Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • February, 1943

    Report of Secretariat of Council of People’s Commissars of USSR to V.M. Molotov, 'About the Implementing of Decree No. 2352 cc of State Committee of Defence'

    This report, sent from the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to V.M. Molotov, informs Molotov that the project for Uranium enrichment was prepared by F. Lange and his colleagues by December, 1942. The installation of this project was planned to be produced outside of Ukraine, in a facility in Kasan.

  • April 01, 1943

    Note of I.Kurchatov for M. Pervukhin, 'About Necessity to Demobilize V.M. Kelman'

    In this document, the "father" of the first Soviet nuclear bomb, Igor Kurchatov, asks the chief of the Soviet ministry of energy, Pervukhin, to help demobilize the Ukranian physicist Veniamin Kelman, who was a fellow of UIPhT before the war. In this note Kurchatov writes about the high quality of the Ukrainian nuclear scientist and about his importance for the development of the Soviet nuclear program. This document once again demonstrates that Ukraine played a significant role in the Soviet military nuclear program.

  • August 06, 1946

    Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong

    Mao Zedong says that "all reactionaries are paper tigers" and discusses the Chinese Civil War. He also introduces the theory of the "intermediate zone," when he states that "the United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa."

  • April 18, 1951

    Review of Andrei Sakharov about Oleg Lavrentiev’s Paper

    In this document, Andrei Sakharov, "father" of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb program, positively assesses Oleg Lavrientiev's ideas about the Soviet thermonuclear program, which were expressed in Lavrientiev's previously-written letters to Soviet leaders.

  • January 01, 1956

    Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 'Agenda Items Relating to Disarmament'

    Summary of the Twenty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly's agenda on disarmament

  • 1958

    Information about Conducting in Ukraine of Month’s Campaign of Joint Actions of the People against the Nuclear Weapon and for Universal Prohibiting of the Nuclear Tests for Ever and Ever

    This document describes the monthly anti-nuclear campaign held in Ukraine from September to October, 1958. During this campaign, a number of mass meetings were organized. In this meetings, scientists lectured on the damage of nuclear tests and danger of nuclear war. The lecturers argued that only western states were responsible for conducting nuclear tests and initiating the nuclear arms race, and that the Soviet Union was forced to develop its nuclear capabilities to protect socialist countries, even though the Soviets support the idea of prohibiting the nuclear weapon.

  • September 25, 1958

    SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht to Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev

    Cover letter and information note from Walter Ulbricht to Nikita Khrushchev on ideas of German scientists Manfred von Ardenne about encasing missiles in a radar absorbing case to evade detection and defeat a missile defense system.

  • February 19, 1960

    A.A. Wells, Director, Division of International Affairs, to Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, 'Control of and Cooperation in Gas Centrifuge Research and Development Program'

    The development of the gas centrifuge method, according to this report, would make production of U-235 (and by extension, nuclear weapons) possible for as many as 20-30 foreign countries. The U.S. is thus forced to consider its strategy for how to limit proliferation despite this new, cheap technology.

  • February 26, 1960

    S.A. Levin, D. E. Hatch, and E. Von Halle, 'Production of Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons by Nations X, Y, and Z by Means of the Gas Centrifuge Process,' Operations Analysis Division, Union Carbide Nuclear Company

    A Union Carbide Nuclear Company study to determine how quickly and easily foreign countries could develop and utilize gas centrifuges with the goal of creating nuclear weapon facilities. The study determines that, due to the cheap cost and relatively small size of the centrifuges, even un-industrialized countries such as Cuba could achieve this technology within 8 years if helped by a larger nation.

  • November 11, 1962

    Message from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations Regarding Brazillian Proposal

    Cable coded number 727 from Raul Roa to Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Offers three amendments to Brazillian proposal: include Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal in the territorial region, guarantee that nuclear bombs won't be used against Latin America, and the suppression of certain military bases in Latin America or Africa with nuclear potential, including Guantanamo.

  • March 04, 1964

    S. A. Levin, L.R. Powers, and E. Von Halle, Union Carbide Corporation Nuclear Division, 'Nth Power Evaluation'

    Union Carbide Nuclear Company updates their previous study on the ease with which other nations could secretly create nuclear weapon facilities using the gas centrifuge.

  • October 30, 1964

    Reply from Acting President, Dr. Subandrio, to Premier Zhou Enlai

    Subandrio writes a letter to Premier Zhou Enlai, praising the idea proposed in a previous message from China about holding a summit conference on general disarmament and banning of nuclear weapons. Subandrio suggests that the conference could have a higher chance of success if the 5 nuclear states (US, USSR, UK, France, and China) met prior to the summit.

  • October 30, 1965

    Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong and Chairman Liu Shaoqi’s Meeting with the Indonesian Delegation

    Chairul Seleh of Indonesia met with Mao and discussed nuclear power, Indonesian economy and industry, Chinese-Indonesian relations, and imperialism.

  • November 23, 1965

    Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to National Security Adviser McGeorge, Bundy, enclosing summary of 'Nth Country Evaluation'

    Summary of Union Carbide’s 1964 study on gas centrifuge technology’s effect on nuclear proliferation. The summary provides Union Carbide’s estimations for how long countries of varying industrial capability would take to develop a nuclear weapon, which was redacted in the original document.

  • March 24, 1975

    Military Exercise Soyuz-75 Instructions

    In this hypothetical scenario, enemy forces have attacked Maritime Front troops with nuclear and chemical weapons. This document directs the troop leadership to modify their route to avoid contaminated areas, decontaminate all contaminated units, and repair and/or replenish their chemical equipment.

  • August 24, 1984

    Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984

    Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

  • July, 1991

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

    With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.