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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • July 23, 1983

    National Security Council, Memorandum from Shirin Tahir-Kheli to Robert Oakley, 'Dealing with Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: A US Strategy'

    This memorandum by a senior NSC staffer took the Pervez case seriously as a threat to aid to Pakistan that Islamabad needed to avert by making “reliable assurances on enrichment and on illegal procurement activities.”

  • July 14, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 'Your Meeting with Ambassador Merker'

    When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.

  • July 14, 1987

    State Department Telegram 215122 to Embassy Islamabad, 'Maraging Steel Case: Press Guidance'

    The Pervez arrest immediately raised questions in the media but the State Department would say little other than: let the legal system do its work, no speculation about Pervez’s intentions, and the admission that the Department had expressed concern to Pakistan about the “overall nature and direction of [its] nuclear program.”

  • July 15, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Letter to Justice on Pakistan Export Case'

    This draft of a State Department letter to the Justice Department, that was presumably sent soon thereafter, supported prosecution of Pervez to the “fullest extent of the law.”

  • July 20, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Ted Borek to Mr. Peck [et al.], 'Solarz Amendment: Legal Memorandum for Mr. Armacost'

    The Pervez case immediately raised questions among State Department lawyers about the relevance of the Solarz amendment. A final answer depended on more evidence; the lawyers wanted to see the many documents that Canadian authorities had impounded as well as the tape recordings of Pervez’s conversations with U.S. undercover agents.

  • July 24, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Briefing Memorandum from Anthony Salvia to the Director, 'HFAC Asia Subcommittee Hearing on Pakistan'

    A hearing by the House subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 22 July 1987 made it clear why administration officials worried about the implications of the Pervez case. With Congressman Solarz arguing that the arrest involved “a flagrant and provocative challenge to US nonproliferation objectives.”

  • July 28, 1987

    US District Court, 'Indictment: US of America Vs. Arshad Pervez and Inam Ul-Haq'

    The indictment against Pervez and Ul-Haq included charges of conspiracy, bribery, racketeering, export violations, and false statements.

  • July 30, 1987

    Embassy Islamabad telegram 16052 to Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case—July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

    Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

  • August 13, 1987

    Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Norman Wulf to the Director, 'Weekly Activities Report'

    Wulf reported to Adelman that the information telegram on the Pervez and other smuggling cases had gone out to the embassies (except for Soviet bloc) and had received a favorable response from nuclear-supplier states.

  • August 29, 1987

    Department of State Telegram 270161 to Embassy Ottawa, 'Access to Canadian Documents in Pervez Case'

    The Canadian government cooperated with the US Justice Department in the Pervez case by seizing documents at his and making them available to federal prosecutors. The State Department wanted permission to review the documents “on the premises of the U.S. law enforcement authorities.”

  • September 04, 1987

    Ted Borek to Mr. Peck et al, 'Draft Note to Canadians on Pervez Documents'

    The Canadian government cooperated with the US Justice Department in the Pervez case by seizing documents at his and making them available to federal prosecutors. The State Department wanted permission to review the documents “on the premises of the U.S. law enforcement authorities.”

  • September 05, 1987

    State Department Telegram 278631 to US Embassy Ottawa, 'Access to Canadian Documents In Pervez Case'

    The Canadian government cooperated with the US Justice Department in the Pervez case by seizing documents at his and making them available to federal prosecutors. The State Department wanted permission to review the documents “on the premises of the U.S. law enforcement authorities.”

  • November, 1987

    United States v. Arshad Pervez, Criminal Number 87-00283, Exhibit List

    The exhibits included Pervez’s notebooks with such incriminating language as “atom” and “military.”

  • November, 1987

    United States v. Arshad Pervez, Criminal Number 87-00283, Exhibits 38-38 through 38-85

    The exhibits included Pervez’s notebooks with such incriminating language as “atom” and “military.”

  • November, 1987

    United States v. Arshad Pervez, Criminal Number 87-00283, Exhibits 38-86 through 52

    The exhibits included Pervez’s notebooks with such incriminating language as “atom” and “military.”

  • November, 1987

    United States v. Arshad Pervez, Criminal Number 87-00283, Exhibits 24 through 38-37

    The exhibits included Pervez’s notebooks with such incriminating language as “atom” and “military.” Moreover, “my expert is procurement manager for nuclear plant.” A letter from Ul-Haq to Pervez from early 1987 demonstrated that this was more than a business venture: “personal interests must not be allowed to overtake national interests.”

  • December 14, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Jonathan Schwartz to Ms. Verville [et al.], 'Pervez Trial Status'

    After hearing tape-recorded conversations and seeing Pervez’s diary entries and the Pervez-Carpenter correspondence, on 17 December 1987, the jury found him guilty on 5 out of 8 counts, including conspiracy, attempted export of beryllium without the required license, and submitting false end-use statements about the maraging steel. Inam Ul-Haq was also found guilty of conspiracy and false statements.

  • December 17, 1987

    Department of State Telegram to US Embassy Islamabad, 'Pervez Case Verdict'

    After hearing tape-recorded conversations and seeing Pervez’s diary entries and the Pervez-Carpenter correspondence, on 17 December 1987, the jury found him guilty on 5 out of 8 counts, including conspiracy, attempted export of beryllium without the required license, and submitting false end-use statements about the maraging steel. Inam Ul-Haq was also found guilty of conspiracy and false statements.

  • December 23, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from Jonathan Schwartz to Ms. Verville [et al.], 'Pervez Trial Status'

    After hearing tape-recorded conversations and seeing Pervez’s diary entries and the Pervez-Carpenter correspondence, on 17 December 1987, the jury found him guilty on 5 out of 8 counts, including conspiracy, attempted export of beryllium without the required license, and submitting false end-use statements about the maraging steel. Inam Ul-Haq was also found guilty of conspiracy and false statements.

  • December 29, 1987

    Department of State, Memorandum from INR Director Morton Abramowitz to Mr. Armacost, 'Pakistan—Pervez Case and Solarz Amendment'

    This INR memorandum tacitly assumed that the facts of the Pervez case fit a decision to invoke the Solarz amendment: despite some recent actions to “restrict nuclear procurement in the US,” the procurement network “could not exist without the umbrella of government approval, protection, and funding.”