RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE UTILIZATION
OF THE RUSSIAN EMIGRATION

1. I do not believe that it is necessary, at this late date, to present arguments in support of the thesis that, in the political warfare which the Communist leaders in Moscow are carrying on against the United States on a world-wide scale, we should make use of every weapon available to us, including the disaffected Russian population under the Communist Dictatorship. The Kremlin for 30 years has been utilizing American citizens in its endeavor to weaken and injure the political, economic and social fabric of the United States. From the very beginning of their regime, the Communist leaders have realized that, in their struggle to extend throughout the world the system which they have established in Russia, one of their most effective allies in subverting non-Communist governments would be elements of the population dissatisfied with the existing government. Consequently, the Kremlin has devoted a great deal of time and energy to the organization and utilization of discontented citizens of foreign countries against the governments of these countries. The record will show that Moscow has had considerable success in that field. At the same time, the Communist leaders have been fully conscious of the potential danger to their own security contained in the existence of extensive disaffection in the Soviet Union. They have not forgotten that the German invasion showed that there were millions of Soviet citizens awaiting an opportunity to seek foreign assistance against the Communist regime. Hence, stringent measures have been taken to isolate the masses of Russian people from contact with foreigners in the Soviet Union, to reduce to a minimum the travel abroad of Soviet citizens, to obtain the repatriation to the Soviet Union of all Soviet refugees abroad, etc. It is a significant fact that to this day, the Soviet government has never relaxed its efforts to get its hands on all Soviet citizens who refused to return to the Soviet Union after the world war.

2. In formulating our strategy in the struggle in which we are now engaged with the Communist regime in Moscow, it is of the utmost importance that we realize that our opponent is not Russia, but the Communist rulers of Russia, and that a most valuable ally in this struggle is the people of Russia. If we base our plans on the concept that Russia is our enemy, we are headed for disaster. If General Vlasov were alive today, he would undoubtedly talk tous along the lines he did to Himmler: From a purely military point of view, Russia is invincible; the United States is not powerful enough to defeat the Russian people and its Communist rulers, but with the aid of the Russian people, it can destroy the Communist government without great difficulty. It should be axiomatic that our strategy should be directed toward the enlistment of the assistance of the Russian people in our struggle against Moscow Communism. With the Russian people as our ally, we will have at our disposal the force which constitutes the greatest menace to Soviet Communism—nationalism. We have seen how this force has disrupted even the hard core of Communist parties. Stalin recognized its power when he had to resort to it to strengthen his regime in the critical days of the world war. It should be our endeavor to make the fullest use possible of this disruptive force. To that end, the Western world struggling to check the advance of Moscow Communism, should seek to bring the Russian people suffering under the Communist Dictatorship, into the ranks of the common front of struggle against world Communism. It may well be that the key to the final victory over Soviet Communism lies in the union of the forces struggling for the liberation of Russia from the Communist regime with the forces struggling for the liberation
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of the world from the menace of subjugation by the Moscow dictatorship.

3. Assuming that there is general agreement that we should enlist the aid of the Russian people in our struggle against the Communist regime in Moscow, the question to be considered is the ways and means of utilizing this ally most effectively. It is not possible to organize the Russian people within the Soviet Union who are opposed to the Communist regime, although there exists widespread discontent with the Communist Dictatorship. We cannot organize a "Democratic Party" in the Soviet Union as the Kremlin has organized a "Communist Party" in the United States. However, there are available to us outside of the Soviet Union, thousands of Soviet citizens who are embittered opponents of the Communist regime. These people constitute the segment of the Russian population which is in a position to struggle actively for the liberation of Russia from the Communist dictatorship. Through them, if properly organized and utilized, the Western democracies can establish contact with the masses of the Russian people inside the Soviet Union. Through them, the opposition forces within the Soviet Union can be consolidated and the Soviet population incited to a more hostile attitude toward the Communist regime. The mere existence abroad of anti-Communist Soviet nationals carrying on an ideological struggle against the Communist dictatorship, constitutes a powerful stimulus to opposition within the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Russian emigration possesses qualities which can be invaluable to us in the conduct of the struggle against the Kremlin. Its implacable hostility to Communism, its complete understanding of the nature of the Communist system, its knowledge of the feelings and aspirations of its fellow countrymen in the Soviet Union, etc., make it a very precious ally. However, in order that the Russian emigration may be in a position to play its proper role in the struggle against Moscow Communism it must be organized along lines calculated to make it an effective political force. The Russian emigration split up into numerous warring political groups cannot be an effective political force. On the other hand, the Russian emigration consolidated into an united front which devotes all its energies to the struggle to liberate its fellow countrymen from the yoke of Communism, and which, through the principles proclaimed by it and through its reflection of the aims and aspirations of the Russian masses in the Soviet Union, enjoys the confidence of the Russian people, can render invaluable services to the forces of the Western democracies in their struggle against the Moscow dictatorship. The most effective means of checking the advance of militant Communism abroad, is to undermine the Communist regime at home and the Russian emigration is well qualified to play an important role in that work.

4. The mass of Russian emigrants—especially the new emigration—is not only willing but eager to struggle for the liberation of their country from the rule of the Communists. Notwithstanding the adverse circumstances with which they have been confronted—horrible living conditions, extreme poverty, the hostility and suspicion of the military government authorities, the latent menace of repatriation hanging over many refugees, lack of any encouragement from the Western World, etc., they have organized themselves into numerous ideological and political programs for liberated Russia, attended courses to train themselves for future activities and with the limited means at their disposal engaged in anti-Communist activities among the Soviet troops in the Soviet occupied zone. Unfortunately, the conduct of an active fight against the Communist regime has been greatly hampered by factional struggles, by an endless contest for leadership and by petty quarrels and bickerings among the different political groups. The emigrants, particularly the new emigrants, have been fully conscious of the need of putting an end to the dispersion of the energies of the emigration on factional quarrels and dissensions, and of creating a
United Front which would concentrate all the efforts of the emigration on the struggle against Bolshevism and direct and develop their anti-Communist activities along lines best calculated to undermine the Communist regime in Moscow. Furthermore, as they believe that the Communist dictatorship can be destroyed only by a revolution of the peoples of Russia themselves, and that it is the task of the emigration to assist from the outside the development of anti-Bolshevik forces inside the Soviet Union, they hold that the Russian peoples in emigration, in order to carry out this task, must be united in a national front in sympathy with and responsive to the aspirations and interests of the discontented Russian peoples within the Soviet Union.

5. Consequently, there has been an almost instinctive urge on the part of the Russian emigrants to consolidate their forces and establish an anti-Communist center which would unite all emigrant groups. However, the efforts of the emigration to create an anti-Communist united front, have encountered three major obstacles; (1) the financial support given to unsavory and self-seeking groups; (2) the lack of sufficient work. Although the various groups have drawn up programs of extensive activities, they have not been able to engage in the planned activities on account of the lack of funds. This point is of special importance since all competent observers of the Russian emigration appear to be agreed that any united front, no matter how successfully organized, will eventually disintegrate unless it is given something to do; and (3) the absence of any outstanding leader in the emigration. This situation is due, unfortunately, to the fact that under the terms of the Yalta Agreement, the United States Military authorities turned over to the Soviet Army not only General Vlassov but all his collaborators of outstanding ability and prestige. We are in a position to remove or reduce these and other obstacles which have stood in the way of the creation of a united front among the Russian emigres.

6. It is my opinion that we can bring about without great difficulty the establishment of an anti-Communist united front embracing all the worthwhile elements of the Russian emigration by stimulating and facilitating the existing striving of the Russian emigres to create a central unifying organization. In this way, the united front which would be established would not be an "artificial" creation imposed from without, but something evolved by the Russian emigres themselves. The present political situation of the Russian emigration and the existing political trends are most favorable to such a development. First of all, the political situation of the Russian emigres is in a state of flux. Two organizations—the SAF and the ATPONR—are in a process of disintegration. The latter organization was originally established as a super-party political center to coordinate the anti-Communist activities of the Russian emigration. The two chief organizations of the new emigrants—the SBDOR and SVOD—which are functioning as a single group through an interlocking directorate, are still in a rudimentary state. Furthermore, there have been going on for some time, a series of negotiations looking to the unification of the anti-Communist forces. The New York
League has been seeking to bring about a united front on a republican basis while the Paris group of Malgunov has been working for unification on a broader basis. The disintegration of SAJ and the discredit of its leader, General Glasenap, and his associates constitute also a favorable development inasmuch as the General and his gang have been a harmful and disrupting factor in Russian emigre political life.

7. The present state of flux in the political life of the Russian emigration is calculated to evoke a new effort on the part of the Russian emigre leaders to achieve unity. With our encouragement and support, the proper leaders could, in my opinion, bring about the creation in a relatively short time, of a central organization which would mobilize the great mass of the Russian emigration into an effective anti-Communist political force. How can the Russian emigration be organized into an effective anti-Communist political force? In the first place, the leadership of the Russian emigration must rest primarily in the hands of the new emigrants, i.e., of persons who have lived most of their life under the Soviet system and have personal knowledge of Communist methods, who know the psychology of their fellow citizens in the Soviet Union and understand their desires and aspirations, etc. Furthermore, the new emigrants have a more intense hatred of Communism and are a tougher and much more ruthless breed than the old. The fight against Communism must be led by leaders of this type. Secondly, all the worthwhile elements of the Russian emigration must be brought into the movement. There are many capable persons in the old emigration whose services would be of great value in view of their high intellectual level, knowledge of the Western World and broad experience in political matters. Such persons should be associated with the leadership in some manner. Thirdly, an effort should be made to embrace as many of the national minorities as possible. A great deal of effort will probably be required to carry out this point. Fourthly, elements which would weaken the anti-Communist movement, whether individuals or groups with programs which do not appeal to the Russian masses in the Soviet Union, should be excluded. Among such elements are the right wing and left wing extremists, politically unreliable elements, and individuals who have become identified with interests alien to Russia or who are interested only in personal profit and interests alien to Russia or who are interested only in personal profit and advantage.

8. The foregoing principles applied to the present situation in the Russian emigration would produce the following setup. The majority of the members, including the head, of the Directing Center of the united front, would be composed of leaders in the Vlascov movement, many of whom would come from the leadership of the two Vlascovite organizations—SBONR and SVOD. Among the movements which should have representatives in the Directing Center, I would place first of all the Solidarists. As this group contains many capable people devoting themselves ideastically to the struggle against Bolshevism and is the best organized and the most active in anti-Communist work of all the Russian emigre organizations, it is of great importance that the Solidarists be represented in the anti-Communist center. While the Solidarists prefer to work by themselves, it is believed, in view of statements made by their leaders and of their participation in the ATSOZDR, that they would be willing to cooperate in an anti-Communist center lead by capable and high-minded leaders. Incidentally, it may be stated that the Solidarists' organization, the NIS, and the Vlascovite organization—SBONR—SVOD—are the only two active anti-Communist organizations in the Russian emigration at the present time. Among the other movements which should be represented in the Directing Center, I would list the Right Wing of the New York "League of Struggle for the Freedom of Peoples," Malgunov's "Union of Struggle for the Freedom of Russia," the moderate monarchists and possibly the old Russian military organization, the ROVS. All these groups contain able people
whose cooperation would be most valuable in the planning and carrying on of anti-Communist activities. With regard to the national minorities, it would be extremely desirable to have representatives from the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Caucasian peoples, Kazakhs, Turkic-Tatars and other groups. In my opinion it will probably be possible to obtain the cooperation of most of the national groups, with the exception of the Western Ukrainians. I would exclude from the Directing Center of the United Front, reactionary monarchists and Mensheviks, as well as representatives of the two monarchist organizations, ROSS and ROKND, of the two dubious groups, the VAKO and KND, and of the two organizations which are now in a state of decomposition, the SAP and ATSOOKR. Since the new organization would be designed to accomplish what the ATSOOKR was created to do, the latter organization would have no further raison d'être. Such a united front could be effected probably only on the basis of an extremely broad platform, containing possibly only two basic principles—liberation of Russia from the Communists and non-predetermination, i.e., the question of the future political and economic structure of Russia to be decided by the Russian people themselves and not predetermined by any group of Russian refugees abroad. However, it is of the greatest importance that the United Front should elaborate a positive program which would not only rally around it the Russian emigration, but also appeal to the discontented masses in the Soviet Union. If a United Front were created along the lines set forth above, it would bring together under one leadership all the worthwhile elements in the Russian emigration and thereby create an anti-Communist movement which would be a most valuable ally in our struggle against Moscow Communism.

9. It should be emphasized that the organization of the Russian emigration into an anti-Communist united front will not only afford us a valuable instrument of political warfare against the Kremlin during the "cold war," but lay the ground work for the development, in the event of war, of a movement which would mobilize the Russian people against their rulers and release forces within the country which would cripple the Communist regime. The existence at the outbreak of war of a well-organized Russian national movement under the leadership of capable, determined and trustworthy anti-Bolshevist Russians, would present a powerful weapon to the American government.
11. Before setting forth my concrete recommendations with regard to the foregoing, I desire to point out that the State Department's proposal that the organization to be created be called a "Russian Welfare Committee" is not a feasible one. In the first place, there is already in existence a welfare committee in the form of the "Central Representation of the Russian Emigration in the American Zone" (TSPRE) which was created to look after the cultural and material needs of the Russian emigres. This organization has been recognized as such by the Military Government and IRO authorities. It is true that this organization is now going through a severe crisis, but it will probably be reorganized and continued in some form or other. Originally, this body was organized at a congress of delegates elected by the Russian emigrants in the American zone, and one of the causes of the present dissension in the organization, is the question of who shall be entitled to vote. The sudden appearance of a non-elected "Russian Welfare Committee" would not only cause great amazement but inevitably involve considerable controversy with the existing organization. Furthermore, a Welfare Committee composed exclusively of the type of men which we would select, would be the object of suspicion from the very beginning. There would be a demand for the appointment to the committee of representatives of other groups, particularly, of the Orthodox Church and if no such representatives were appointed, the Welfare Committee would have difficulty in maintaining its bona fides.

Specific Recommendations

12. In view of the foregoing, I recommend:
3. As soon as the bureau has been organized, it should undertake
the planning of anti-Communist activities which could be initiated or
developed at once. Among such activities are:

A. Propaganda among the Soviet troops and administrative
personnel in the Soviet occupied zones. Two Russian emigrant
organizations—the NTS and NBOHR—have been engaged in distributing
leaflets and newspapers in the Soviet occupied zones.

B. Radio broadcasts by the Russian United Front. Russian
national propaganda, especially by radio, can be developed into a very
effective weapon against the Communist regime in Moscow. As soon
as the Russian United Front has been organized, facilities should be
made available for regular broadcasts by the United Front Organization.
It is recommended that the Russian National Committee be permitted
to lease time on the Free Europe Committee's station in Germany.

C. Preparation for distribution in Western Europe and
the United States of both serious studies and popular works on all
phases of the Soviet Union and Communist activities. This activity
would be directed toward destroying the Communist myth so assiduously
build up by Communist propaganda in non-Communist countries. The
Russian emigrants can be of great assistance to us in this field.

I have made extensive inquiries about the five persons mentioned
above and gone through all the information concerning them in the files of
M.I.S. and C.I.C. I found no derogatory data with regard to any of them.
All are sincere and capable anti-Communists.
The five individuals mentioned above have all been active in the Vlasov movement and have worked together in different fields. It is believed that they would form a very harmonious team. There are other individuals who possess qualifications which might be very useful and whom it may be found advisable to bring into our bureau later, but for various reasons, it is not deemed wise to bring them in at the beginning. Such individuals are:
4. A suitable house should be obtained for the headquarters of the
bureau. It should be located away from the Munich area, preferably in the
region between Munich and Stuttgart. It should be reasonably large—about
20 rooms—and should be situated in a place where it could not be readily
kept under observation and where the movement of people would not excite
undue notice or comment.

6. In order to conceal effectively the connection of the United States
Government with the activities carried on by us in the Russian emigration, it
seems to me essential that we have at our disposal in the United States a
cover organization composed of private American citizens who have no connection
with the United States Government. Assuming that we will not be able to
utilize the Free Europe Committee or the International Rescue Committee, I
recommend that we create a small organization, under some appropriate name,
composed of American citizens who are not members of any Russian political
organization. Our contacts with the Russian emigrants would be made in the
name of this group and our representative who would reside in Germany
would be ostensibly a representative of this group.

by Kelley