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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • February 16, 1967

    The Visit of the [Syrian] Ba’ath in the USSR, Political Report No. 3

    The document records the state of play in Syrian-Soviet relations prior to the Six-Day War. According to the author of the report negotiations between the Syrian Ba’ath delegation and Soviet authorities, which took place in Moscow during January 1967, were tense and uneasy because the Soviets were displeased by the provocative and aggressive Syrian policy toward Israel.

  • May 26, 1967

    Protocol of the meetings between Egyptian Minister of War, Shams Badran, and Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, on the 25 and 26 of May 1967

    Badran and Kosygin met in Moscow on the eve of the Six-Day War. Badran submitted a long list of weapons which Cairo wanted to be airlifted immediately. After a late night discussion in the Politburo, Kosygin informed Badran that Moscow would be willing to airlift only some of the items on the Egyptian list; others would be supplied in a later date. During the first meeting with Badran, Kosygin advised the Egyptian government to think of ways to end the crisis with Israel, perhaps by granting Israeli ships free transit in the Straights of Tiran.

  • May 26, 1967

    Protocol number 62 of the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Friday, May 26, 1967 at 4 pm, in The Kirya, Tel Aviv

  • May 26, 1967

    Minutes of an Extended Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security Issues

    Faced with a growing Egyptian military buildup in Sinai the Cabinet tried to determine if the time had come for military action, or if additional diplomacy would strengthen America's support of Israel. No consensus was reached and the decision was postponed.

  • June 02, 1967

    Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Discussion with the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the direction of India’s foreign policy. Topics covered include Indian opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; India’s position on the escalating tensions between Egypt and Israel; the possible establishment of a new Asian regional economic bloc; and the recent decision by the United States to eliminate military aid to both India and Pakistan. Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan is also discussed, including the possibility of providing military supplies to Pakistan.

  • June 14, 1967

    Letter from Walter Ulbricht to Leonid Brezhnev

    Ulbricht and the SED Politburo suggests coordinating joint policy by seven socialist countries in response to the Six-Day War.

  • June 14, 1967

    Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Ambassador S.V.H. Sanandaji on the Six-Day War, Bucharest

    Nicolae Ceaușescu received Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Soltan Hossein Vakili Sanandaji, and they discussed developments in the Near East, specifically the ongoing conflict between Israel and Arab states. Ceaușescu suggested to the Ambassador that Iran should use its influence in the area to encourage other Arab states to seek a peaceful and realistic resolution to the conflict.

  • June 14, 1967

    T. Zhivkov’s Report at the Bulgarian Plenary Meeting on the Middle East

    Zhivkov presents the BCP position on the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 'The Near East Situation and Our Further Procedure"

    Cover page to a long report on the outcome of the Six-Day War and Czechoslovakian relations with the United Arab Republic.

  • June 17, 1967

    Letter from Walther Peinsipp (Tel Aviv) to Lujo Tončić-Sorinj (Vienna), 'Final Confrontation of Soviet and American Opinions from Israel'

    Summary of conversation with a departing Soviet Embassy official who describes the Soviet assessment of the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Attachment, 'Preliminary Findings Regarding the Reasons for the United Arab Republic's and the Arab States' Defeat

    Detailed Czechoslovak report explaining the United Arab Republic's defeat in the Six-Day War.

  • June 17, 1967

    Attachment, 'Fundamental Lessons Learned from the Aggression and Proposals for Further Steps'

    Czechoslovakian assessment of the situation in the Middle East following the Six-Day War and recommended foreign policy activities.

  • June 20, 1967

    Attachment, Draft Resolution of the 37th Session of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 'The Near East Situation and Our Further Approach'

    Czechoslovakia offers assistance to the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic following their defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel.

  • June 20, 1967

    On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

    Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

  • June 20, 1967

    On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

    East German Document describing the speech by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This German translation of Brezhnev's speech was circulated to the SED leadership.

  • June 24, 1967

    Record of Conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow

    Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.

  • June 28, 1967

    The Visit of the Czechoslovak President's Special Envoy, V. Koucki, to the UAR

    The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.

  • July 04, 1967

    Airgram to Department of State from Embassy in the Hague, 'Visit by Ambassador of Romania, Dr. George Elian'

    George Elian, the Romanian ambassador to the Hague, advocates for closer relations between Romania and the United States during a meeting with an American diplomat.

  • July 09, 1967

    Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Gerhard Weiss and Gamal Abdel Nasser

    Weiss and Nasser discuss the events of the 1967 Arab-Israeli or Six-Day War.

  • July 11, 1967

    Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Budapest (excerpts)

    Soviet-bloc leaders discuss fallout of the Six Day War on the Arab countries. The focus particularly on the critical need to support the "progressive" Nasser regime. There is some debate over whether more military aid to the Arabs is necessary or wasteful. The leaders make it clear that they support the existence of the State of Israel and want to avoid getting dragged into a wider Middle East War. The idea of UAR recognition of Israel in exchange for the right of return is floated. Kosygin also gives a summary of his meeting with Johnson in New York.