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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • June 22, 1954

    Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia

    Letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to Yugoslav leader Josep B. Tito suggesting that the time is ripe for a rapprochement between the two states and parties. Blaming former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and former Yugoslav leadership member Milovan Djilas for doing the work of the imperialists by attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet and Yugoslav people and parties, Khrushchev suggests that the ousting of both will increase rapprochement between the two countries and be the catalyst for a a summit between the two leaders.

  • July 24, 1954

    Cable from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and Central Committee of the League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia

    Letter from the CC CPSU to the CC LCY regarding the positive response given the CC CPSU by the CC LCY concerning the 22 June 1954 Soviet letter to the Yugoslav leadership suggesting the possibility of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The Soviets also suggest that they support the Yugoslav position on the question of the city of Trieste, a disputed zone between the Yugoslavs and the Italians.

  • August 11, 1954

    Letter from Tito and the Executive Committee [Politburo] of the CC LCY to Nikita Khrushchev and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

    Yugoslav response to Soviet approaches about normalizing relations between the two countries and the two parties. While encouraged by the Soviet gestures, the Yugoslav leadership remains cautious and suggests that the rapprochement take a slow and steady course, taking into account the differences as well as the similarities between the two countries.

  • September 23, 1954

    Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

    Nikita Khrushchev’s letter to Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito concerning the possibility of improving relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet leader suggests that rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia can only be accomplished if both parties continue the exchange of views regarding mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country, peaceful coexistence, equality among parties, and world peace. Khrushchev goes on to suggest that a summit between party representatives should meet in order to further rapprochement.

  • September 27, 1954

    Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

    The CC CPSU leadership letter of apology to the CC LCY for “an inappropriate formulation” that had escaped Soviet censors concerning the Yugoslav leadership in the second edition of the book Historical Materialism

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relaying a message from "Brazilian Ambassador in Washington [Roberto de Oliveira Campos] says that the USA is getting ready for military intervention in Cuba. The approximate plan is that US planes will start bombing Cuba in the places where there are alleged bases with nuclear weapons and that will be as soon as Cuba refuses to accept the UN Commission for disarmament."

  • October 24, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-USSR-Cuban relations. It says, the "American arguments in favor of the military blockade of Cuba are: firstly, they have solid proof that Cuba will get atomic weapons; secondly, Kennedy must take more severe measures because of the internal pressure, that’s why his option is blockade, although he is trying to transfer this issue to the UNO [United Nations Organization] in order to alleviate the pressure on himself; thirdly, transferring Cuba’s issue to the UNO he is creating a precedent against unilateral USSR actions in Berlin."

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about meeting with Brazilian officials to discuss the US preparing a military invasion of Cuba.

  • October 25, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.

  • October 26, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Jeneiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talks with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official Carlos A. Bernardes about the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They are afraid that euphoria could make the US intensify a conflict that could lead to invasion, because the US ambassador [Lincoln Gordon] claims constantly that the solution to this crisis is not only disarmament of Cuba, but also liquidation of Fidel’s regime.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Ambassador Vidaković describes a meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Dorticos is convinced that the American attack and invasion will happen later that night.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

  • October 27, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Vidaković describes the positions of both Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, with whom he met, and U Thant, who sent him a message. Both men relay the difficulties in dealing with the Cuban situation, especially concerning the resolution to the UN on inspections in Cuba and the imminent danger of a possible American attack.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Foreign Minister Raúl Roa said to the Yugoslavian official that Fidel’s last declaration (his 5 point statement on 28 October) was directed more at Khrushchev than to Kennedy.

  • October 28, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Barišić is forwarding a message from Brazilian President João Goulart to Yugoslavian President Tito. The body of the message contains his thoughts on both Brazil and Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis and also his hopes that negotiations can reach a settlement that will both retain Cuba's right to self-determination and also proceed with the denuclearization efforts of Latin America.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassy, Rio de Janeiro

    Popovic is concerned with announcing "the messages" and requests that the Embassy contact him immediately.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations

    Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.

  • October 29, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (Koca Popovic) to Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković)

    A telegram from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (Koca Popovic) to the Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) about the proposal sumitted to the United Nations concerning the Cuban crisis - Guantanamo closure, nuclear base installations, denuclearization of Latin America, etc.

  • October 30, 1962

    Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

    Vidaković tells the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that Fidel Castro is very stubborn and that most of the negotiation talks that are taking place are just empty words.