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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • February 28, 1955

    Report by the Measurement Lab of the USSR Academy of Science, 'On the Properties of the Atomic Bombs Detonated on the Marshal Islands in 1954'

    Soviet scientific intelligence report on U.S. nuclear weapons testing on the Marshall Islands in 1954. This report concludes that the Ivy Mike and Castle nuclear detonations were thermonuclear based on gamma ray spectroscopy of fission fragments collected by Soviet aircraft over the USSR and PRC.

  • June 30, 1955

    Letter from Iu. B. Khariton to N. I. Pavlov Regarding the Testing of a Nuclear Weapon at Object 700

    The letter describes geographic, safety, and technical considerations taken into account when selecting a test site for the RDS-37 hydrogen bomb. Specifically, the letter highlights that a testing field should be chosen based on the existence of population centers, the terrain, and the main wind patterns.

  • August 24, 1955

    Report by N.M Emanuel, 'Regarding the Nature of the Fallout Path of the Hydrogen Bomb Detonated on 1 March 1954 at Bikini [Atoll]'

    Report by N.M. Emanuel on the U.S. Castle Bravo test in the Marshall Islands. The report surmises from fallout data that the bomb used a fission-fusion-fission design, and that the bomb contained a larger than normal amount of fissile material which induced a thermonuclear reaction.

  • January 01, 1956

    Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 'Agenda Items Relating to Disarmament'

    Summary of the Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly's agenda on disarmament

  • May 16, 1956

    Bhabha and Jawaharlal Nehru Correspondence on Indian Nuclear History

    A series of letters between Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru covering a wide range of subjects, including the appropriate venues to voice opinions, the status of the Colaba site, meeting with the Pakistan Association for the Advancement of Science, and issues with coordination between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Education on scientific research and education. Also includes a copy of a letter from The Tokyo Shimbun requesting Dr. Bhabha’s presence at a forum discussing the justifiability of American hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific.

  • March 23, 1957

    Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd, 'Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request (2) Test Limitation'

    US-UK discussion of French nuclear weapons potential and efforts that could be undertaken to hinder or advance the their program. The French request for technical assistance from these two governments was also covered.

  • 1958

    Information about Conducting in Ukraine of Month’s Campaign of Joint Actions of the People against the Nuclear Weapon and for Universal Prohibiting of the Nuclear Tests for Ever and Ever

    This document describes the monthly anti-nuclear campaign held in Ukraine from September to October, 1958. During this campaign, a number of mass meetings were organized. In this meetings, scientists lectured on the damage of nuclear tests and danger of nuclear war. The lecturers argued that only western states were responsible for conducting nuclear tests and initiating the nuclear arms race, and that the Soviet Union was forced to develop its nuclear capabilities to protect socialist countries, even though the Soviets support the idea of prohibiting the nuclear weapon.

  • April 04, 1958

    Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Zhou Enlai on the Prohibition of Nuclear Testing

    Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.

  • June 20, 1959

    Letter from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the Temporary Halt in Nuclear Assistance

    The Soviet Central Committee informs their Chinese counterparts that, in light of the arms reduction talks taking place in Geneva, Soviet nuclear assistance must cease. The Chinese had requested a sample atomic bomb and technical data, but the Soviet feared that doing so would imperil the efforts of the socialist countries in Geneva.

  • December 27, 1962

    Bulgarian UN Representative Milko Tarabanov, Report to Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo on Disarmament Negotiations

    UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session. The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO). Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

  • August 28, 1963

    Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'

    Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force

  • September 21, 1964

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Explosion

    Zhou Enlai offers multiple dates on which the first nuclear test explosion may take place and asks Mao Zedong for his preference.

  • October 11, 1964

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, et al., on the Nuclear Explosion

    Zhou Enlai notifies Mao Zedong and other prominent political and military officials that preparations have been made to detonate the explosion between October 15 and 20, depending on weather conditions. Attention is also given to the high level of secrecy surrounding the explosion, methods of data collection, publicity, and the political consequences of the explosion.

  • October 21, 1964

    National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade'

    This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

  • October 24, 1964

    Bhabha Speech on Nuclear Disarmament United Nation's Day

    A speech delivered by Dr. Bhabha for United Nation’s Day on the subject of nuclear disarmament and general disarmament.

  • November 03, 1964

    Record of Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with British Minister President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay

    Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.

  • May 10, 1965

    Letter from Zhang Aiping, et al., to Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing on the Nuclear Test

    On May 10, Chinese military officials confirm that they are prepared to detonate an aerial nuclear explosion but, due to unfavorable weather conditions, must postpone the test until May 12 or 13.

  • May 11, 1965

    Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Test

    Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong that favorable weather conditions will allow them to carry out the aerial nuclear test explosion. An official statement for the press has also been prepared.

  • May 21, 1965

    Politburo Talk by Zhou Enlai on Receiving a Group of Central Military Commission Operational Meeting Comrades

    Speaking at the Politburo, Zhou Enlai explains how nuclear weapons capabilities have won China newfound admiration in the non-aligned world and instilled fear in the other nuclear powers, particularly the United States and Soviet Union.

  • July 25, 1968

    Rajya Sabha Extended Debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Draft

    Transcript of debate between members of the Rajya Sabha and the Minister of State in the Ministry if External Affairs, Shri B. R. Bhagat, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and why India has chose not to sign.