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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 25, 1953

    Summary of Discussion at the 151st Meeting of the National Security Council

    American response to East German protests, plans of action toward the Soviet Union, question of defectors from socialist countries, implementation of passive and active resistance in socialist countries.

  • 1955

    View of the Asian-African Conference from the Bogor Conference

  • March 27, 1955

    Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Compilation of the Excerpts of the Telegrams Concerning the Asian-African Conference'

    The collection of telegrams covers the procedure and agenda about the Asian-African Conference, the arguments about China’s participation in the Conference, the attempts of the US and the UK to influence the Conference, and the attitudes of various countries toward the Conference.

  • October 08, 1956

    Seventh Meeting of the Main Committee, Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Statement by South African Ambassador W.C. du Plessis)

    Statement by the South African Ambassador to the United States, W. C. du Plessis, at the Seventh Meeting of the Main Committee of the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held at the United Nations. Du Plessis discusses several amendments intending to improve the representation of African and Middle Eastern countries in the IAEA, as well as several amendments regarding the structure of the organization and the IAEA board.

  • September 03, 1961

    Telegram from the Albanian ambassador in Belgrade, Tahmaz Beqari, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania

    The ambassador reports on the proceedings of the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries, and about the differences and nuances of the stances of various delegations. Except India, Libya, and the United Arab Republic, all delegations were in favor of China’s participation in the United Nations. In addition, Nehru pointed out that colonialism is in agony while the Ghanaian, Cuban, Iraqi, Nepalese and Ethiopian delegations claimed to the contrary. When Dorticós, the Cuban President, began unmasking American imperialism, the diplomats of Western countries left the conference. The diplomats of friendly countries, according to Beqari, called the speeches of the conference “80% positive.”

  • December 17, 1963

    Record of the Second Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Nasser

    Zhou and Nasser discuss developments in and relations with Libya, Tunisia, Israel, Palestine, Morocco, Yemen, and Mauritania, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement and the proposed second Asian-African Conference.

  • June 21, 1965

    Minutes of the Second Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Nasser

    Zhou and Nasser discuss developments in Algeria, the Second Asian-African Conference, oil in the Middle East, US foreign policy, and the economic situation in Egypt.

  • March 21, 1973

    East German Ambassador in Mogadishu Herklotz, 'Note About a Conversation with the USSR Ambassador to the SDR [Somali Democratic Republic], Comrade A. Pasiutin, on March 15, 1973'

    The two ambassadors discuss relations between East and West Germany, as well as Somalia President Siad Barre's trip to visit Arab states.

  • December 25, 1976

    Minutes of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov and Muammar al-Qaddafi

    Qaddafi seeks Bulgarian assistance in his attempt to close a deal with the Soviet Union for purchase of weapons and for construction of a nuclear power plant. Todor Zhivkov in turn requests a loan. Both leaders discuss the situation in Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Syria, Chad, Sudan, and Western Sahara.

  • March 23, 1977

    Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cuban Ambassador to Maputo commented on President Fidel Castro’s trip to some African countries'

    The information obtained by Romania’s ambassador to Maputo by his Cuban counterpart not only continues Castro’s praise of Mengistu’s revolutionary zeal, but also sheds more light on the wide scope of the Cuban President’s endeavors on the African continent.

  • August 22, 1978

    TELEGRAM 079.451 from the Romanian Embassy in Tripoli to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    A senior Libyan official visits the DPRK and requests assistance with construction. Military and cultural cooperation between North Korea and Libya are also discussed.

  • November, 1979

    Saddam and His Inner Circle Discussing Relations with Various Arab States, Russia, China, and the United States

    Transcript of a meeting between President Saddam Hussein amd Iraqi officials, taking place sometime between 4-20 November 1979. Saddam discusses relations with Europe, Russia, China, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Iraqi officials criticize Libya and Syria for their support to Iran. Another official criticizes the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat for his attitudes in making peace agreement with Israel. Saddam accuses the Americans of playing a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran.

  • March 11, 1980

    Minutes of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov and Muammar al-Qaddafi , Tripoli

  • April 09, 1981

    Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

    Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

  • July, 1982

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987'

    With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

  • March, 1985

    Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective'

    For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.

  • April 19, 1986

    International Olympic Committee President interview with Chun Doo-hwan on North Korean Threats to the 1988 Seoul Olympics

    IOC President Samaranch speaks to South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan. Samarach tries to persuade Chun to concede some of the sports organizing at the upcoming Summer 1988 Olympics to North Korea, as their demands have "decreased drastically." Chun fears that concessions now will lead to greater concessions in the future. Chun urges Samaranch to take control of the situation, as the IOC is well-respected. In order for the IOC to negotiate with North Korea, North Korea must declare that it will honor the Olympic Charter.

  • October, 1987

    General Military Intelligence Directorate Memos on Iran's Chemical Weapons Capability and Alleged Use

    Contains memos issued by the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), last dated 6 July 1988, regarding the following issues: The use of chemical weapons by the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War, stating dates and places where they were used; the attempts of Iran to produce chemical weapons relying on the assistance of North Korea, Syria and West Germany; developing some Iranian insecticide factories to be able to produce chemical weapons; types of chemical weapons which are used or produced by Iran, such as mustard Gas, C factor, phosgene factor, white phosphorus, sarin gas. Page 27 contains correspondence by the Iraqi Military Attache Office in Cairo to the GMID, dated 14 September 1988, regarding information received from the Egyptian Intelligence about Iran's attempts to obtain chemical weapons from Spain through mediators and to provide Libya with chemical weapons in return for supplying Scud B missiles.

  • July, 1996

    A. Bouzid, ‘Summary of Armament during the 1954 Revolution'

    Summarizes the logistical process and efforts of armament for the Algerian revolution, from 1947-1962. Lists the various countries who supplied the Algerians with weapons and ammunition, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, East Germany, and China. Outlines, in detail, the processes for transporting weapons across borders, the logistical structure of departments handling distribution and supply of weapons for the revolution, and modes of transport for these supplies.

  • June, 2007

    About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology

    Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo. Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit. To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.