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Digital Archive International History Declassified

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  • November, 1983

    Translation of a letter from Nicolae Ceausescu to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl about Euromissiles

    A letter from Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Helmut Kohl. Ceausescu makes some suggestions to ease the Geneva negotiations: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”: the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; or the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”.

  • November 07, 1983

    Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 'About the Talks with Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov'

    This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of "prevention of a surprise nuclear attack" (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

  • November 12, 1983

    Memorandum on INF and START negotiations

    This memo to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The memo suggests that the proposal could jeopardize the Geneva talks and harm European interests.

  • November 16, 1983

    Antonio Badini, Outline of General Considerations

    A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

  • November 18, 1983

    Letter, Argentinian President Bignone to Brazilian President Figueiredo

    Argentinian President Bignone informs Figueiredo of the Argentine capacity to enrich uranium.

  • November 19, 1983

    Letter, Brazilian President Figueiredo to Argentinian President Bignone

    In his answer to Argentinian President Bignone, Brazilian President João Batista Figueiredo expresses satisfaction for the result achieved by the neighbor country.

  • 1984

    Memorandum on East-West Dialogue

    This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

  • 1984

    Arms Freeze: Who Is For and Who Is Against

    Pamphlet by the Soviet Novosti Press Agency arguing for the U.S. government to accept a mutual proposal to freeze American and Soviet nuclear arms production. Argues that this would lead to an improved political atmosphere and nuclear arms reductions in the future. Translated for publication from the Russian text, "Zamorazhivanie, kto za i kto protiv."

  • 1984

    Return Address: Moscow, Issue 1

    Bulletin by the Group for Establishing Trust Between the USSR and the USA, an independent peace organization in the Soviet Union. Three issues were editor Sergei Batovrin and published from New York City. They contain news on the peace movement in the Soviet Union and the harassment and imprisonment of activists by the government.

  • 1984

    Return Address: Moscow, Issue 2

    Bulletin by the Group for Establishing Trust Between the USSR and the USA, an independent peace organization in the Soviet Union. Three issues were editor Sergei Batovrin and published from New York City. They contain news on the peace movement in the Soviet Union and the harassment and imprisonment of activists by the government.

  • January 18, 1984

    Note, Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar to the Argentine Foreign Ministry, on US Secretary of State George Shultz's Visit to Brazil

    On the eve of the trip of American Secretary of State George Shultz to Brazil, the American officer responsible for the Brazilian desk at the Department of State conveys to the Argentine Embassy in Washington that the United States would appreciate an initiative toward the implementation of a system of mutual inspections or a joint declaration in which both countries would renounce the development of a nuclear device, the same two points proposed by American Congressman Paul Finley in 1977.

  • February 17, 1984

    Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

    A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

  • March 24, 1984

    Cable from Ambassador Katori to the Foreign Minister, 'Prime Minister Visit to China (Summit Meeting – International Affairs)'

    Nakasone and Zhao Ziyang review Chinese and Japanese views on the Soviet Union's military build up and the Cambodian issue.

  • March 27, 1984

    Ciphered Telegram No. 87, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Report from an informant in the Parliament of India on the Congress Party's frustrations with Soviet Union and the Soviet's unwillingness to share military technology.

  • March 28, 1984

    Ciphered Telegram No. 88, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

    Report on frictions between the Soviet Union and Indian political leaders.

  • April 04, 1984

    Constraints on the foreign policy of the Netherlands

    A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his foreign policy advisor Antonio Badini about the domestic constraints on Dutch foreign policy.

  • April 04, 1984

    Memorandum, Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, Information for the President of Brazil, 'Brazil-PRC. Nuclear Energy'

    Memo from Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro to President João Batista Figueiredo on the current state of, and potential for the future of nuclear cooperation with China, in the follow-up to the presidential visit to Beijing. Guerreiro recalls that, since China was also not a party to the NPT, nuclear cooperation and purchase of material, like the uranium acquired in 1982, would not be subjected to full-scope safeguards, preserving the “sovereignty of Brazil’s nuclear program.” Guerreiro mentions a study by the National Security Council, the Nuclear Commission, Nuclebrás and the Foreign Ministry on the commercial and technological potential for an agreement with China, similar to the ones that Brazil had already signed with “other developing countries, namely those that are not members of the NPT.” One such agreement, Guerreiro suggests, could be signed during President Figueiredo’s upcoming visit to Beijing.

  • May 30, 1984

    Stenographic Record of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung

    Stenographic record of the first meeting between Kim Il Sung and Erich Honecker upon the former's 1984 official visit to the GDR. This is the morning session of 30 May 1984. Kim does most of the talking. Kim Il Sung discussed the economic situation in North Korea, objectives and problems of energy generation, the educational system. He asked the GDR for labor and cooperation in the education of specialists. He wanted to sign a long-term agreement of economic cooperation along with the intended friendship treaty. Kim Il Sung also evaluated the military situation in South Korea, explaining the problems of negotiations and reunification with the South. Honecker proposed the creation of an agreement towards economic and scientific cooperation between GDR and North Korea.

  • July 31, 1984

    Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 91/3-84, 'Argentina’s Nuclear Policies Under Alfonsin'

    Almost two years after the 1982 SNIE, the military rule had collapsed and a democratically-elected government led by Raul Alfonsin was taking an unambiguous stand on nuclear weapons. In its 1984 assessment, the intelligence community was more certain about Argentina’s nuclear policies: “on the basis of discernible evidence … Argentina does not have a program to develop or test nuclear explosives.” Nevertheless, Alfonsin was unlikely to change “Argentina’s long-term efforts to achieve its goal of acquiring a full range of nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities.”

  • October 05, 1984

    National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 73/5-84, 'Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies and Programs'

    Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s.