Search in
ADD SEARCH FILTER CANCEL SEARCH FILTER

Digital Archive International History Declassified

SEARCH RESULTS

  • June 14, 1937

    Concerning the 36th Division of the NRA's Appeals to the Soviet Government

    In response to Ma Hushan's (commander of the 36th Division of the NRA) request for Soviet assistance in Xinjiang and the release of Ma Zhongying from the Soviet Union, the Politburo resolves that it will provide assistance only after the leadership of the 36th Division concludes an agreement with the Xinjiang government and establishes peace in the south of Xinjiang.

  • July 29, 1937

    Concerning Soviet Military Operations in Xinjiang

    The Politburo orders two regiments be sent into Xinjiang to prevent the advance of the 36th Division. It also orders that Ma Zhongying continue to be detained and recommends that the governor of Xinjiang avoid an agreement with Ma Hushan.

  • September 22, 1937

    Concerning Travel of the Civil Air Fleet to Xinjiang

    The Politburo orders the Civil Air Fleet to send a transport aircraft to make several trips between Urumqi and Kashgar in coordination with the NKID and NKVD.

  • September 24, 1937

    Concerning Alleged Plots Against Governor Sheng Shicai

    The Politburo decides to send an experienced investigator to investigate an alleged plot against Sheng Shicai, the governor of Xinjiang.

  • November 10, 1937

    Letter from Governor Sheng Shicai to Cde. V. M. Molotov

    Sheng Shicai expresses gratitude to Cde. V. M. Molotov for Soviet assistance with eliminating the 36th Division of the NRA from the South of Xinjiang and combating a Trotskyist plot in Xinjiang. He requests Molotov's assistance with "implementing the policy of the six principles" in Xinjiang and turning it into a model province.

  • January 09, 1938

    Concerning Troop Movements through Xinjiang

    The Politburo recommends that Sheng Shicai advise Jiang Jieshi to permit the regiment currently stationed in Erlizihe to proceed to its designated location.

  • January 10, 1938

    Concerning NKVD Operations in Xinjiang

    The Politburo orders the NKVD to deploy a reinforced cavalry regiment and an attached RKKA fighter squadron to the area of Hami, allocating additional tanks, automobiles, and gasoline trucks to support their operations. It also provides recommended changes to Shicai Sheng's military policy in Xinjiang.

  • March 10, 1938

    Report on Imre Nagy’s Arrest by the NKVD (Commissariat of Internal Affairs)

    Matusov and Altman report on Nagy's arrest on 4/5 March 1938 and subsequent release on 8 March, and describe some of his work.

  • September 02, 1938

    A Conversation Between Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov and the Governor Shicai Sheng which Occurred in the Kremlin on 2 September 1938

    Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Governor Sheng discuss Xinjiang's military, level of industrialization, and natural resources, as well as Governor Sheng's strong desire to join the Communist Party.

  • January 04, 1939

    Translation of a Letter from Governor Shicai Sheng to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov

    Governor Sheng Shicai expresses gratitude to Cdes. Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov for the opportunity to visit Moscow. After reporting critical remarks made by Fang Lin against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, Sheng Shicai requests that the All-Union Communist Party dispatch a politically experienced person to Urumqi to discuss Party training and asks that the Comintern order the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang to liquidate the Party organization.

  • January 10, 1939

    Concerning Soviet Troops in Xinjiang

    The Politburo transfers Soviet military units deployed in Xinjiang and supervision of the Xinjiang army to the control of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

  • January 11, 1939

    Concerning the Work of the NKVD Special Departments

    The Politburo describes the work of the NKVD Special Departments, which are charged with fighting counterrevolution, espionage, and other anti-Soviet activity in the Red Army, Navy, and NKVD. To accomplish these tasks, the Special Departments organize an apparatus of informers and conduct searches and seizures.

  • March 07, 1939

    Letter from People’s Commissariat of Power Plants and Electrical Industry to the Council of People’s Commissars of USSR, 'On the Organization of the Research Activities on the Nuclear Atom'

    In this letter the Soviet minister proposed to the Soviet government to concentrate the nuclear research in Ukrainian Institute of Physic and Technology (UIPhT) and to locate in Kharkov the nuclear scientists from Leningrad Institute of Physic and Technology because Kharkov institute had very good base for the nuclear studies. If this proposal was realized Kharkov could become more important Soviet nuclear center than Moscow or Sarov. In any case this letter of people’s commissar recognized the prominent role of the Ukrainian Institute of Physic and Technology (UIPhT) in the Soviet nuclear science.

  • September 01, 1939

    Secret Supplementary Protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

    Secret Texts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

  • December 28, 1939

    Concerning the NKVD's Monitoring of International Communications

    The Politburo describes changes to its existing procedures for monitoring international communications, including requiring the NKVD to monitor all international conversations of foreign embassy officials and journalists, prohibiting private citizens from making international calls, and increasing the NKVD's work to identify illegal radio stations operating within foreign embassies.

  • February 17, 1940

    The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

    Ambassador Steinhardt on rumors that the Soviet Union is planning to take control of Latvia and Estonia.

  • February 22, 1940

    Letter from State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to Academy of Sciences of USSR, 'About the Rationality of the Cyclotron Construction in UIPhT'

    This letter informed the Academy of Sciences that UIPhT asked the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to allocate 75 thousand rubles for designing of the cyclotron, and 1,5 million rubles for its building. The State Plan asked an advice on necessity to build the cyclotron.

  • February 28, 1940

    Letter from Director of the Institute of Physical Problems Petr Kapitsa to State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 'About Cyclotron of Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology'

    This document is an answer to the letter from State Plan of Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic to Academy of Sciences of USSR “About Rationality to Construct Cyclotron in UIPhT” (22 Feb 1940). The answer of academician Petr Kapitsa to this letter was very critical. Kapitsa wrote that UIPhT “during the last several years built a number of research installation but did not finish them. However it started to build new installations. Such activities of UIPhT can’t be considered as normal”. So Petr Kapitsa discouraged building a cyclotron in UIPhT, and this was one of the reasons why this institute did not become the leading nuclear center in USSR.

  • March 14, 1940

    Concerning the Secret Cipher Unit of the USSR Consulate in Urumqi

    The Politburo directs the NKVD to permit the division of the combined secret cipher unit of the USSR Consulate General and Trade Mission in Urumqi into independent secret cipher units.

  • April 17, 1940

    Conclusion of Radium Institute of Academy of Sciences on Invention of UIPhT Fellows Sent to Agency of Military Chemical Defense

    In this letter two nuclear scientists from UIPhT described the construction of the nuclear bomb and proposed to start activities in producing of the nuclear arsenal and make these activities secret. Two Ukrainian physicists were first Soviet scientists who revealed the way of producing the nuclear weapon (of course they did not know about the similar inventions of the western scientists which were made at the same time because of secrecy regime).