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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • February 11, 1961

    Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'Memorandum of Conversation between China’s Ambassador to Cuba, Shen Jian, and Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro'

    A diplomatic meeting between Fidel Castro and Shen Jian (from China) in which they discuss the Cuban revolution, US-Cuban relations and imperialism.

  • December, 1961

    Memorandum Regarding the Plan of Insurrection for the First Period of 1962

    Intervention of Fidel Castro concerning the plan of insurrection of the Revolutionary Armed Forces for the first period of 1962.

  • December 14, 1961

    Polish Notes from Miami Regarding Situation in Cuba

    Notes on news stories collected from various Spanish-language newspapers in Miami. Topics cover the growing tension between Cuba and the US, efforts to recruit Cubans to US army, skepticism over whether the US could have any influence over Castro's revolution, and worries that US military involvement in Cuba could escalate into another big war.

  • January 09, 1962

    Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on Deputy Foreign Minister Péter Mód’s talks with political leaders in Cuba

    Ambassador János Beck reports on Foreign Minister Péter Mód’s visit to Cuba, and with whom he met. The report is divided among four different official meetings: Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI). Beck summarizes each meeting separately. Topics include Cuba’s expectation of a US invasion and the US’s current clandestine activities, Organization of American States (OAS) and its use as a political tool in US-Latin American relations, Sino-Soviet relations, socialist unity and the importance of Soviet trade, Cuba’s perceived Soviet military advantage over the US, and the Communist Party’s development/popularity in Cuba. Many of these topics appear in various meetings outlined in the report.

  • January 18, 1962

    Note to the GPRA Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Mission to Cuba'

    Report from Lakhdar Brahimi -- GPRA representative at celebration of Cuban revolution in Havana -- on meeting with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, both of whom express considerable interest in Algerian revolution. Fidel Castro pledges Cuban support, both material and diplomatic, advises Algeria on how to proceed in negotiations with France, and strongly encourages the opening of an Algerian diplomatic mission in Cuba. Brahimi concludes with recommendations on how best to respond to Cuban suggestions and an outline of potential strategic benefits from a diplomatic relationship between two countries.

  • June 09, 1962

    Soviet Report by Cuban Involvement in Assisting Partisans in Other Latin American Countries

    Report on a conversation between Fidel Castro and Soviet representatives. Castro believed that revolutionary situation has developed in all Central American countries (except Mexico) and a few South American countries. In his opinion, a slight push in the form of armed actions by partisans would rally the peasant masses and bring about regime change. The report also discussed Havana's low opinion of many Latin American Communist Parties. Cuba's bypassing these parties in interfering in the respective countries' affairs worsened the relations between them and Havana.

  • June 13, 1962

    Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 13 June 1962

    Rapacki reports on a meeting with the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas], including: Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, [President Osvaldo] Dorticos [Torrado], Blas Roca, [and Emilio] Aragones [Navarro]. They discussed general issues of coordinating sugar trade, agricultural policy, policies toward the church, diplomatic visits, and the most current topic of the Escalante affair.

  • August 23, 1962

    Soviet Report on American Attempts at Disseminating Fabricated News on Cuba

    Report on the American effort to spread false rumors about the arrival of Soviet military equipments and personnel in Cuba. To counter this subversive attempt, the Cuban security organs has established full control of foreign correspondence and captured maps and intelligence reports.

  • October 23, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

  • October 24, 1962

    Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and Military Chiefs

    Fidel Castro and his military advisors are discussing possible American mobilization of troops to Cuba (in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and what Cuba would need to do to defend itself from such an invasion. A majority of the conversation is devoted to anti-aircraft and aviation preparations.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Fidel Castro to N. S. Khrushchev

    In his message to Khrushchev, Fidel Castro evaluated the two possible scenarios of American aggression against Cuba. Castro seems to suggest a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US in the case of an attack on Cuba.

  • October 27, 1962

    Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev

    A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

  • October 27, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev

    A message from Gromyko to Alekseev to relay a message to Castro regarding American invasion.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Castro’s response to a Soviet Foreign Ministry telegram regarding the prohibition of special arms and possible US invasion.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Soviet delegate to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry

    Soviet response to American changes to U Thant’s proposal.

  • October 28, 1962

    Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev

    Gromyko asks Alekseev to relay a message to Castro regarding U Thant’s possible visit.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:45 p.m., Sunday

    Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

  • October 28, 1962

    Letter from Fidel Castro to Khrushchev

    Fidel Castro explained to Khrushchev his decision to shoot down American planes operating in Cuban air space and reaffirmed his opposition to any inspection of Cuban territory.

  • October 29, 1962

    Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Ministry AA Gromyko and Carlos Olivares Sanchez

    Conversation between Gromyko and Sanchez where Sanchez asks the Soviet opinion on a number of issues, including the US blockade of Cuba and Castro’s recent speech.

  • October 30, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”