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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • March 26, 1954

    Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954

    In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

  • July 17, 1954

    Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Anthony Eden

    Eden assures Zhou that the US has no intention of establishing military bases in Indochina, and that although it has not been suggested that Cambodia and Laos join the Southeast Asian Pact, such an agreement would not threaten China. Zhou expresses concern over the pact, and suggests another model for peace in Indochina. The two debate over these issues.

  • May 08, 1961

    Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

    President Kennedy writes British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the implications for NATO and West German security if the US or UK assisted the French nuclear program.

  • September 05, 1961

    Ministry of the Interior Bulletin on Anti-Bulgarian Activity of Greece and Turkey

    The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports its intelligence findings on the military cooperation between the US, Greece and Turkey.

  • January 31, 1962

    Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

    Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

  • November 12, 1962

    Hungarian Socialist Workers Party First Secretary János Kádár’s Account of His Visit to Moscow to the HSWP Central Committee

    János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

  • January 28, 1963

    Bulgarian Consulate, Istanbul (Karadimov), Cable to Foreign Ministry

    Bulgarian General Consul in Istanbul Dimo Karadimov reports to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry news of new ballistic missiles in Turkey. Specifically, Karadimov notes that the US military will replace Jupiter missiles with Polaris missiles within the year. Karadimov cannot confirm NATO's involvement.

  • February 08, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Defense Policy'

    These Council of Ministers minutes report on the meeting between Prime Minister De Quay and several of his state secretaries with NATO Secretary-General Stikker, who gave an outline of what was still called a ‘NATO Nuclear Force’. The prime minister responded positively to the plan but indicated the incoming cabinet would have to take a final decision. In the discussion, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns comments on the attitude of President De Gaulle and points out that NATO and EEC matters ought to be viewed separately.

  • March 15, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Atlantic Nuclear Weapons Plan'

    The Council discusses the danger of the German Federal Republic moving to acquire an independent nuclear force. Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns regrets the American focus on the Germans at the expense of the British. Resistance from the French regarding the plan is not expected.

  • March 17, 1963

    Bulgarian Embassy, Athens (Minchev), Cable to Foreign Ministry

    Bulgarian Ambassador to Greece Nikolai Minchev relays recent newspaper reports to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minchev summarizes a recent NATO meeting in Athens where NATO staff and Turkish and Greek military personal discussed security in the two nations and the Balkan region as a whole.

  • June 07, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'NATO Council in Ottawa and Visit to President Kennedy'

    The Council of Ministers report on the NATO council meeting in Ottawa, which Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns and Minister of Defense Visser attended. Luns spoke privately with President Kennedy about the attitude of the French and the possibility of an independent German nuclear arsenal. Visser visited weapons centers in the United States and emphasizes the need to accept American leadership in the defense of Europe.

  • July 05, 1963

    Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Information Report on NATO

    On 5 July 1963 the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs completed an information report on NATO's activity during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the report, the ministry outlines detailed espionage carried out by NATO agents. According to the report, the NATO Military Intelligence Services provided instructions for NATO member-states' military attaches stationed in Warsaw Pact countries and agents they could get to cooperate with them. Agents were to observe and report specific military intelligence collecting in Warsaw Pact countries -- arms deliveries, missile sites, military movements, etc. The report also includes explanation of how the attaches carried out their intelligence gathering -- reading official press, speaking in Russian and misrepresenting themselves as Russian, etc . The Bulgarian Interior Ministry notes that Western governments were well-informed of Bulgarian military structures -- including exact formations and secret designations.

  • August 02, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Position Regarding NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force'

    Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns gives the new Marijnen cabinet a sketch of the multilateral NATO nuclear force situation so far. He is now of the opinion that the Netherlands should not join a multilateral NATO nuclear force. Minister of Defense De Jong says the Dutch government will need to take a position near the end of the year.

  • August 05, 1963

    Bulgarian Consulate, Istanbul (Karadimov), Cable to Foreign Ministry

    Bulgaria's General Consul in Istanbul, Turkey, reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs information he received from the Chief of the Greek General Staff to Turkey. As recorded, the Greek General Staff reported a meeting between Turkish and Greek governments. The governments discussed a non-aggression pact between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries and the use of Polaris missile submarines in Turkish waters.

  • October 02, 1963

    Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Paper Regarding Dutch Participation in Talks Regarding a Multilateral Nuclear Force'

    Paper presented at 4 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The paper lays out the reasons for declining to participate in the Multilateral Force so far, but argues that due to changes in the situation – principally a turn on the part of the British toward participation – the Netherlands now should move to participate in the talks. The paper lists the (political) advantages of such participation.

  • October 04, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Discussion of NATO Nuclear Force'

    State Secretary of Foreign Affairs De Block, standing in for Minister Luns, presents his ministry’s paper on Dutch participation in talks regarding the MLF. The paper lays out the reasons for declining to participate so far, but argues that due to changes in the situation the Netherlands now should move to participate in the talks. Objections from the Ministers of Defense and Finance as well as concerns over resistance in parliament lead most of the discussion to be tabled until the following meeting.

  • October 08, 1963

    Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev, Marked "Final Version"

    Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev discussing Polish opposition to Soviet proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gomulka suggests that the treaty will further split the communist camp. While discussing the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the Polish leader suggests that the Soviet Union and the PRC adopt a common position in matters of foreign policy in order to strengthen the power of the Socialist camp.

  • October 09, 1963

    Memorandum, Dutch Joint Chiefs of Staff, 'Regarding the Military Desirability of the Creation of a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force"

    Memorandum presented at 11 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The memorandum is highly critical of the military merits of the proposed NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, and argues that even if the MLF is created, the Netherlands should decline to participate.

  • October 11, 1963

    Meeting Minutes, Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, 'Dutch Participation in Multilateral Nuclear Force Talks'

    Minister of Defense De Jong presents a memorandum from his joint chiefs of staff, the tenor of which he supports, which serves as the basis for an extended discussion. The memorandum is highly critical of the (military) merits of the MLF, but De Jong takes care to bracket his critique as coming strictly from the point of view of the Ministry of Defense. De Jong stresses that neither troops nor financial means can be made available for participation in the MLF. State Secretary of Foreign Affairs De Block proposes the formula: “to take part in the discussions on the clear understanding that it does not commit them [the Dutch] to participate in such a force.” Prime Minister Marijnen brings up a number of counterarguments to both military arguments against and political arguments in favor of the MLF.

  • October 14, 1963

    Discussion between Soviet Marshal V. V. Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo

    (Excerpts) discussion between Marshal Vasilii Kuznetsov and SED Politburoi members on the issues of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, US plans for the MLF, and Warsaw Pact military and political cooperation.