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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • September 11, 1949

    Telegram from Gromyko to Tunkin at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang

    The Soviet Union sends a set of questions to Kim Il Sung on about the South Korean army and North Korea's war plans.

  • September 14, 1949

    Telegram from Tunkin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Reply to 11 September Telegram

    North Korea plans to attack South Korea, but the Soviet Foreign Ministry is skeptical about North Korea's actual military capabilities and generally disproves of North Korea's plans.

  • September 15, 1949

    Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin

    A description of the political and economic situation in South and North Korea, and on the presence of the struggling democratic and reactionary forces and their influence among the people. Attached are three appendices on the combat and strength of the South Korean and the People's Army of North Korea, the amount of weapons in the People's Army, and the amount of ammunition in the People's Army as of August 1, 1949.

  • September 24, 1949

    Politburo Decision to Confirm the Following Directive to the Soviet Ambassador in Korea

    The Soviet Politburo argues that North Korea is not ready to launch a successful overthrow of the South Korean regime and suggests North Korea should concentrate its efforts on developing partisan groups in South Korea.

  • October 26, 1949

    Draft Reply from Stalin to a Telegram from Mao Zedong on the Issue of Korea

    Stalin agrees with Mao Zedong that North Korea is not yet ready to launch an assault, and reports that the Soviet Union has told North Korea to concentrate on developing liberated areas and guerrillas in South Korea.

  • January 22, 1950

    Telegram from Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong

    Liu Shaoqi reports to Mao Zedong that the ethnic Korean officers have arrived to bring back the ethnic Koreans to Korea. To the request of the North Korean officers in bringing back the weapons ethnic Korean officers had used, Mao responds in the affirmative.

  • January 31, 1950

    Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Stalin

    As a response to Stalin's willingness to talk to Kim Il Sung on the issue of offensive attack to South Korea and on Stalin's request of lead, Kim Il Sung, according to Shtykov, responded that he would like to set up a meeting with him, and that he would take necessary measures for the lead to be delivered to the Soviet Union.

  • February 23, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to Maj. Gen. A.M. Vasilevsky, Head of Soviet Military Advisory group in DPRK

    Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky reporting the arrival of Lieutenant-General Vasiliev and the transfer of military adviser duties from himself to Gen. Vasiliev.

  • March 21, 1950

    Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinski regarding meeting with Kim Il Sung

    Shtykov reports on his meeting with Kim Il Sung where Kim Il Sung requests a meeting with Stalin in Moscow.

  • May 30, 1950

    Telegram from Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, Report on a Meeting between Shtykov and Kim Il Sung

    Terenti Shtykov reports on Kim Il Sung's military planning for an invasion of South Korea and signals Soviet approval for the invasion.

  • September 20, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    China approves of Kim Il Sung's idea of fighting a protracted war, and gives advice on military strategies that will make a protracted war possible.

  • September 21, 1950

    Telegram from Soviet Defense Minister A.M. Vasilevsky to Stalin

    Vasilevsky reports on the state of Korean fighter aviation regiments, damaged Soviet regiments in Korea, Korean maintenance crews and transport of battalions and munitions supplies to Korea, allowing Stalin to decide, pending further calculations, whether or not it would be logical to transfer aircraft to Pyongyang.

  • September 22, 1950

    Information about the North Korean Workers Party Central Committee Meeting

    Heo Gai discusses the possibilities of North Korea's turning to the Soviet Union and China for military support.

  • September 26, 1950

    Ciphered Telegram from Matveyev (Zakharov) to Feng Xi (Stalin)

    Telegram from Zakharov to Stalin detailing the dire situation for the North Koreans following the Incheon landing.

  • October 01, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Kim Il Sung

    China advises Kim Il Sung to have the North Korean armies retreat north of the 38th parallel as quickly as possible after the First Front Army was cut off by the opposing side.

  • October 02, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

    Zhou Enlai notifies Ambassador Ni Zhiliang about the estimated arrival of Pak Il-u and advises Kim Il Sung to order the troops that were cut off by the opposing side and have no way to retreat to persist in guerrilla actions where they are.

  • November 08, 1950

    Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Chai Junwu, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang

    Zhou Enlai attempts to arrange a meeting between Kim Il Sung and two Chinese leaders, Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, to discuss military operations and arrangements.

  • November 17, 1950

    Telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai

    Mao Zedong informs Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang that Stalin has approved of a single central command led by the Chinese, and that they are now waiting to see how Kim Il Sung will respond.

  • December 08, 1950

    Draft Agreement by the Party Central Committee on Establishing a Sino-North Korea Joint Headquarters

    The agreement establishes a Joint Headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean sides that will command the North Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and all guerrilla forces, and details the leadership and specific powers and operations of the Joint Headquarters.

  • January 02, 1951

    J. Burgin's Report on a Trip to North Korea

    Burgin reports on the political and economic circumstances of North Korea during the course of war and addresses the question of Polish assistance to Korea.