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In reply refer to

5 May 1950

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Mr. DeWitt C. Pools
 National Committee for Free Europe, Inc.
 301 Empire State Building
 350 Fifth Avenue
 New York 1, New York

Policy

Dear DeWitt:

I am submitting herewith a direct quote from a policy document issued by our friends, dated April 26:

"US Policy Towards the Soviet European Satellites

"The ultimate objective of US policy toward the satellite states of eastern Europe is to weaken the grip of the Soviet Union upon them with the eventual aim of eliminating preponderant Soviet power there and enabling these nations to exist as free members of the European community. For the immediate future, as the sovietization of the satellites continues apace, we wish to preserve what we can of western influence there and to maintain our concern for the rights and welfare of these peoples.

"Background. At the present time, the trend in the satellite states initiated in 1944 is moving rapidly toward Moscow's goal of undiluted Communist regimes under absolute Soviet control. The campaign to eliminate all vestiges of western influence is reaching a climax in numerous 'espionage trials,' arrests and mistreatment of the citizens of western nations, measures against western diplomatic missions which in the case of Bulgaria have already led to a break in relations with the US, and the restriction or banning of the informational activities of western nations. Meanwhile the satellites are cutting other ties with the free world by withdrawing from participation in a number of international organizations such as the World Bank and, at the same time, their propaganda attacks on the west have become increasingly violent. This situation raises the possibility that the US and other western nations might eventually be forced to withdraw their diplomatic missions and see the entire eastern European area isolated as a Soviet preserve with its human and material resources utilized exclusively to magnify the Kremlin's power. If the USSR has complete

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control of these countries and the west is not able even to cause it any worry or inconvenience there, it would seem clear that the USSR will be able to devote more of its energies to disruptive efforts in Germany and western Europe. It is therefore in accordance with western interests, as well as with the basic principles of American policy as regards the self-determination of peoples, that the trend toward the domination and absorption of the nations of eastern Europe by the USSR should be slowed and, if possible, reversed. Even though attempts to assert our rights and our influence in the satellite states may be in the main ineffective, we believe that it is important to maintain our position and not to accept, openly or tacitly, the concept that this area is the preserve of the Soviets and of no concern to the west.

Means to Implement US Policy in Eastern Europe. In view of the position of virtual impotence to which the west has now been reduced in eastern Europe, it is difficult to find positive means of attaining or even pursuing our objectives in this area. Certain means, however, appear to be available and we believe it desirable that the US, UK, and France coordinate their position and carry out the following course of action in eastern Europe: 1) Despite provocation and pressures, the western powers should continue to maintain diplomatic representation in the satellite countries so long as they are not forced to withdraw by the creation of situations which can no longer be tolerated. The maintenance of at least some representation is deemed necessary in order to obtain such useful and possibly vital information as may be found on the spot, to indicate that we do not intend to abandon these peoples to Soviet domination, and to be present and thus more easily able to exploit any unexpected situations which may arise, as happened in the case of Yugoslavia in 1948. 2) The US, UK, and French governments may feel compelled to take certain measures against the satellite states in retaliation for actions of the latter against their diplomatic missions or in violation of the rights of their citizens. In order that such retaliatory measures may be as effective as possible, the three powers should make a practice of consulting each other in advance and, in cases where it seems advantageous, coordinating their actions. 3) The western powers should maintain a strong propaganda offensive against the Communist regimes of eastern Europe, through radio broadcasts and all other available means, in order to maintain the morale of the people and to hinder efforts to establish full Soviet control in these nations, although western propaganda should not promise imminent liberation or encourage active revolt. Every effort should be made to expose the fact that Soviet domination of the satellites is maintained by force or the threat of force and by the imposition of Soviet-Communist agents in positions of power. The US, UK and France should cooperate in making available to each

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other information, suggestions and facilities for such a propaganda offensive and in general should coordinate their efforts in this field. 4) The western powers should fully utilize the UN forum in order to keep before world opinion the issue that these countries are being deprived of independence and that their peoples are being denied fundamental human rights. We believe that the case against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania on violation of the human rights clauses of the Peace Treaties should be pursued with the aim of obtaining a favorable international decision in this matter and of exploiting fully the propaganda value of this basic issue of individual freedom. We also think that consideration should be given to the desirability of bringing before the General Assembly the question of the unjustifiable and improper treatment by the Soviet and satellite governments of the citizens of other states. 5) The western powers should not lose sight of the fact that the nations of eastern Europe have been and should be a part of the European community and this point might be emphasized in connection with the activities and deliberations of the Council of Europe and any other moves which are being made in the direction of a united Europe. In this regard, we believe that judicious use should be made of exiles from the satellite countries although they should not be recognized as having any official status. We further think that the US, UK and France should coordinate their attitudes and policies toward the various satellite exiled groups with the view of making the fullest use of them in the interests of western policy, which we also consider are the interests of the respective satellite peoples themselves. Such coordination is particularly important and urgent since plans are now being made to use certain exiles in radio broadcasts to Eastern Europe. 6) The western powers should fully exploit the advantages presented to them by Tito's quarrel with the Kremlin and should encourage all signs of Titoism in the satellite states--without, however, forgetting that the majority of the people in those countries oppose all varieties of communism. We think that the US, UK and France should consistently seek to weaken the Soviet position in eastern Europe both by taking the measures necessary to keep the Tito regime afloat and by working through the Yugoslavs so far as is possible to influence developments in the orbital satellites. 7) We believe that export controls on east-west trade should be maintained and strengthened in accordance with the security interests of the west, although such controls should be flexible and capable of adjustment. In this adjustment process the paramount importance of security should be emphasized but at the same time recognition should be given to the problem of the dollar gap and to the desirability of a certain volume of east-west trade in non-security items in order to support the western European economies without creating an undue dependence on the east. We also think that we should constantly reexamine the validity of the basic assumptions on which

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our general economic policies toward the Soviet bloc are based with a view to determining the extent to which trade between eastern and western Europe is possible and desirable in the future and, therefore, the degree to which reliance should be placed on such trade in economic planning for western Europe after 1952."

I believe you and your associates in the NCFE should find the foregoing most gratifying.

Sincerely,

U.

cc: SADO

EXT UNIT, RHM/hlw

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