December 11, 1953
National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe'
This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.
March 26, 1954
Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954
In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.
July 17, 1954
Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden
Eden assures Zhou that the US has no intention of establishing military bases in Indochina, and that although it has not been suggested that Cambodia and Laos join the Southeast Asian Pact, such an agreement would not threaten China. Zhou expresses concern over the pact, and suggests another model for peace in Indochina. The two debate over these issues.
April 17, 1958
Letter addressed by N.S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the RWP concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Romanian territory
Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Gheorghiu Dej, informing the Romanian leadership of the decision taken by the Soviet leadership to withdraw the Soviet Red Army troops from the territory of Romania. Military and security services advisors will however remain in place until 1963.
March 22, 1961
Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'American attitude toward NATO - German opinions'
Letter expressing Germany’s opinion that the defense of Europe is impossible without using nuclear weapons as an intimidation tactic and horror at the United States’ suggestion that Europe can defend itself with conventional weapons alone. Defense of Germany should be NATO’s top priority because if Germany falls, the rest of Europe falls. The letter also references NATO’s difficulty in developing a cohesive strategy because each country is too concerned with protecting its own territories and assets.
May 08, 1961
Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan
President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.
May 15, 1961
Telegram by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP) to Minister of Defense, 'Opinion sharing between Brosio-Acheson on NATO nuclear weaponry '
This document is related to Brosi's discussion with Acherson on NATO nuclear weaponry and strategy. Brosio underlines how the American nuclear strategy is rejected by European countries. Most of them are skeptical and take distance from Americans' willingness to use nuclear weapon against their enemies. In this sense, Acherson as representative of the American government, is ready to discuss the topic at a multilateral level.
June 06, 1961
Telegram from an official in the Albanian embassy in Beijing Lilo Zeneli to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania
Zeneli writes about his meeting with the 2nd Secretary in the Cuban embassy in Beijing who asked Zeneli about his opinion on the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade. Zeneli answered that the Albanian government greets any initiative which aims to help the struggle against imperialism and colonialism with the objective of establishing peace. He also declared that Yugoslavia is not a non-aligned state because it participated in the Balkan military pact with Greece and Turkey, both of which are members of NATO. The 2nd Secretary of Cuba expressed his hope that there will be positive results during the conference that would lessen the international tensions between the two blocs.
July 14, 1961
Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni
Report on the imbalance between nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO’s defense program. The Allied powers have reduced their production of planes and ships in favor of nuclear weapons development, which worries Alessandrini because conventional weapons have not decreased in importance since the start of the Cold War.
January 31, 1962
Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'
Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”
October 25, 1962
Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker’s and Peasant’s Government (Council of Ministers)
The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.
November 12, 1962
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee
János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.
January 28, 1963
Bulgarian Consulate, Istanbul (Karadimov), Cable to Foreign Ministry
Bulgarian General Consul in Istanbul Dimo Karadimov reports to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry news of new ballistic missiles in Turkey. Specifically, Karadimov notes that the US military will replace Jupiter missiles with Polaris missiles within the year. Karadimov cannot confirm NATO's involvement.
February 08, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Defense Policy'
These Council of Ministers minutes report on the meeting between Prime Minister De Quay and several of his state secretaries with NATO Secretary-General Stikker, who gave an outline of what was still called a ‘NATO Nuclear Force’. The prime minister responded positively to the plan but indicated the incoming cabinet would have to take a final decision. In the discussion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns comments on the attitude of President De Gaulle and points out that NATO and EEC matters ought to be viewed separately.
March 13, 1963
Report from Alessandrini to Piccioni concerning NATO MLF consultations
Report by italian representative to the Atlantic Council A. Alessandrini to Deputy Prime Minister on NATO consultations, positions of the members of the Alliance and Nassau agrrements for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. In particular, the paper discusses the points of view of SACEUR L. Lemnitzer and US Ambassor to NATO Finletter.
March 15, 1963
Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Atlantic Nuclear Weapons Plan'
The Council discusses the danger of the German Federal Republic moving to acquire an independent nuclear force. Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns regrets the American focus on the Germans at the expense of the British. Resistance from the French regarding the plan is not expected.