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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 09, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 9 and 12 July 1956

    In their meeting on July 9 and 12, 1956, the CPSU Presidium calls for an article to be prepared on the subversive activities of “imperialists” in Poznan and Hungary. Italian communist, Palmiro Togliatti, is to assist in writing an article in the Italian press. The working notes also refer to the situation developing over the rehabilitation of Hungarian communist, Laszlo Rajk, with a reference to HWP leader Rakosi.

  • October 20, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 20 October 1956

    Notes from the meeting of the CPSU Presidium on the issues of Poland and Hungary. Soviet officials discuss preventing the ouster of Polish Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski and forming a committee to possibly replace Gomulka. The Presidium considers events in Hungary with recommendations to dispatch Mikoyan, recall troops to their units, and draft an informational report.

  • October 21, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 21 October 1956 On the Situation in Poland

    Khrushchev calls for patience and a refrain from military intervention in Poland. The entire Presidium supports Krushchev.

  • October 23, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 23 October 1956

    The Presidium is updated on events unfolding in Budapest. Khrushchev favors deploying troops to quell the uprising. Mikoyan, alone in his dissent, advocates political measures followed by troops if necessary. Nagy’s capacity to control the situation is discussed, Presidium members assert the incongruities with Poland, and Khrushchev dispatches Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest.

  • October 26, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 26 October 1956

    Liu Shaoqi of the CPC CC tells the CPSU Presidium that the Rokossowski issue is central in Poland. The Presidium considers incoming information sent by Mikoyan and Suslov from Budapest. It is recommended that Hungarians studying in Moscow be instructed and sent back to Budapest to end the “vacillations” within the CC. Presidium members are critical of Mikoyan and call for a firm line with Hungary. Khrushchev commits to sending three more Presidium members to Hungary, contacting ousted Prime Minister Andras Hegedus, and reinforcing the troops.

  • October 28, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 28 October 1956

    The notes from this session of the CPSU Presidium reveal a desire to support and strengthen the Kadar-Nagy government and the draft declaration prepared by the Hungarians for radio broadcast on October 28. Khrushchev, desiring to avoid the complications that Britain and France face in Egypt, asserts the need for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal.

  • October 30, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956

    The Presidium decides to promulgate a declaration on Hungary in which Soviet withdrawal and relations with the new government will be addressed. Members discuss the language of the new declaration and the advice of the CPC CC regarding the status of Soviet troops. The declaration is also intended to address the broader crisis in Soviet relations with people’s democracies.

  • October 31, 1956

    Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. Gryaznov, a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Yugoslavia

    Tito, currently in Brioni, requests that a meeting with Khrushchev and Malenkov is relocated to Brioni, as Tito is forbidden to leave due to illness.

  • October 31, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956

    Khrushchev and members of the CPSU CC Presidium decide to not withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. Negotiations with Tito and the situation in Yugoslavia are also mentioned.

  • November 01, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956

    At this session of the Presidium, Mikoyan argues that in the face of a universal demand for troop withdrawal the best option is to support the Hungarian government. Mikoyan promotes negotiations over force. The other members support the application of force to put down the uprising. Supporters of force refer to the necessity of keeping Hungary within the Soviet sphere and preventing the uprising from spreading to other Eastern European nations.

  • November 02, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956

    A plan outlining military measures against Hungary was presented at this session of the Presidium. The notes reflect that fear of fascist influence in Hungary motivated adoption.

  • November 02, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956

    The CPSU CC Presidium is confronted with reports from Hungary of mass demonstrations, armed counterrevolutionary groups, and the support for Nagy by the opposition. The CC is told about the Hungarian decision to declare neutrality and the likely confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian troops should the former continue to advance toward Budapest. Also discussed is the split within the HWP and possible Soviet responses.

  • November 03, 1956

    Notes of a Secure Phone Call from the Soviet Ambassador in Romania, A. A. Epishev

    Imre Nagy reports that Soviet troops plan to enter Romania, and contacts Gheorghiu-Dej for advice on how to proceed.

  • November 03, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath

    Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.

  • November 04, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956

    At this session of the CPSU CC, Molotov raises concerns over the new Hungarian government’s decision to condemn the “Rakosi-Gero clique” and call for the condemnation of Stalinism. Molotov argues that the CC must exert influence on Kadar to prevent Hungary from going the way of Yugoslavia. The session also discusses recommendations for purging higher educational institutions and Kadar’s withdrawal of appeals to the UN for assistance.

  • November 05, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 5 November 1956

    Members of the CPSU CC Presidium consider changing the name of the Hungarian Worker’s Party (HWP).

  • November 06, 1956

    Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 6 November 1956

    Debate occurs at this CC session between Molotov, who opposes approving the appeal written by the Provisional CC of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, and the other members of the CC who desire approving the document. Molotov is concerned about the unknown composition of the CC of the HSWP, the condemnations of former Hungarian Worker’s Party (HWP) politicians, the issue of renaming the HWP, and the risk that Hungary will become the next Yugoslavia. Khrushchev states that Molotov is “clung to the cult of Stalin” and that Molotov is considering bringing back Rakosi and Hegedus.

  • May 21, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32

    Protocol 32 gives hint to the consternation Khrushchev faced to have his plan of missiles placed in Cuba approved. It took two separate meetings and four days for the Presidium to conceded to Khrushchev's plan.

  • June 10, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 35

    A record of the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This protocol illustrates Khrushchev's confidence in the plan to install missiles in Cuba, although some members still have to approach the operation from a practical standpoint.

  • July 01, 1962

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39

    Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.