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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November 01, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m., Thursday

    Campos discusses diplomatic gestures between Brazil, the United States and Cuba during the Cuban crisis and some misunderstandings that may have emerged during that time.

  • November 01, 1962

    Brazilian Embassy in Washington, Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Campos sends an attached memorandum of analysis of the developments of the Cuban crisis, elaborated by the Political Sector of the Embassy. It discusses Soviet motivation, American actions, Soviet reactions, etc.

  • November 02, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations, New York, 8 p.m., Friday

    De Melo-Franco outlines the motives that underlie the Brazilian draft about the denuclearization of Latin America (in the United Nations). Panama, Argentina, Nicaragua, Haiti and Peru express their concerns/questions/support of the Brazilian resolution.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Warsaw (Valente), 4 p.m., Monday

    The Brazilian Embassy in Poland discusses Poland's sympathy on the Brazilian motion in the United Nations about the denuclearization and its favorable reflection in a solution of the Cuban crisis.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow (da Cunha), 4:15 p.m., Monday

    Brazil's embassy in Moscow discusses visits by Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka to Moscow and says that there is the impression that the recent international events have created a state of disorientation in the community of socialist countries and that the great challenge of Khrushchev will be to accommodate this state of affairs in the short term.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:45 p.m., Monday

    Pinto describes two recent speeches, one by Kennedy the other by Castro, and appears to give more credit and praise to the speech by Castro. He also discusses the Cuban crisis situation in general.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Monday

    Pinto relays the message that Mikoyan intends to remain in Cuba at least one week, permiting a complete review of relations between Cuba and Russia, in face of the last events.

  • November 05, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

    Pinto briefly discusses the new representative of Cuba at the UN, Carlos Lechuga.

  • November 06, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 10:30 a.m., Tuesday

    Pinto calls to attention the rude and violent tone of the proclamations of support to Cuba on the part of China contrasting with the relative moderation of the USSR and of its satellites. Pinto believes Mao is "taking a shot" at Khrushchev.

  • November 06, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations (Afonso Arinos), New York, 8 p.m., Tuesday

    Melo-Franco says he received some confidential information from Secretary General U Thant about the situation in Cuba. He also lists the advise he gave to the Cuban ambassador Carlos Lechuga.

  • November 07, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 5 p.m., Wednesday

    The Brazilian Foreign Ministry instructs its delegation to the United Nations General Assembly on coordinating their efforts with Secretary General U Thant.

  • November 07, 1962

    Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

    Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

  • November 08, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 5:30 p.m., Thursday

    Melo-Franco discusses his conversation with Cuban Ambassador Carlos Lechuga about Brizilian-Cuban relations.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the UN General Assembly, New York, 2:30 p.m., Friday

    In the XVII session of the General Assembly of the UN, the Delegates from Canada, Sweden, and Ghana referred exhaustively to the Brazilian draft about denuclearization of Latin America and expressed support to the ideas it contains.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 7:45 p.m., Friday

    Pinto describes his conversation with the Cuban Minister of External Relations, Raúl Roa, which he says confirmed his impressions that the Cuban government, conscious of the gravity of the situation, is disposed to make concessions to reach a minimal guarantee.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday

    Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

  • November 09, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York, 7:30 p.m., Friday

    Mello-Franco discusses a conversation he had with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov. According to Kuznetsov, the American insistence on the question of inspection is becoming moot [ociosa] since the United States has declared satisfaction with the removal of offensive material existing in Cuba, it is only a pretext to postpone indefinitely the commitment of non-invasion and suspension of the economic blockade against Cuba.

  • November 10, 1962

    Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

    In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:15 p.m., Monday

    A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

  • November 12, 1962

    Telegram from the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 7 p.m., Monday

    A description of Brazil's resolution to the United Nations General Assembly regarding Cuba and the denuclearization of Latin America, as well as where the resolution stands in the Assembly thus far.