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Digital Archive International History Declassified


  • October 23, 1964

    Cable 578 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

    In a meeting with Foreign Office officials, a US embassy officer stated that the US did not object to the sale of uranium to Israel, but sought cooperation in order to assure that appropriate safeguards were put into place.

  • October 27, 1964

    Cable 591 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State

    When embassy officers provided the aide-memoir and the paper on IAEA safeguards to Admiral Quihillalt, the chief of the National Atomic Energy Commission, he was more receptive to the US position than previously and was glad to know that the US was not in touch with the Israelis about the sale.

  • November 25, 1964

    Cable 549 from the Department of State to the US Embassies in Argentina, Austria, and Israel

    This cable from the US Department of State expresses concern that the Foreign Office was slow to respond to questions about the Argentine-Israeli deal, particularly with regards to safeguards, and says that the Dept. of State, ACDA, and the AEC were considering more "representations" to Argentina and possibly to Israel.

  • November 30, 1964

    Cable 749 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'Sale of Uranium to Israel'

    Although the Embassy noted that the Foreign Office's apparent support of safeguards did not necessarily represent the Argentine government's thinking, it concluded that more Argentine dialogue should be allowed before Washington took further representation.

  • February 02, 1965

    Cable 729 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Argentina

    In this cable, the US Department of State requested the Embassy to remind the Argentine government that it was still awaiting a response on the uranium sale to Israel, and asked the Embassy to review the "full extent" of Argentine exports of uranium.

  • February 03, 1965

    Airgram A-691 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'Argentine Sale of Uranium Oxide to Israel'

    This airgram details a meeting with Admiral Quihillalt, director of the National Atomic Energy Commission of Argentinia, who notes that since the deal with Israel had been concluded before the IAEA established protocols for safeguard measures, the Argentine government did not feel the need to include reporting and inspection requirements. However, safeguards would be placed on future sales. Attached is a note from the Argentine Foreign Ministry, with an unofficial translation.

  • March 26, 1965

    Minutes of Todor Zhivkov – Raul Castro Meeting in Sofia

    Zhivkov lays out his perspective on the place of Bulgaria within the Communist Camp. He also talks about the Balkans and the rift between Bulgaria and Romania. Both leaders discuss the Chinese accusations of Soviet Revisionism. Raul Castro talks about the strength of the communist movements in Latin America and the prospects for successful social revolutions in Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Brazil.

  • April 27, 1965

    Airgram A-163 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Argentina on the Argentine Sale of Uranium Oxide to Israel

    In response to a request for further instructions, the Dept. of State informed the Embassy that Washington was looking to establish a common policy on the mandatory application of IAEA safeguards. Until they were closer to agreement, the Embassy should request that the Argentine government apply safeguards to future deals.

  • June 03, 1965

    Cable 7659 from the Department of State to the US Embassy in the United Kingdom

    In a conversation with one or two State Department officials, a British Embassy officer notes that reports available to both governments estimate Israel's purchases of uranium to add up to 190 tons and proposed a joint US-British approach to Argentina on safeguards.

  • August 21, 1965

    Airgram A-160 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'EXCON: Argentine Exports of Uranium Oxide'

    A request by an Argentine Congressman gave the yellow cake sale to Israel a public airing.

  • August 24, 1965

    Airgram CA-2198 from the Department of State to US Embassies in Argentina on the Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium

    Owing to discrepancies in available data, the Department of State requested information on the amount of uranium shipped to Israel, any new agreements between Argentina and Israel, any safeguards put into place, and the current status of Argentina's uranium processing plants.

  • October 22, 1965

    Airgram A-350 from the US Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, 'Argentine Uranium'

    The Embassy reported that it had no information on Israeli uranium imports, and the only way to obtain that information would be a high-level inquiry to the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

  • April 10, 1966

    Airgram 763 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium'

    Although AEC representative Lester Rogers reported that the Embassy had no new information, this airgram includes tables on Argentina's annual production of uranium from 1958-1965 and the production capacities of two uranium processing plants.

  • May 11, 1966

    Cable 1250 from the Department of State to the US Embassies in Argentina and Israel, 'Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium'

    The Department of State was unable to locate the Argentine uranium sold to Israel and was disturbed by the fact that the amount exceeded Israel's needs for peaceful use.

  • May 26, 1966

    Cable 1776 from the US Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, 'Israeli Purchase of Argentine Uranium'

    The Embassy did not believe it was advisable to inform the Argentine government of US plans to ask the Israeli government about the location of the uranium.

  • March 17, 1967

    Research Memorandum RAR-8 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone: Pluses and Minuses'

    The treaty creating the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ) was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967. Taking a close look at key provisions, INR found that the entry into force provisions included loopholes which “unenthusiastic” states could use so the treaty did not cover their territory.

  • May, 1967

    Report, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Cooperation with Argentina in the Atomic Energy Field'

    Details the current status of South African nuclear cooperation with Argentina, France and Israel as well as South Africa's redesignation to the IAEA Board of Governors.

  • May, 1967

    Report, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Items of Interest in the Field of Atomic Energy: Developments During March-April-May 1967'

    South African report summarizing communication between South African and US officials on the renewal of their atomic energy cooperation agreement, as well as cooperation with Argentina and France, discussion of the sale of uranium to Israel, and South Africa's redesignation to the IAEA board of governors.

  • November 07, 1967

    Complaint by [Government of] Brazil Regarding Czechoslovak Transport of Guerrilla Fighters from Cuba to Latin America

    Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

  • November 17, 1967

    Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

    Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.