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TO: AMBASSAD VIENNA IMMEDIATE
INFO: AMBASSAD PARIS
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NODIS
USIAEA, FOR AMB, SMITH FROM NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1

TAGS: IAEA, TECH, AU, FR, PK

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON PAKISTAN

1. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS ALL
ASPECTS OF US-PAK RELATIONS AND HAVE DECIDED TO PROCEED
WITH CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS DESPITE FRENCH INABILITY
TO GIVE US OFFICIAL ASSURANCES OF CANCELLATION. ART HUMMEL,
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J oe N ye a nd I p lan to m eet w ith G le nn a nd Z ablocki ea rly ne xt w ee k. A fter th ese m eetings w e w ill ho p e fu lly b e in a p osition to s chedule fu rth er m eetings on th e h ill.

2. T h urs day m orning (S ept 14) I m et w ith r ep re sentat ives f rom all th e c on cerned o ffices to r eview t alking p oints f or th e G le nn/ Z ablocki m eetings. A ll p articipan ts a greed th at th e f ollowing tal king p oints c ould b e u sed f or th e G le nn/ Z ablocki m eetings. A m odified v ersion of th ese tal king p oints w ould b e u sed f or m eetings w ith ot her s en a to rs a nd c on gressmen. P lease r eview th ese p oints a nd l et m e h ave y our c om ments b y o penin g o f b u siness m onday (S ept 18). C om m e nt a ttache d

T alking p oints for c onsultations w ith G le nn a nd Z ablocki

- W e'v e b een w orkin g in tensive ly f or w ell o v er a y ear w ith b oth th e F ren ch a nd P akistanis o n th e p roblem o f th e r eproc ess in g p lant.

- I a m n ow h appy to r eport on a s ubstan ti al s tep f orward to w ard o ur o bjective o f p reventing P akistan from a c quirin g a n uclear e xplosive c apabilit y. W e a re n ow s atisf ied th at th e F ren ch w ill n ot g o f orward w ith th e ir c ontrac t a nd th at n o s en sitiv e e quipment f or th e p lant h as b een o r w ill b e t ransf erred.

- W e b elieve o ur l ow p rofile in W ashington o n th is s ubject (d u ring th e la st se ve ra l w eeks) h as b een p articu larly h elpful in t erms o f o ur r elations w it h th e F ren ch a nd w ill c ontribute to o ur a bility to c oop erate w ith th em o n o th er in p ortant n on-p roliferation is sues. It c ould s e v erely e m b arrass th e F ren ch g overnm ent if w e w ere s een s ecret

N OT T O B E R EPRO DUCED W ITHOU T T H E A UTH ORIZA TION O F TH E E XECUTIVE S ECRETARY

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TO BE TAKING CREDIT FOR WHAT IS THEIR DECISION.

-- (IF ASKED ABOUT ASSURANCES: FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL
REASONS NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS
WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT OF CANCELLATION, AND WE
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN TERMS OF OUR
RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES TO TRY TO HAVE THEM DO SO.)

-- WE HAVE COME TO DISCUSS WITH YOU HOW WE CAN NOW GO
FURTHER TO RESTORE A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN IS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND
THAT WE HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE REGION. THE
SITUATION IN IRAN IS WORRISSOME AND AFGHANISTAN CONSTITU
TUTES A SERIOUS DESTABILIZING FACTOR. INTERNALLY
PAKISTAN IS A DEEPLY TROUBLED LAND. THE BHUTTO PROBLEM
MANS LIKE A SHADOW OVER THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE.
PAKISTAN FEELS THREATENED BOTH FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT.
A DISINTEGRATING OR RADICALIZED PAKISTAN COULD DIRECTLY
THREATEN OUR MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

-- PAKISTAN SEES HERSELF SURROUNDED BY UNFRIENDLY OR
UNSTABLE STATES, AND IS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE WILL
AND ABILITY OF THE US, OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND
CENTO TO PROVIDE SECURITY DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD.

-- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH OUR NON-PROLIFERATION
INTERESTS AND OUR BROADER REGIONAL CONCERNS, WE BELIEVE
IT IMPORTANT TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESTORE MORE NORMAL
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN NOW THAT THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF
THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT IS BEHIND US. WE BELIEVE
THAT A RESUMPTION OF AID AND LIMITED MILITARY SALES
COULD GIVE US SOME INFLUENCE ON GOP POLICIES,
AND PERHAPS RELIEVE SOME OF THE TENSION AND SENSE OF
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ISOLATION WHICH GAVE PAKISTAN GREATER INCENTIVE TO MOVE COVERTLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

-- AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, CANCELLATION OF THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. NEVERTHELESS, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE ON THE REPROCESSING PLANT DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PAKISTAN AS A POTENTIAL PROLIFERATOR. I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR THINKING AS WE LOOK BEYOND THIS IMPORTANT MILESTONE.

-- THE MOTIVATING FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR OPTION REMAINS UNDIMINISHED -- NAMELY THE FEAR OF INUTA AND PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO COMPENSATE FOR A PERCEIVED INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. IN RECENT MONTHS, PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED BY THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION WHICH HAS LED TO INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN KABUL. PAKISTAN IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY INSTABILITY IN IRAN.

-- AWARE OF PAKISTAN'S STRONG MOTIVATION, WE HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY AND, I MIGHT ADD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THIS WILL FOCUS NOT ONLY ON ANY INDIGENOUS EFFORT AT REPROCESSING, BUT ON OTHER AREAS AS WELL.

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN CAN OBTAIN SENSITIVE ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT. YOU MAY HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE ASSISTANCE BUT WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY THE CHINESE THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION TO DO SO. WE HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A STUDY OURSELVES OF PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITY TO PROCEED WITH THE PLANT ON ITS OWN, AND SECRET
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WE DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE THE TECHNICAL SKILLS AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY TO COMPLETE THE FRENCH PROJECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- WE RECENTLY OBTAINED SOME EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN IS LOOKING INTO THE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROCESS WHICH COULD, OF COURSE, PERMIT THEM TO PRODUCE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN SHOPPING AROUND FOR SOME EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN THE CENTRIFUGE PROCESS.

-- WE ARE STILL ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, BUT THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN ANY CENTRIFUGE EFFORT ARE ENORMOUS AND WE BELIEVE WE CAN CONTROL THIS THROUGH NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS TO RESTRICT PAKISTANI PURCHASES OF ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN A CENTRIFUGE OR OTHER PROGRAMS.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD BEAR CLOSE WATCHING AND WE NEED TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH DEAL BOTH WITH PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATION AND WITH ITS CAPABILITIES TO PURSUE THE NUCLEAR OPTION IF IT SO CHOOSES.

-- WE WILL MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THAT OUR SUPPORT -- ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE -- IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, EXPLAIN TO THEM ALL RELEVANT LEGISLATION. WE WILL ALSO SEEK TO AT LEAST MITIGATE PAKISTAN MOTIVATION BY ATTEMPTING TO MOVE INDIA TO ACCEPTING FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND BY SUPPORTING A SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

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- In sum, we think it is in US national interest to restore our relations with Pakistan, a critical country in an unstable region. The administration and Congress share the common objective of limiting nuclear proliferation. We think we have a greater chance of dealing effectively with the nuclear problem in the long run if we reknit our ties with Pakistan. As we know, in the case of other countries which have motivation toward a nuclear weapons option, such as South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, we have to continuously work on the problem in a variety of ways and this we fully intend to do.

- We think that any alternative course would heighten Pak insecurity, give them greater motivation to go it alone in the nuclear field and would not serve our geopolitical interests in the region. Christopher
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6004

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FOR NEWSOM FROM SMITH

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: IAEA, TECH

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REF: STATE 235372

PAK TALKING POINTS SEEM FINE. IN THIRD PARA I'D STRIKE "DURING THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS". WE HAVE LAID LOW FOR A YEAR. I BRIEFED ZABLOCKI'S COMMITTEE ON NONPROLIF ISSUES LAST FALL AND ASKED THEM NOT TO ASK ABOUT PAKISTAN, THEY RESPECTED THIS REQUEST. I SUGGEST YOU COMMEND THEM AND SAY HOW HELPFUL THIS CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINT HAS BEEN. SMITH

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