MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 27, 1969
Place: Mr. Kissinger's Office
Present: Ambassador Shriver
         Henry A. Kissinger
         Helmut Sonnenfeldt
         Mr. Tanguy

Invitation to President Pompidou to Visit the United States

Ambassador Shriver gave his view that it would be in the U.S.
interest to invite President Pompidou to visit the United States in the near
future. The Ambassador pointed out that Pompidou does not know our
country at all from first-hand experience except for a brief visit to New
York City several years ago. The Ambassador also noted that several
months ago, Pompidou had made plans to come to the United States as
a private citizen and spend one month here visiting different parts of the
country including one or two important campuses. The Ambassador
concluded that all things considered, it would be desirable if the President
could invite Pompidou to come to the United States early next fall even
though Pompidou, because of his preoccupation with domestic questions,
might not be able to make the visit that soon.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that it would be highly desirable for
Pompidou to visit the United States in the near future and he was sure
that the President would support the idea. It was pointed out that the
interim NSC report on U.S. policy toward post-de Gaulle France contem-
plated an official invitation from the President to Pompidou.

As to the timing, Mr. Kissinger thought that September might be
a little early for the President in view of his existing and anticipated
obligations at that time. The simplest solution would be simply to
substitute Pompidou, as the new President of France, for former President
de Gaulle, who had accepted the President's invitation and had planned to
come to the United States sometime in January 1970. However, it might be
possible to arrange for Pompidou to come sooner if he was able to.

In response to Ambassador Shriver's suggestion, Mr. Kissinger
agreed to speak to the President in the next few days about authorizing the
Ambassador to sound out Pompidou with respect to visiting the United States
sometime in the coming months at the invitation of the President. If
the President approved, this preliminary, informal inquiry would enable
us to judge when it would be best to send Pompidou a formal invitation.
Mr. Kissinger told the Ambassador that he would inform him of the
President's reaction after the Ambassador returned to Paris.

Military Cooperation

Mr. Kissinger said that he did not think that the President had
made up his mind yet about military cooperation with France although he
was well disposed to explore the possibilities. In approaching the question
the President would not let "NATO theology" stand in the way of whatever
advantages might accrue to U.S. security through an increase in French
military cooperation with the United States.

Mr. Kissinger said that he was less clear about the President's
thinking on possible nuclear cooperation with France. However, Mr.
Kissinger would not exclude the possibility that the President might be
interested in developing a certain amount of cooperation in this field.
Mr. Kissinger thought that the President would just as soon have it as
not to have it. Moreover, Mr. Kissinger felt that the President would be
highly sympathetic to French-U.K. cooperation in the nuclear field. He
did not think that the MacMahon Act would be a serious impediment.

U.K. Entry

The President continues to favor British entry into the Common
Market but he does not want to spend a great deal of U.S. political
currency to achieve this objective.

The French Role in the Middle East

In answer to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Kissinger said
the United States is happy to approach the Middle East problem through the
four-power talks provided France supports what the United States is trying
to achieve. On the other hand, if the French try to play us off against the
Soviets, then we will concentrate our efforts in two-power talks with the
latter.

We do not need the French in order to negotiate with the Soviets.
It is easy to talk with them directly. The French should realize therefore
that there is no brokerage role for them between us and the Soviets. The
French should try to get back in a position where they can exert some influence over the Israelis. The United States is not going to allow itself to be put in a position where it has the entire onus for putting pressure on the Israelis to accept proposals agreed upon by the four powers.