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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • August 12, 1996

    US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

    Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

  • September 12, 1996

    South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Backgrounder for Use During the Bilateral Discussions with Iran on Disarmament and Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'

    Background information for use by a South African representative in bilateral discussions with Iran on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

  • October 28, 1996

    Letter, South African Department of Foreign Affairs Director-General to the Non-Proliferation Secretariat

    Letter to D. J. van Beek, the Non-proliferation Secretary, regarding the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee request for an interdepartmental working group on national policy on transparency in arms trade and transfers.

  • November 01, 1996

    Email, Caroline Russell to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Staff, 'Priority: India Nuclear Debate – Comments from Raja'

    Caroline Russell emails her staff at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency regarding Raja Ramanna's recent statements regarding the state of India's nuclear program. Ramanna was the Director of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and was quoted in the Times of India stating that India already had a capability which did not need to be tested.

  • April 15, 1997

    Cable, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Credentials for the Second Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna, 12-16 May 1997'

    Draft copy of the letter of credentials that Mr. Nzo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, will provide for the South African delegation to represent the Republic of South Africa at the Second Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Vienna in May, 1997. The delegation is to be led by Mr. Jacob Selebi.

  • June 26, 1997

    Cable from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Foreign Ministry, 'Outer space. Expansion of the international market for spatial services. Brazilian insertion. Entrepreneurial interest. CLA. ECCO. Considerations.'

    Brazilian diplomat Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima recommends that the Brazilian government should proceed to make the Brazilian space market more attractive for foreign investments. Among Flecha de Lima’s suggestions is the creation of a set of norms to regulate commercial activities at the Alcântara Launch Center.

  • November, 1998

    Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in India'

    This heavily-redacted study is one of the few Z Division (International Assessments Program) documents that have been released. An unredacted portion (pp. 25-26) reports on the statements, labeled “inconsistent” by the author(s), of Indian nuclear scientists after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests with regard to specific details of the devices tested.

  • May, 1999

    Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in Pakistan'

    This study, even more heavily redacted than the Z Division study on India (November 1988), examined the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon status, and number of other topics (deleted from the table of contents), and policy implications. The Joint Special Operations Command is among the agencies on the distribution list. As the report is a “Gamma Controlled Item,” some of the excisions relate to communications intelligence information.

  • August 01, 2000

    Thesis, US Joint Military Intelligence College, 'From Independence to the Bomb: India’s Nuclear Motivations, 1945-1974'

    This unclassified JMIC thesis focuses both on general motivations for nuclear proliferation as well as examining the specific case of India. Its chapters focus on key issues for nuclear motivations analysis; economic motivations for nuclear power, 1945-1964; India’s bid for nuclear self-reliance, 1962-1974; India’s nuclear motivations, and implications of India’s decisions.

  • November 30, 2001

    Military Intelligence Digest Supplement, US Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Iraq: Procuring Possible Nuclear-Related Gas Centrifuge Equipment'

    This DIA article briefly describes Iraq’s effort to procure aluminum tubes from 1986 to 1991 and discusses the potential for their use for conventional military purposes.

  • September 13, 2002

    Technical Intelligence Note, US Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence, 'Iraq: Recent Aluminum Tube Procurement Efforts'

    Although the Department of Energy dissented against other Departments' opinions on the Iraqi aluminum tubes its intelligence office went along with the prevailing view that Iraq was trying to “rejuvenate” its nuclear program.

  • January, 2008

    Interview with Arnan 'Sini' Azaryahu by Avner Cohen

    Transcript of interview by Avner Cohen with long-term Israeli government insider Arnan "Sini" Azaryahu, who served as a trusted aide and confidant to Minister Yisrael Galili, a close ally and advisor to Israeli prime minister Gold Meir. In this interview, Sini recounts a tense meeting held in Meir's office during the height of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when Meir overruled a request from Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to prepare Israel’s nuclear arsenal for a demonstration blast.