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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • January 24, 1973

    Memorandum from Ronald I Spiers to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 'US – French Military Cooperation: Status Report'

    Description of weapons safety talks between US and French nuclear weapons technicians. The US team is impressed that the French employ safety tactics that are on par with US practices. A third talk would help cover any remaining issues related to safety, and would also be a time to discuss underground nuclear testing by the French. The French continue to press for more technical assistance for their missile program.

  • February 03, 1973

    Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'Missile Assistance to France -- New NSSM'

    Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.

  • March 09, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Reports that the Belgian Embassy Counsel received the North Korean Counsel in his home, where the latter noted the establishment of a North Korean information bureau in France and a trade bureau in Finland, and proposed a formal or informal visit to Brussels. The Belgian reply was noncommittal; the North Korean also announced his intention to visit the Dutch Embassy.

  • March 13, 1973

    Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Contacts with North Korea'

    A memorandum from the Dutch Government which argues the benefits of opening informal contacts with North Korea.

  • March 14, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Schmelzer states he would like to be informed of the Belgian government's reaction to the report of the Belgian Embassy Counsel in Warsaw's report on his informal meeting with the North Korean Counsel.

  • March 15, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Brussels to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Van Schelle reports that pending the outcome of an investigation the Belgian government has told its Embassy in Warsaw to avoid further contacts with the North Koreans. Furthermore the Belgian Embassy in Bern will look into a presumable visit to Switzerland by a highly placed North Korean and possible motivation of the Swiss to establish a North Korean trade office. The Belgians have reiterated their restrictive standpoint and have no current intention to recognize North Korea

  • March 21, 1973

    East German Ambassador in Mogadishu Herklotz, 'Note About a Conversation with the USSR Ambassador to the SDR [Somali Democratic Republic], Comrade A. Pasiutin, on March 15, 1973'

    The two ambassadors discuss relations between East and West Germany, as well as Somalia President Siad Barre's trip to visit Arab states.

  • March 28, 1973

    Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan, "Growing Ties with Pyongyang"

    Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on growing ties with Pyongyang, UNCURK session, document concerning last week's confidential letter, and North-South dialogue.

  • April 19, 1973

    Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, 'US Assistance to the French Missile Program'

    Sonnenfeldt worries about documents concerning French nuclear aid passing through so many hands that their security is at risk; Kissinger is to tell Richardson to be as discrete as possible. Richardson has recently sent Galley information on the new areas of U.S. aid to France and of the talks that will be used to implement such aid. He informs Galley that we are willing to go ahead on the four areas recommended by his predecessor Laird: information on nuclear effects simulators; sales of small simulators; hardening technology; and ABM intelligence.

  • May 10, 1973

    Agenda, Brazilian Delegation to West Germany, 'Program of the Meeting on Nuclear Cooperation'

    Schedule of the Brazilian delegation during a visit to various cities in West Germany (Bonn, Erlangen, Frankfurt) in February 1973. This mission is regarded as a critical step towards the establishment of the nuclear agreement with West Germany in 1975. The hand-written notes indicate the appointments and the sites to be visited by technical officials, engineers Carlos Syllus, who later became Director for Technology at Nuclebras, David Neiva Simon, who had been involved in the negotiations of the first Angra power plant with Westinghouse, and Ambassador Nogueira Batista, who would later become president of Nuclebras.

  • May 21, 1973

    Sixth Interkit Meeting, Record of Meeting with Boris Ponomarev and Konstantin Katushev

    This record of a meeting with the secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Boris Ponomarev, and with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev, addresses the anti-Soviet course adopted by Beijing. The discussion specifically refers to relations between China and the Communist parties of Albania, Romania, Australia, France, Italy, and New Zealand. The document also assesses the situation in Anwar el-Sadat's Egypt, in Hafez al-Assad's Syria, in Iraq, and in Yemen, the main idea being that the Socialist countries should support the development of progressive Arabic states.

  • June 27, 1973

    Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland, 'Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation'

    Kennedy sends Hyland a review of the current status and future prospects of French aid as drafted by Denis Clift, as well as a summary of Dr. Foster’s most recent meeting with the French where they discussed new areas of cooperation. It also discusses the advantages if the French were to implement a missile warning system, and how French assistance might be a useful bargaining tool for the U.S. especially when it comes to improving French-European relations.

  • July, 1973

    Possible Ideas for the Introduction of a Submission in the Politburo

    A report on Stage I of the CSCE prepared for the SED Politburo.

  • July 03, 1973

    Notes on a conversation between the GDR and FRG Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Otto Winzer and Walter Scheel, on 3 July 1973

    Notes on a conversation between the GDR and FRG foreign ministers on inter-German relations and the CSCE negotiations.

  • July 04, 1973

    Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The UN and North Korea'

    The memorandum notes the Minister's intent to recognize North Korea no later than year's end, if possible. It agrees with the suggestion made in a departmental study that confidential consultations with those countries most involved would be good to get rid of UNCURK and the attached UN Command. It does note that (1) recognition should be postponed until some kind of basic agreement between the Koreas has come about; (2) getting rid of UN Command would create a difficult situation for those American troops still present, which should be addressed.

  • July 07, 1973

    Notes of a Conversation between Comrade Winzer and the Foreign Minister of the FRG, Walter Scheel, on 7 July 1973, 11:50 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. in the Finlandia Hall

    Notes of a conversation between GDR and FRG foreign ministers discussing their first meeting and future relations between the GDR and FRG.

  • July 09, 1973

    Report by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on China's Policy toward Western Europe and Opposition against the CSCE

    This document contains information prepared by the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on China's European policy and Chinese opposition to the convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It states that China's overall goals are diametrically opposed to those of the European Socialist countries and their Communist parties, with Beijing identifying the Soviet Union as its primary enemy. In this light, the Soviet leadership maintains that actively confronting China in ideological and political terms remains one of the most important tasks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

  • July 18, 1973

    Preparatory Materials for East German Protest Against the Intended Establishment of a Chinese Trade Representation in West Berlin

    These documents are related to East Germany's protest against the intended establishment of a Chinese trade representation in West Berlin. The East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that West Berlin cannot be regarded as part of West Germany. Therefore, by initiating diplomatic relations with West Berlin without considering the existence of the internationally acknowledged Four Power Agreement on Berlin between the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, China is deliberately acting against the interests of East Germany.

  • July 18, 1973

    Cable from Dutch Embassy in Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'North Korea'

    Tengbergen reports an telephone call by the North Korean Embassy Counsel requesting to meet with him informally, which he declined.

  • July 20, 1973

    Internal Memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Message from Warsaw dd 18 July, red'

    Brief note relaying that the July 18 message from Warsaw has been requested for viewing by the chief of the DKP department.