changes in history. Considering recent developments in Asia, and the loss of emotional elements regarding Vietnam, we can have a calm and realistic conversation regarding the importance of cooperation and understanding between Japan and the United States. We hope that through the recent meeting, citizens of both countries may better understand that Japan-US relations has risen to a high place in world affairs and what this will mean.

(ii) A meeting between the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as suggested in Secretary Kissinger’s address at the New York Japan Society’s annual gala on June 18th, would be beneficial in promoting the close consultations between both countries, but in practice should be conducted with flexibility.

Relevant Excerpt from Secretary Kissinger’s Speech

“Of course, we do not expect to pursue identical polices – toward China, toward the Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. But we should seek to maintain compatible approaches. In our bilateral we should recognize a higher standard of mutual concern than normally obtains between states-accepting a greater obligation to consult, to inform, and to harmonize domestic and external policies that impinge on the interest of the other.

We believe that both our countries share this approach. To implement it, we have jointly developed channels for more intensive consultation and used them with growing frequency and frankness. The United States intends to propose a semi-annual review of policies at the ministerial level, alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to assess the present and to chart the future.”

(B) Security

(i) Points to confirm regarding FM Miyazawa’s April visit to the U.S.

We would like to express our gratitude for the United States demonstration of understanding regarding Japan’s security issues, and for the mutual confirmation regarding the meaning of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty for our nations during FM Miyazawa’s visit last April.

Although we have already confirmed this, on this occasion we express our nation’s determination to continue performing our duties according to the stipulations of the Security Treaty.

(ii) Defense Cooperation

The security cooperation framework of our two countries is the bedrock of our nation’s security, however, for some time, there has been various debates centered on the National Diet regarding the specific shape of framework for this cooperation. The appropriate authorities of both countries must sufficiently consult with each other because it is necessary to establish a framework of Japan-U.S. cooperation for the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. During Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s visit to Japan, we anticipate an honest exchange of opinions in order to set the direction for the future.

(iii) The Korea Clause

A narrow strip of water separates the Republic of Korea from our country, and regardless of the ‘Korea Clause,’ it is clear that the security of the Republic of Korea has a great influence on the security of our country. Our country highly values the United States’ confirmation of the close linkage between our security and that of The Republic of Korea, and the United States’ determination to continue stationing its military in the Republic of Korea.

(For Reference)

Minister for Foreign Affairs Miyazawa’s visit to the United States

Showa 50 (1975) April 14th

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During my visit to Washington, on the 11th of April, Secretary of State Kissinger and I had the following conversation about our country’s security issues.

1. Secretary of State Kissinger and I confirmed that the continued maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is conducive to the long-term interests of both Japan and the United States, and furthermore, that the United States’ nuclear capability is an important deterrent against attacks on Japan.

2. In relation to this, Secretary of State Kissinger affirmed that the United States will continue to maintain it’s pledge to protect Japan in the event of an attack, whether it is a nuclear attack or a conventional attack.

3. I stated to Secretary of State Kissinger that Japan plans to continue to perform its duties according to the stipulations of the Security Treaty.

On the 22nd, during my meeting with President Ford, the President reaffirmed the points made during the conversation that I had with Secretary of State Kissinger. To this, I expressed my appreciation and stated that I will inform Prime Minister Miki.

(For Reference)

Regarding Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Showa 50 (1975) July

-- This is a summary of the Government’s position on the issue of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation (burden sharing) as made clear through debate during the 75th Session of the National Diet.  --

1. While maintaining the security framework with the United States, we will retain our own effective defense capability to deter invasions before they occur. In the event that an external invasion occurs, our country will base its response on the security framework with the United States.

However, there are no emergency arrangements on the specifics of Japan-U.S. cooperation for the defense of our country.

2. Our fundamental view on our country’s defense is as it was previously stated; therefore, for the smooth operation of the security treaty, Japan and the United States, as responsible parties for both of our countries’ defense, needs to exchange opinions without letting candid conversation lapse. In the future, if the need arises, we hope for some kind of agreement on cooperation between Japan and the United States for the defense of our country.

3. An agreement on cooperation between Japan and the United States for the defense of our country will not necessarily entail the bearing of new rights and obligations. Furthermore, as a given situation widens in scope, and depending on international affairs at the time and depending on the nature of the armed attack, the factors of a situation are too multifarious. Therefore, it is difficult and unsuitable to reach an agreement on specific situations during peacetime. Additionally, we are not fixated on reaching an agreement in the form of “arrangements.”

Currently, in regards to such situations, we will implement joint plans between the Self-Defense Force and US military. In order to effectively deal with these situations, it is necessary to make clear such things as, mechanisms to communicate missions being carried out separately under Japanese and U.S. command, what Japan can and cannot do, or what assistance can be expected from the United States. One step would be for the two governments to jointly establish a place of research or an institution for discussion where the two parties can study these topics under complete civilian control.

It goes without mentioning that as defense officials of Japan and the United States continue to deepen their discussions, the specific content or forms of agreements should be adequately considered while referencing the limitations stipulated by the Constitution and in consultation with the related ministries and offices.

4. Furthermore, in order to discuss defense issues from a wider perspective, we hope to report to the National Defense Council roundtable discussion and solicit opinions from the members. Additionally, when discussions have progressed to the point of making specific agreements, upon discretion of the Cabinet Prime Minister, the agreements will be brought to the National Defense Council for consideration. We hope to make these agreements public as possible, as long as it does not damage friendly relations between Japan and the United States or the national interest of our country.  

(2) The State of Asia after Vietnam

(A) Indochina

(i) Our country’s basic position towards Indochina

In order to deter the dominant communist forces in Indochina from becoming dependent on China or the Soviet Union, and to deter the further pursuit of expansionist or military adventurist policies, and to plan for the peace and stability of the region, we believe that, as long as the neighboring countries are free nations, normalizing relations with these countries is favorable. From our country’s perspective, to gain a precise understanding of Indochina as well, we place our priority on establishing relations with Hanoi. Although Vietnam will be unified eventually, we find it necessary to hold diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. As free states, we should turn the Indochinese countries attentions inward, and lead them to use their energy towards building their countries. This will require a certain amount of aid. However, relations with South Vietnam will be conditional upon whether or not the new regime honors the former governments debts. We believe that Indochina policy should be conducted with care, as not to cause concern or misunderstandings with ASEAN and other neighboring countries.

(ii) Our forecast on Indochina

The current issue in Indochina is not the role of the Soviet Union as a directly involved actor, but rather the relationship between North Vietnam and China. We believe that China does not truly wish for a giant unified Vietnam, but has to, nonetheless, outwardly support unification. However, because of their wariness over Vietnam, China will try to cut-short Vietnam’s growing influence over Cambodia and Laos. Because it is likely that North Vietnam will respond by seeking Soviet support to bring Cambodia and Laos under their sphere of influence, it will quickly become necessary to investigate the relations between North Vietnam and China.  

Overall, despite the ascendency of North Vietnam in Indochina, it is doubtful that a monolithic communist sphere will emerge in the region, as stated above due to the hostility between China and North Vietnam, and the existence of Cambodian and Laotian nationalism.

(iii) Questions for U.S. Perspectives

(1) Whether or not there are any intentions for renewed relations between North and South Vietnam (Reference at the end)

(2) How to deal with U.N. membership for North and South Vietnam (Applications completed: South Vietnam July 15th, North Vietnam July 16th). Thoughts on relations to simultaneous U.N. membership for North and South Korea.

(3) U.S. perspectives on unification of North and South Vietnam and Chinese-Soviet influence over Indochina. (We believe that the unification of Vietnam will not create difficult problems for our country)

(For Reference)

(1) Secretary Kissinger on U.S.-Indochina Relations

(A) If North Vietnam and Cambodia establishes peaceful relations with its neighbors, and if they provide information on U.S. military personnel missing in action, then the United States will consider diplomatic ties with both countries within the next year. (June 19 CBS Television Interview)

(B) The United States will not conduct reconstruction assistance for North Vietnam (Comment made to Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Yasukawa on July 8th)

(2) The United State’s responsibility to cooperate for the rebuilding of Indochina as stipulated by Article 21 of the Paris Peace Accords:

“The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Viet- Nam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and throughout Indochina.”

(B) Trends among ASEAN nations

(i) Although ASEAN countries had, to a certain degree, anticipated the future of Indochina after the Paris Accords and had made plans accordingly, however, it cannot be denied that they were dealt a momentary shock by how the situation had changed more quickly than they had expected. We believe these countries will place the most emphasis on strengthening the foundations of their domestic politics, economy, and society, rather than rather than a direct external invasion or domestic destabilization from foreign-backed domestic communist guerillas.

(ii) In regards to external relations, at one point it seemed as if ASEAN felt an urgent need to do something, but in the end they have settled for observing the developments among the Indochina countries. It should be noticed that Thailand and the Philippines movements towards normalizing relations with China came to fruition after the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. This rapprochement was the United States response to the changing international circumstances and an effort to stabilize the international environment by opening relations with a non-status quo country that had historically been a diplomatic blank spot. It is not accurate to label such developments as the “collapse of the United States.” It is clear that ASEAN states generally want to maintain friendly relations with the United States more so than with any other countries.  Although they may present a hardline attitude towards liberal countries, this is largely a result of domestic concerns or concerns over the Indochina countries and so should not be simply construed as anti-American or anti-liberal. Rather, care should be taken to understand the weakness and interests of small countries in an unstable environment.

(iii) In the medium- to long-term, nationalism in ASEAN countries is expected to rise.0While on the one hand, ASEAN will reach out to Indochina countries to establish relations based on coexistence and cooperation, they will also strengthen the unity of among ASEAN countries. At the same time, they will raise the banner of neutrality in South East Asia, but will likely also harden itself as anti-communist. Whether it is seen as a regional organization or a neutralist organization in South East Asia, it cannot be doubted that ASEAN, at this point, is an immature organization. However, it is true that the above trends are common aspirations of Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN may be the last bastion of hope for the small Southeast Asian nations that cannot allow itself to rely fully on the U.S. military, but are too proud to join the communist camp. By maintaining freedom and independence from foreign intervention, the neutralist framework allowed for ASEAN to find coexistence with Indochinese nations. It is a representation of the entire Southeast Asian region’s aspiration to protect its own existence. At the same time, if it is deemed necessary to avoid extreme changes in the regional balance, and if they so wish the ASEAN countries could coexist with a U.S. military presence in South East Asia.  

(C) The role of Japan and the U.S.

(i) We recognize and respect the aspirations of the ASEAN countries, and we believe it is something to be dutifully supported. We believe that the maintenance of close cooperation between the two largest and most stable powers of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and the United States, together with gaining the ASEAN countries’ trust and sustaining friendly relations with them, would be a great contribution to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region. Regarding this thought, our country wants to express understanding to even the neutralist stance advocated by ASEAN and proactively pursue ties, not only on bilateral bases, but also with the ASEAN framework as well.

(ii) As long as the most important polices of the ASEAN countries for the foreseeable future is the strengthening of basic domestic stability, there has never been more anticipation for cooperation from both Japan and the United States. The most important part of this will not be the simple contribution to qualitative economic expansion, but rather the adequate understanding of the countries’ ‘nationalism’ and ‘needs,’ and the amount of consideration given to the improvement of the people’s livelihood. Our country hopes to increase the quality and quantity of government aid, strengthen as much as possible government leadership for preexisting private investments, and decrease friction with local societies.

(3) Security of Northeast Asia21

(A) The Korea Issue

(i) Japan-U.S. cooperation for détente on the Korean peninsula

(a) Japan-U.S. cooperation for the adoption of a North-South coexistence framework

1. While we hope for the ultimate unification of North and South Korea, at this current juncture, taking just one step forward from the status quo by establishing and adopting a peaceful coexistence framework on the Korean peninsula would be the most desirable outcome. This would be a step forward for détente on the Korean peninsula.

2. For this occur, North Korea needs to recognize ‘Two Koreas,” which in turn would require convincing from China and the Soviet Union. However, due to mutual antagonism, neither China nor the Soviet Union is interested in pushing “Two Koreas” on Kim Il Sung. This is especially the case for China.

3. Japan and the United States cannot expect fast results from approaching China or the Soviet Union, separately or together, because neither China nor the Soviet Union hopes for this kind of change (nor do they wish for Kim Il Sung to unify the Korean peninsula). However, it is still necessary.

4. When approaching China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, rather than approaching them with the “Mutual Recognition,” the “Simultaneous North-South U.N. Membership” may more desirable on a tactical level. North and South Vietnam simultaneously applying for U.N. membership as a “divided nation” may be an additional resource to convince Kim Il Sung.

5. Given the above, it is desirable for Japan and the United States to, either together or separately, approach China and the Soviet Union with a framework for simultaneous U.N. membership for North and South Korea.  

(b) Japan-U.S. cooperation for the internal political stability of the Republic of Korea

The internal political stability of the Republic of Korea is indispensible to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula. The best way in which to support this is through Japanese-U.S. economic cooperation that undertakes low-profile measures to elevate and stabilize the people’s livelihoods. By elevating and stabilizing people’s livelihoods, it can be expected that the government will gain self-confidence and it will not only suppress its inclination towards de-democratization, but will encourage democratization.

At this time, giving orders to the Park administration regarding its undemocratic nature would only work to isolate the Republic of Korea.

It would be desirable if the United States were able to adroitly caution the Republic of Korea, but our country finds that giving orders to the Republic of Korea regarding its administration would only cause friction for Japan-South Korea relations.

(b) The U.N. and the Korea Issue

1. The recent U.S.-Japan sponsored joint resolution should be welcomed as a detailed and constructive proposal that intends for an honest resolution to the issue. We hope to work with the United States to increase as much as possible the number of nations in support of this proposal.

2. At the same time, we believe that even if the resolution is passed in the current General Assembly with much support, the key to the ultimate solution is still in bringing North Korea and China to the discussion table. We seek the President’s opinion on the possibility of such discussions.

(ii) U.S. South Korea policy

(U.S. South Korea policy has repeatedly promised its commitment to South Korea. Reconfirm and encourage the continued basing of the U.S. military in South Korea, and inquire about the United States’ thoughts on the internal politics of South Korea.)

1. The peace and security of the Korean peninsula is of utmost importance to our country. Because a large scale conflict on the Korean peninsula will necessarily influence the security of our country, we sincerely desire for peace and security in this region. (Therefore, we still continue to believe that the critical importance of South Korean security to the security of Japanese obviously follows from our geographic proximity to South Korea.)

Recently, especially after Indochina, the United States government has repeatedly made statements reconfirming their commitment to the defense of South Korea.  We believe this was highly effective at both a) deterring a North Korean invasion and b) encouraging South Korea. (Based on these statements, is it correct to understand that U.S. South Korea policy will not change for the foreseeable future)

The existence of the U.S. military in South Korea embodies, more than anything else, the United States’ commitment to the defense of South Korea. As regrettable as it may be, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula is the most effective deterrence to the outbreak of conflict. Therefore, it is our view that until a stable framework for maintaining peace is created, we strongly hope for the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea.

2. In our country, there are those who are critical of the current state of South Koran politics. This is comprised of the opposition party, naturally, but also includes members of the ruling party. Due to unfortunate incidences in the past one to two years, there is a sense that this feeling has broadened. We believe that a more free and democratic South Korea would be beneficial for the government’s stability, as well as for Japan-Korea relations. But whether South Korea will easily comply is a different matter. It would be a misplacement of priorities if the defense of South Korea became threatened over the issue of internal politics.

There seems to be quite a few congressmen and experts in the United States who are critical of South Korea’s internal politics. How does the United States government think about this topic?

(iii) Japan-South Korea cooperation (including economic cooperation)

(1) The basis of Japan-South Korea Relations

Relations had been strained for two years, after several consecutive incidences, starting with the Kim Dae-jung incident of 1973 August, the Japanese Arrest incident of 1974 April, President Park’s Shooting Incident of 1974 August. Since last fall, relations have become calmer for the time being.

However, Japan-South Korea relations have the difficult aspect of being prone to becoming emotional, due to historical circumstances and geographic proximity. The government is cautious, pays close attention to this point, and handles them carefully, especially when a problem arises, so as not to allow the issue to escalate and negatively affect Japan-South Korea relations at large.

(2) Japan’s South Korean Policy

Our South Korea policy is based on maintaining and developing friendly relations with South Korea. Our policy of advancing economic cooperation and cooperation regarding the U.N. us much as possible remains unchanged.

However, the string of incidences since two years ago has left a deep scar in the citizens of both Japan and South Korea. This is an obstacle to Japan-South Korea cooperation.

Acquiring the wide support of citizens is vital to the advancement of Japan-South Korea relations. Because of this, it is also essential for South Korea to consider improving the atmosphere between Japan and South Korea. We have also previously conveyed this to Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil during his visit to Japan.

Furthermore, the Kim Dae-jung incident of July 22nd, which had caused ‘ill feelings’ between Japan and South Korea, has been settled and a new friendly Japan-South Korea relations has started after receiving a written statement from South Korea regarding Kim Dong-un, the completion of follow-ups on diplomatic settlements from November 2nd of two years ago, and after Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa’s visit to South Korea on the 23rd and 24th of July.

(3) Japan-Republic of Korea Regular Ministerial Conference

The Japan-Republic of Korea Regular Ministerial Conference has been held every year since 1967. Two years ago, the conference was held after a diplomatic settlement following the Kim Dae-jung incident. Last year, the conference was not held due to strains in Japan-ROK relations following the shooting incident of the President. However, the July 24rd meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim yielded an agreement to hold the conference as soon as possible. The ROK indicated the beginning or middle of September to be best for their schedule. Japan is currently considering the dates, and confirmation will be made between the two countries through diplomatic channels.

(4) Economic Cooperation with the Republic of Korea

( ) Basic Policy

Our economic policy towards the Republic of Korea has to this point been based on the improvement of the ROK’s economic development and welfare of its citizens. Henceforth, we will continue to assist with appropriate projects in the South Korea’s 3rd Five Year Plan (1972~1976), with a similar focus on development and welfare.

() Cooperation After the 3rd Five-Year Plan

The Joint Communiqué from the 7th Japan-ROK Regular Ministerial Conference held in December of 1973 established the basic direction that “around the conclusion of the 3rd Five Year plan, Japan-ROK economic cooperation will move from government-based cooperation to one where civilian-based cooperation will take the lead role.” However, after the oil shock and the subsequent results of the 8th meeting of the International Economic Consultative Organization for Korea (IECOK), it is our hope that this basic direction is fully re-evaluated and discussed at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference.

(iv) North Korea

(a) The political and military intentions of North Korea

(1) There is no doubt that the red unification of the Korean peninsula is Kim Il Sung’s basic goal. Strategically, judging that international circumstances are becoming favorable, North Korea is conducting a major international diplomatic campaign towards South Korea, the US, and world opinion under the banner of ‘Peaceful Unification of the Korean peninsula’ as they focus on gathering more supportive nations.

Through this large scale diplomatic campaign, we believe Kim Il Sung aims to a) prepare for entry into the U.N. General Assembly following its entry into the Non-Aligned Movement at the August Ministerial Conference in Lima and b) to gather support for a proposal at the General Assembly to dismantlement the U.N. military forces as a breakthrough towards withdrawal of US forces from the Korean peninsula.  

(2) Additionally, Kim Il Sung will continue to raise the placard of peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula while using various means to destabilize South Korea by supporting anti-Park forces inside and outside of South Korea. North Korea will also make efforts to advertise inside and outside of the ROK the undemocratic nature of the Park administration.

(3) Again, after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, North Korea will address the issue of unification by supporting ‘South Korean Revolutionary Forces’ (even if it is an fictitious creation of North Korea) contextualized under the ideas of ‘self-determination for the people’ and ‘independent unification.’ To aid in this effort, North Korea will plot to destabilize and bring confusion to South Korea in order to cause the internal collapse of government. There is the possibility that if the opportunity presents itself and if it is deemed necessary, North Korea may use its military to deliver the final blow on the Republic of Korea.

(b) Relations between Japan and North Korea

(1) In the past, relations with North Korea have been built on actual humanitarian, culture, sports, and economics ties. We will continue to maintain this policy. In international circumstances such as now, we are not thinking about approving North Korea. It is still premature to install things such as a trade representative, and we will consider the issue prudently.

(2) Although South Korea has requested that we do not approve the export of materials with strategic value to or the deferral of payments for export-import bank funds for North Korea, according to our legislation there are things that the government can and cannot regulate. We are seeking South Korea’s understanding. However, lately, North Korea’s foreign capital situation is worsening and thus is remarkably late to pay for deferred payment exports. It has gotten to the point of having to reconsider applying for export insurance. For the foreseeable future, this current situation of Japan-North Korea trade will only get worse, and it is our conjecture that trade will be considerably scaled back.

Our North Korea policy is first and foremost for the maintenance and development of friendship and cooperation with South Korea. This is fully considered in our relations with North Korea.

(For Reference)

Japan-North Korea Trade Change (in thousands of dollars)

ExportImport

197020,7599,339

7119,94710,524

7220,98713,362

7335,60918,104

7473,61122,275

7510,8484,619

(Jan~Mar)

(3) Japan-U.S. Cooperation for North Korea Policy

( ) As a country that desires the establishment of peaceful coexistence for North and South Korea, we hope to simultaneously create friendly and stable relations with South Korea, and also to engage North Korea with the goal of establishing diplomatic relations.

( ) Our relations with North Korea have been built on actual humanitarian, culture, sports, and economics ties. Recently, not only the opposition party, but the ruling party politicians as well have visited North Korea. Not are can they to be used as a pipeline with North Korea, but we can be also expectant of their effect on opening the closed North Korea.

( ) We do not know the extent of U.S. engagement with North Korea, but we find it necessary for liberal countries, beginning with the U.S., to engage North Korea to convey the intent of liberal countries and the actual state of affairs in South Korea so that North Korea will not make misjudgments. However, such movements cannot lower the status of or weaken South Korea. Furthermore, is necessary to support South Korea, and therefore this point must be examined with careful consideration.

From this perspective, an American lawmaker visiting North Korea would have much meaning.

( ) Regarding Japanese or U.S. engagement of North Korea, there must be regular information exchanges and consultations.

(Speaking frankly, this issue lacks a sufficient cooperative framework)

Furthermore, approaching North Korea jointly has the benefit for Japan of softening the domestic Japanese and South Korean reaction.

( ) Frankly, U.S. North Korea policy is quite behind. The policy is not necessarily lacking in flexibility. There are those who personally believe that engagement needs to be considered before North Korea reaches a favorable status.  However, it is necessary to persuade the U.S. that Japan’s North Korea policy is not being pursued at the expense of South Korea, but rather in order to build them up.

From the standpoint of widening the institutions and spaces for engagement, it is noteworthy that North Korea is successively joining specialized U.N. bodies and is increasing the number of bodies where the 2 Koreas coexist.

(B) China

(i) Ford’s Visit to China

(Matters to be raised on our part)

(1) To what extent is the U.S. considering developing relations with China

(2) How does the U.S. intend to deal with the Taiwan question in relation to the future development of international relations with China?

(If the topic of the reopening of flights between Japan and Taiwan is raised)

The Japanese government had hoped for Japan-Taiwan flights to be reopened and to highlight private-level exchanges between Japan and Taiwan. Agreements have been reached through exchange association that acts as a window between Japan and Taiwan and the East Asia Relations Committees. It is positive that the flight path may reopen.

Because it is our basic policy that Japan-Taiwan relations should be supported at the private-level within the framework of establishing diplomatic ties with China, it is a matter of course that reestablishing a line with Taiwan will occur within this framework. Therefore, we have judged that the reestablishing this line will not worsen Japan-China relations.

(ii) Japan-China Relations

(1) Although government and civil exchange with China has expanded after normalization in 1972, it can be said that Japan-China relations is currently in the process of normalization in the true sense. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue deeper mutual understanding between the governments in order to establish a framework for regular discussions on not only Japan-China relations, but also wider international affairs. Additionally, the governments must make the necessary arrangements to realize true civil exchange, rather than the traditional ‘friendship between gentlemen.’ The government needs to continue arranging exchanges, such as the academic delegation sent to China in March. The largest challenge for Japan-China relations is to regularize processes such as these to add the breadth and depth to Japan-China dialogue.

(2) Currently, an important issue for Japan and China is the negotiation on the treaty of peace and friendship. Since the Korea vice-minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry visited Japan last fall, we have proactively conducted talks through diplomatic channels.

At the moment, the focus of talks has been on how to handle the stipulations on the “wording opposed to hegemony. China is persistent not only on making this an important principle in the joint statement, but including this in the main body of the treaty. We do not object to the idea of opposing hegemony in and of itself, however we are of the standpoint that it would be difficult to agree (note) to including the word ‘hegemony,’ the definition of which is not currently well established, in the main body of a treaty, which is legal document that regulates a relationship of rights and obligations. In summation, China is taking a prudent pace of diplomacy. We also do not intend to rush the process, and plan on conducting diplomacy at a natural pace.

(Note)

The joint statement made by the Japan Socialist Party and China, which labeled the U.S. military presence in South Korea and Japan, together with the Northern Territories issue, as a manifestation of hegemony, is a great problem for both Japan and the United States.

(C) Soviet Union

(i) Trends in Soviet activity in Asia

(1) Although fundamentally constrained by the Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union’s Asia policy is using the U.S.-Soviet détente as propaganda tool for self-advantage and ostentation towards Asian countries. In the long run, the Soviet Union is striving to expand its influence while persistently pursuing diplomatic maneuvering centered on its “Asia Security Proposal.” The CSCE summit meeting was an accomplishment of the Soviet Union’s diplomacy towards the West. Now, the Soviet Union will assert the Asian iteration, the “Asia Security Proposal.” Although this will likely result in the intensification of disagreements between the Soviet Union and China in the Asian region, the West should be approach this with sufficient cautious as this proposal aims to advantageously maintain the status quo on territory while expanding its political influence.

(2) The Post-war Soviet Union’s Japan policy has consistently sought to separate Japan from the United States. More recently, a) the separation of Japan and China and b) the application of Japanese economic and technological strength have also become important goals of Soviet diplomacy. The basis of our foreign relations is the powerful and important Japan-U.S. relationship. Therefore, we will take sufficient caution so as not to become affected by the Soviet Union’s policy intentions. However, for this sake close consultation and cooperation between Japan and the United States is indispensable. The Japan-U.S. relationship is essential, not only from Japan’s policy standpoint, but also for the stability of Asia at large.

(ii) Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty (Territorial Issues)

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(iii) Siberian Development Cooperation

(1) From the standpoint of securing energy resource supplies, if the conditions are right, we plan on pursuing development cooperation with the Soviet Union. We adhere to the attitude that U.S. corporate participation is indispensible, especially when concerned with oil or natural gas, given its large scope, requirement for great sums of capital, and the fact that it deals with strategic materials.

(2) U.S. companies are participating in the following projects: Yakutsk natural gas exploration (El Paso Corp.) (See Endnotes) and the Sakhalin Continental Shelf exploration (Gulf Oil, et al). Although we assume that the United States will provide matching loans, especially for the former project, we hope very strongly for U.S. participation through investment and technology.

(Note) Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed a basic contract for the Yakutsk gas exploration project in December 1974. This July, Japan and the Soviet Union initialed a loan contract, which will be formally signed after a loan contract between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is signed and comes into effect. Therefore, these initials will not limit or regulate the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(3) A joint Japan-U.S. approach to Siberian development is desirable for Japan-U.S. cooperation from a political perspective, as well towards negotiations with the Soviet Union. We hope for the President’s cooperation on this matter from a wide perspective.

(If there is a question regarding Tyumen oil)

At the Sixth Japan-Soviet Union Joint Economic Conference held in Moscow last October, we answered that it would be difficult to enter negotiations regarding the Soviet Union’s proposal for Japanese investment and 25 million tons of transport for the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

This project is economically and technologically difficult. It is also problematic from both political and military perspectives. Therefore, the government cannot support this proposal.

(4) Others

(A) The Middle East

(i) Matters to be specified on our part

We would like to express our admiration for the President, Secretary Kissinger, and United States Government’s energy and zeal in their approach towards the Middle East peace negotiations. We hope that this energy leads to the speedy conclusion to the disengagement negotiations between Egypt and Israel and the road towards an official and permanent resolution to the Middle East issue. In regards to this, we would like to confirm the United States’ forecasts and perspectives.

(1) Prospects on a conclusion to the Sinai Peninsula negotiations

(2) If there is a conclusion to the Sinai Peninsula negotiations, what sort of schedule does the U.S. envision? (For instance, the Second Israel-Egypt military disengagement negotiations, convening Geneva Conference)

(3) Forecasts on Middle East affairs for the second-half of this year. (Particularly in the event that the current Sinai peninsula negotiations do not come to a conclusion)

(4) Prospects on how to handle the proposals made this year at the U.N. General Assembly for the expulsion of Israel or the imposition of economic sanctions on them.

(ii) Outline for Responses

(Q) How does Japan see the possibilities of an UNSC sanction on Israel or the expulsion of Israel?

(A) As I said during my administrative policy address in January, we hope for a harmonious resolution to the Middle East problem through dialogue, and therefore, in regards to the interested parties, we do not find it right to mischievously take a hardline approach or to exclude Israel from the framework of dialogue through international organizations. We oppose the expulsion of Israel and we find economic sanctions undesirable. Even if we were to take this principled position, as the country most dependent on Middle Eastern oil among developed countries, we will be in a bitter position at the U.N. General Assembly depending on the circumstances.  Therefore, we hope that the U.S. will continue to persuade the interested parties to pursue peaceful negotiations, and for the second disengagement negotiations to reach a settlement by the U.S. General Assembly at the latest.  

(Q) What does Japan feel about the PLO?

(A) As I said during my administrative policy address in January, although we believe that the UNSC Resolution 242 is just, in regards to Palestinian refugees, the U.N. Charter should recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We see the PLO as an ethnic liberation organization representing the Palestinian people. However, because the PLO is neither a nation nor government, recognition of the PLO under international law as a nation or state is a non-issue.  Considering the recent developments in Lebanon, what is the U.S. perspective regarding the fate of the PLO and how the U.S. will handle relations between the PLO and Israel.

(Q) What is Japan’s attitude towards the establishment of a PLO office in Japan?

(A) We are inclined to recognize a PLO affiliate entering the country with private qualifications in order to establish a private office. Because the PLO is neither a nation nor an international organization, we will not consider the issue of granting diplomatic immunity.

(B) East-West relations in Europe

(i) The President attended the CSCE summit meeting on July 30th of last year, but we would like to know how the U.S. sees West-East relations developing, especially on how to deal with the likelihood that the Soviet Union will strengthen its aggressive diplomatic activities by interpreting the items adopted by the CSCE to be favorable to themselves, or how the West will deal with internal issues, such as the growth of leftism in Portugal.

(ii) The Portugal issue (If there is a foreign ministerial level opportunity)

How does U.S. see the current state of Portugal affairs, considering the continuing confusion in political affairs and the affect this has had on unity of the Western camp.  

(C) Disarmament

(i) The NPT Issue

(1) Issues with Japan’s ratification (Respond in the following if the question is raised)

(a) Regrettably, although the government has endeavored to gain approval during the current ordinary session of the National Diet, the issue will be carried over to the next session for additional review.

(b) This requires sufficient discussion and wide public support.  Public interest for this issue, inclusive of the ongoing debates in the Diet, is high. This is advantageous for ratification in the future. We want to express that we are determined to have this treaty ratified at the next session of the Diet.

(2) The necessity of strengthening the NPT Framework (To be raised on our part)

(a) Starting with India’s nuclear experiment, we are concerned about the trend of proliferation. The strengthening of the NPT framework is needed. Regarding the NPT review conference, it is significant that a final declaration was made that included the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the encouragement of nuclear disarmament, ensuring the security of non-nuclear countries, and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear power.

(b) Regarding the above conference, we are very interested in the strengthening the NPT framework so as to ensure the security of non-nuclear weapons states. The contents (note) of the final declaration are something our country can be satisfied with, and it was beneficial in promoting our country’s ratification of the NPT.

(Note) The final declaration had the effect of drawing attention to the decision by the U.S. and U.K to uphold the U.S.-U.K.-Soviet declaration that resulted from UNSC Resolution 255 regarding the security of non-nuclear weapons states.

(c) Strengthening the NPT framework requires greater progress for international cooperation on securing more non-treaty states to participate, preventing the appearance of new nuclear states, nuclear disarmament, the security of non-nuclear weapons states, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility regarding the above topics.  

(3) Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers initiative (note)

(Respond in the following way if the question is raised)

Regarding the question of our cooperation on the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers initiative raised during the NPT Review Conference, as a country seeking to develop nuclear power, we would like to cautiously consider the possibility of realizing this initiative.

(Note) Under the peaceful use of nuclear energy, typical nuclear fuel undergoes the ‘nuclear fuel cycle,’ which includes production, use, spent fuel (re)processing, and finally re-use. This initiative will approach the nuclear fuel cycle at the regional level, rather than at the level of individual countries. It will also attempt to concentrate the reprocessing facilities of a given region in a specified country.

(ii) Japan-U.S. Uranium Enrichment Program Issue

(Respond in the following way if the topic is raised)

From the standpoint of acquiring a secure supply of enriched uranium, we are very interested in the smooth realization of the joint project on uranium enrichment after joint civilian investigation are conducted, as was laid out by the joint statement made during the Japan-U.S. summit meeting two years ago. We would like to positively consider our attitude towards the joint project while taking into account the internal and external circumstances facing the U.S. and the intentions of our private stakeholders.

Furthermore, it is desirable for the parties involved from both countries to sufficiently coordinate on the specifics of this issue.

(iii) SALT II

(To be raised on our part)

Next to the OSCE meetings, we believe that the SALT II arrangement is central to détente between the East and West. Together with the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings, we are extremely interested in the prospects of the above arrangement. What is the U.S. perspective on the matter?

(Note) The U.S. has regularly briefed us on how the SALT negotiations were proceeding.

(Reference) Our basic thoughts on SALT

Because we rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to deal with nuclear threats to our country, we need the U.S. to maintain its effective and reliable nuclear capabilities.

(D) Various issues regarding the U.N.

(i) The United Nations has approached the 30th anniversary since its foundation. It has accomplished its important role in supporting international peace and the advancing international cooperation.

(ii) It appears that the U.S. has intensified its critical attitudes of the U.N. after being disappointed by the so-called “Third World” countries unifying to push through votes before those in favor of adequate cooperation can gather. This trend is just producing resolutions that will not be enforced, and this will not solve any issues. As this may prove harmful to the authority of the United Nations, we too view this trend with concern. While we fully understand the United States’ dissatisfaction in this manner, on the other hand, there are aspects of these countries’ aspirations that are difficult to ignore. As developed nations, we ought to show understanding and take time so that their demands can be placed within the confines of reason. It is our country’s position, as well, to endeavor towards this direction.

If the U.S. lost interest in the United Nations, the U.N. would not function and would result in unfathomable damage to the international community. It is our hope that the United States, with full understanding of the above points, continues to cooperate with Japan and other countries, so that the United Nations will fulfill its constructive and effective role in solving various world problems.

(iii)0We would like to seek the United States’ cooperation on a specific issue. We believe that the United States recognizes our constructive contribution up till now through the U.N. University system. However, we face the problem that the financial foundation of the U.N. University is not solid. We have heard that the United States is considering financial cooperation for the U.N. University, and we are very hopeful for this to occur.

(Reference)

The United States’ Criticism of the United Nations

1. The American public is dissatisfied with the U.N., and as a result, since late last year, the U.S. government has also publically criticized the United Nations. This is in response to the so-called “Third World” countries using their numbers to their advantage in order to pursue forceful methods in the U.N. Some examples being: the adoption of the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action at the 6th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly; the treatment of the Palestinian issue, exclusion of South Africa, the adoption of the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the exclusion of Israel from its regional UNESCO group during the 29th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly; and the adoption of the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action at the UNIDO General Conference held in Lima this year.

2. Examples of the U.S. government’s public criticism of the U.N.: Ambassador Scali’s speech during last year’s opening of the U.N. General Assembly, the newly-appointed Ambassador Moynihan’s speech and conduct, and Secretary Kissinger’s speech given in Milwaukee on July 14.

2. Culture-Science and Technology0

(1) Promoting cultural-educational exchange

Recently, cultural and educational exchange between our two countries has become increasingly active based on bilateral dialogue through such bodies as the Japan-U.S. Conference on Culture and Education. This has worked to advance our two countries’ mutual understanding and friendly relations. As a country, we hope to continue utilizing conferences such as this.

Japan has supported the advancement of Japanese studies in the United States through the Japan Foundation. Inclusive of Japanese studies, we hope to expand cultural and educational exchange as much as possible.

(If the Japan-U.S. Friendship Law is mentioned)

We appreciate the United States’ efforts on the matter. If this law is passed, it will be a strong force that will drive cultural and educational exchange between Japan and the U.S. We expect for this to happen.

(2) Cooperation on science and technology

In the past 14 years since the first meeting of the Japan-U.S. Committee on Scientific Cooperation in 1961, the Committee has shown sound results and has expanded to nine groupings, including science, medicine, and natural resource development and use. To this we give our high esteem.  

Since April of this year, the U.S.-Japan Evaluation Committee for Scientific Cooperation is undertaking the constructive work of deliberating on the long-term ways in which to expand the existing plans on cooperation, and looking for new fields for possible cooperation. We hope for the Committee to chart direction in which to expand and intensify scientific and technology cooperation between Japan and the United States.

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