February 07, 1961
Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'British memorandum on NATO nuclear weapons'
Observations of the SMD on two topics, "The British vision of NATO weapons" and "General Norstad to the Atlantic Council." It concludes with three handwritten pages by Alessandrini to Andreotti, 3 February 1961.
July 14, 1961
Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni
Report on the imbalance between nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO’s defense program. The Allied powers have reduced their production of planes and ships in favor of nuclear weapons development, which worries Alessandrini because conventional weapons have not decreased in importance since the start of the Cold War.
January 31, 1962
Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'
Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
December 19, 1962
Memorandum of Conversation, 'Skybolt'
This memorandum details an extensive conversation between representatives from the U.S. and Great Britain about President Kennedy's decision to cancel work on "Skybolt," or a surface-to-air missile that the British were invested in. The meeting was an attempt to placate a "looming crisis" in Anglo-American relations.
January 15, 1963
MAE Cable Report on Nassau Accords
Report by italian representative to the Atlantic Council A. Alessandrini on outline to the Atlantic Council of Nassau Accords; the paper also discusses the problem of NATO nuclear defense, the US position on autonomous arsenals and Italy's position.
January 28, 1963
Bulgarian Consulate, Istanbul (Karadimov), Cable to Foreign Ministry
Bulgarian General Consul in Istanbul Dimo Karadimov reports to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry news of new ballistic missiles in Turkey. Specifically, Karadimov notes that the US military will replace Jupiter missiles with Polaris missiles within the year. Karadimov cannot confirm NATO's involvement.
February 08, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Defense Policy'
These Council of Ministers minutes report on the meeting between Prime Minister De Quay and several of his state secretaries with NATO Secretary-General Stikker, who gave an outline of what was still called a ‘NATO Nuclear Force’. The prime minister responded positively to the plan but indicated the incoming cabinet would have to take a final decision. In the discussion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns comments on the attitude of President De Gaulle and points out that NATO and EEC matters ought to be viewed separately.
February 15, 1963
Bulgarian Legation, Washington (Shterev), Cable to Foreign Ministry
Bulgarian Charge d’Affaires in the US Kiril Shterev reports to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that US Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric stated that three submarines carrying Polaris missiles will be deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. The deployment follows US withdrawal from Italian and Turkish bases after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
March 15, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Atlantic Nuclear Weapons Plan'
The Council discusses the danger of the German Federal Republic moving to acquire an independent nuclear force. Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns regrets the American focus on the Germans at the expense of the British. Resistance from the French regarding the plan is not expected.
June 05, 1963
Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'
Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.
June 07, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Council in Ottawa and Visit to President Kennedy'
The Council of Ministers report on the NATO council meeting in Ottawa, which Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns and Minister of Defense Visser attended. Luns spoke privately with President Kennedy about the attitude of the French and the possibility of an independent German nuclear arsenal. Visser visited weapons centers in the United States and emphasizes the need to accept American leadership in the defense of Europe.
August 02, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Position Regarding NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force'
Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns gives the new Marijnen cabinet a sketch of the multilateral NATO nuclear force situation so far. He is now of the opinion that the Netherlands should not join a multilateral NATO nuclear force. Minister of Defense De Jong says the Dutch government will need to take a position near the end of the year.
October 02, 1963
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Paper Regarding Dutch Participation in Talks Regarding a Multilateral Nuclear Force'
Paper presented at 4 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The paper lays out the reasons for declining to participate in the Multilateral Force so far, but argues that due to changes in the situation – principally a turn on the part of the British toward participation – the Netherlands now should move to participate in the talks. The paper lists the (political) advantages of such participation.
October 04, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Discussion of NATO Nuclear Force'
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs De Block, standing in for Minister Luns, presents his ministry’s paper on Dutch participation in talks regarding the MLF. The paper lays out the reasons for declining to participate so far, but argues that due to changes in the situation the Netherlands now should move to participate in the talks. Objections from the Ministers of Defense and Finance as well as concerns over resistance in parliament lead most of the discussion to be tabled until the following meeting.
October 08, 1963
Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev, Marked 'Final Version'
Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev discussing Polish opposition to Soviet proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gomulka suggests that the treaty will further split the communist camp. While discussing the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the Polish leader suggests that the Soviet Union and the PRC adopt a common position in matters of foreign policy in order to strengthen the power of the Socialist camp.
October 09, 1963
Memorandum, Dutch Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'Regarding the Military Desirability of the Creation of a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force"
Memorandum presented at 11 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The memorandum is highly critical of the military merits of the proposed NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, and argues that even if the MLF is created, the Netherlands should decline to participate.
October 11, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Dutch Participation in Multilateral Nuclear Force Talks'
Minister of Defense De Jong presents a memorandum from his joint chiefs of staff, the tenor of which he supports, which serves as the basis for an extended discussion. The memorandum is highly critical of the (military) merits of the MLF, but De Jong takes care to bracket his critique as coming strictly from the point of view of the Ministry of Defense. De Jong stresses that neither troops nor financial means can be made available for participation in the MLF. State Secretary of Foreign Affairs De Block proposes the formula: “to take part in the discussions on the clear understanding that it does not commit them [the Dutch] to participate in such a force.” Prime Minister Marijnen brings up a number of counterarguments to both military arguments against and political arguments in favor of the MLF.
October 14, 1963
Discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo (Fragment)
Excerpts of the meeting between Marshal V.V. Kuznetzov, Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and the GDR politburo on issues of nuclear proliferation in Europe and Warsaw Pact planning.
November 22, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Talks Regarding a Multilateral Nuclear Force'
The Council accepts the proposal of Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns to inform the involved governments that the Netherlands is making preparations for participation in the Multilateral Force talks. The Ministers of Defense and Finance object that the existing defense budget and conventional forces ought not to be slighted as a result.