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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 28, 1945

    Beria’s Cover Memo to Stalin on Niels Bohr

    Memo to Stalin discussing Beria’s efforts to obtain information from physicist Niels Bohr about development of the atomic bomb.

  • November 28, 1945

    The Interrogation of Niels Bohr

    At the end of October 1945 two NDVD employees of the “S” Department for atomic intelligence activities were sent to Denmark to establish contact and speak with Niels Bohr. They managed to meet Bohr at his institute twice, on 14 and 16 November 1945, and obtained answers to 22 questions on constructing a nuclear reactor and the atomic bomb.

  • December, 1945

    Kurchatov’s Evaluation of Niels Bohr's Questioning

    Evaluation by the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project, Igor Kurchatov, of the interview with Niels Bohr.

  • June 06, 1946

    Record of the Conversation of Comrade I.V. Stalin with Rasmussen, Denmark Minster of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Axel, Chief of the [Danish] Trade Delegation

    Stalin, Rasmussen, and Axel discuss the development of Soviet Danish relations. Topics include economic and political exchanges.

  • June 24, 1957

    Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the State of Soviet Foreign Policy

    The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

  • January 31, 1962

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

    Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

  • October 25, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    An intelligence report from the Danish Defense Intelligence Services providing a general background on the historical events in Cuba leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Castro's revolutionary government), the defense systems and readiness of Cuba and its closest allies and military aid and materials in Cuba.

  • November 01, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    Denmark reports on the fact that the Soviet Union does not wish for a Third World War and have abandoned Cuba as a military base, although they hope to keep it as a political base. There is also some reports on conflicts going on around the world in the 'global' Cold War. As a part of this weekly intelligence briefing, there is also a list of dates from the week with important events/actions listed for each of those days.

  • November 08, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    An intelligence report on the activities concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis, including those of the Soviet Union, Cuba and Eastern Europe states. This weekly report also includes an account of the important events/activities from this particular week. The report also analyzes several photo-reconnaissance missions.

  • November 09, 1962

    Danish Newspaper Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegria Torras

    As the first journalist in Cuba since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, Petersen is received by 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Pelegria Torras, for an interview. They discuss the differences between socialism and capitalism; Cuban-Scandanavian relations; Cuban sovereignty; and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

  • November 15, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    This weekly report from the Danish Defense Intelligence Service provides an account of the important events/activities from the past week listed by each day. It also includes the following summary: "Since the Soviet Union and the United States at the current moment have reached on an agreement about the inspection of the transports to Cuba, two issues are left unsolved, that is, the issue of an inspection on Cuba itself and the removal of the IL-28 planes. With regards to the inspection on Cuban territory, it seems like the negotiation efforts of Mikoyan have been in vain. And as for the removal of the Soviet planes, Moscow has expressed itself very negatively, since the planes now are regarded as Cuban property."

  • November 22, 1962

    Danish Defense Intelligence Service Weekly Brief (Excerpts)

    The Danish Defense Intelligence Service reports on the general standing of several nations after the Cuban Missile Crisis and says that detente is not likely at this time. This weekly report also includes a list of the important events/actions from that week by each day.

  • January 20, 1966

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

    This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

  • October 19, 1976

    The President's Daily Brief, October 19, 1976

    The CIA reports that Norway and Denmark have expelled North Korean diplomats for smuggling alcohol and tobacco.

  • October 21, 1976

    Chairman of the Central Information Group to the Deputy Minister

    Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland expelled all embassy workers from DPRK, accusing them of smuggling weapons, alcohol and cigarettes.The Chairman of the Central Information Group (Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe) of the GDR requests the Deputy Minister check all Korean embassy workers, including diplomats and their relative, and to keep them under careful surveillance.

  • October 22, 1976

    Letter from Norwegian Information Service in the United States to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Facsimile - North Korean Smuggling in Scandinavia'

    Newspaper articles from the United States report on North Korean smuggling activities in Nordic embassies.

  • October 30, 1976

    The President's Daily Brief, October 30, 1976

    A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

  • June 28, 1977

    Fala-77 Military Exercise Maritime Front Reconnaissance Plan for an Amphibious Assault Operation

    This document summarizes the objectives of a 1977 Warsaw Pact reconnaissance military exercise intended to gather information about enemy defensive capabilities on the islands off the coast of Denmark and Norway, particularly Zealand.

  • December 05, 1979

    Exchange of notes, Defense Minister Scholten (also to other NATO Defense ministers) – British Defense Secretary for Defense

    Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.

  • 1980

    Military Exercise Report of the Decision of the Commander of the Maritime Front for an Offensive Operation

    A note to the Chief of Staff of the GDR People's Navy, this document assesses the enemy position and military capabilities in the Baltic Sea, the Jutland Peninsula, and the North Sea. The document notes that the NATO forces are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The stated objective of the exercise is to remove the enemy's nuclear weapons capabilities, to defeat enemy forces defending the Jutland Peninsula, and thereby to create conditions under which Warsaw Pact forces may then reach the North Sea.