SECRET TELEGRAM FROM JASZCZUK (MOSCOW) TO RAPACKI (WARSAW) [CIPHERGRAM NO. 2019]
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get citationMemorandum of a conversation with Yuri Andropov. He and Boleslaw Jaszczuk discuss Chinese influence military and economic influence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam's opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally he notes the poor communications technology in place in Southeast Asia."Secret Telegram from Jaszczuk (Moscow) to Rapacki (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 2019]" February 13, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-100, t-604, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 45. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118912
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Ciphergram No. 2019
From…Moscow…dispatched on 02.13.63 at 20:40 hours…received on 02.13.63 at 21:44 hours...
Came in to the Decoding Department…02.13.63 at 23:45 hours……………………………..
From the conversation with Andropov:
1) I relayed to him the note and informed him about [your] conversation with [DRV Ambassador to Poland] Tran Chi Hien.
2) Andropov acknowledged the seriousness of the matter… Nevertheless, according to A[ndropov], some statements of the Vietnamese do not fully correspond with the position of the DRV’s leadership. From the talks which Andropov conducted in Hanoi recently, one gets the impression that, among other things, one can see the source of overcoming a series of difficulties in the DRV as far as the victory of the revolution (not postponed for years to come.). That is why we will have to explain to the Vietnamese comrades that there should be no talk about any concession or tying their hands; otherwise, the Chinese will come out ahead.
They exert a very large influence on the DRV (both within the party as well as in the army, where there are their [Chinese] commissars. The PRC extended a credit of 400 million rubles, of which 100 million would not have to be paid off. Andropov’s conversations, which took several hours, shed light on a series of unclear matters. For example, regarding the issue of missiles in Cuba, Ho [Chi Minh] sided with the Chinese position (why send them and then withdraw them), but after [hearing] the explanation, he recognized the correctness of the Soviet conduct.
On the matter of Cuba, some Vietnamese comrades were saying that, if it were them, the DRV would continue to build socialism quietly, and on the outside it would assume a position of coexistence and neutrality. Andropov is pleased with the talks. He thinks that the position of the VWP [Vietnamese Workers’ Party] is currently much better than before. The VWP’s statement, which was published today in Pravda, is closer to the Soviet position (even though it does not mention a Soviet initiative to stop public criticism and meeting despite the fact that it assigns an equal role to both the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] .)
Andropov sees serious difficulties in the lack of speedy and thorough information (this phenomenon occurs in the entire region of Southeast Asia) which often can make their understanding difficult and cause the wrong stance to be taken. For example, Khrushchev’s speech at the VI Congress of the SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German Democratic Republic)] initially came as a summary (3 pages), and then in a few days in the full form. No wonder that the reaction is not as quick as for example that of Europe. The lack of detailed and accurate information facilitates for the Chinese the propagating of their position and struggle with “the contemporary revisionism.”
During Andropov’s conversation with Ho [Chi Minh] it became clear that nobody is imposing on the DRV the forms of activity within the framework of Marxism- Leninism. The DRV should act within this framework as it deems correct, but the USSR can also choose such means which it sees [fit] to bring good results in its situation.”
3) Andropov’s conversations in Beijing were formal and did not bring anything new.
4) Yesterday, [John] Gollan [Member of the Communist Party of Great Britain] left
Moscow. His report was rather stingy. The Chinese are in a “bellicose mood,” but they say that they do not want it to come to a split. As to Gollan’s proposition of meeting with the CPSU, they avoided a clear reply. Andropov thinks that a year-long campaign in the CCP and the nation makes it difficult for them to withdraw. The economic situation in the PRC is bad. An atmosphere of further difficulties is on the rise. There is a talk of a future disaster of drought [even] before the beginning of spring works.
5) I informed Andropov about the future plenum and its principal themes. Andropov is asking to give him the dates when their party delegation (headed by the CC Secretary) could come visit us. He sees March as the earliest possible date, but he leaves the final dates to us.
Deciphered on 02.13.09:50
Deciphered by Stafiej, checked by Zagórowicz