SUBJECT: Radio Broadcasts to the Soviet Union Supported by the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia—Some Basic Policy Considerations

Overall Purpose of Broadcasts

1. The overall objective, for the immediate future, of the radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union supported by the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia should be to deepen and widen the gulf between the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Communist rulers. With this end in view, the broadcasts should seek to increase the stress and strain and the tensions which exist in the Soviet Union and sow the seeds of dissatisfaction where it does not now exist. There is no question but that dissatisfaction exists on a wide scale in the Soviet Union in varying degrees, ranging from insipient dissatisfaction with existing conditions and doubts as to the realization of Communist ideals, lack of sympathy with present policies of the Kremlin, etc., to complete disillusionment and fierce hatred of the Communist regime. The peoples of the Soviet Union are potentially valuable allies of the Free World and it is in the interest of the Free World to integrate their opposition to their Communist rulers, however passive and unimportant such opposition may be at present, into the world-wide struggle of the Western Democracies against the Kremlin. Consequently, it is essential to encourage in the Soviet Union the spirit of resistance to exploitation and oppression, to fortify anti-Communist sentiments, to bring home to the peoples of the Soviet Union that they have friends in the Free World, and to develop among them a sympathetic attitude toward the Western Democracies. Every effort should be made to reduce to a minimum the collaboration of the population of the Soviet Union with the Communist Government and to develop an attitude of non-cooperation and passive resistance as will not entail punishment of participants. The cumulative effect of unorganized miscellaneous non-cooperation can be very great in that it not only causes material damage to the functioning of the governmental machinery but also depresses the morale of the communist rulers and makes more difficult their work while encouraging the spirit of resistance of the population. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the development in considerable segments of the population of the Soviet Union of an attitude of sullen resentment and shrewd non-cooperation with the communist authorities will redound to the great advantage of the Free World, both during the cold war as well as in the event of armed conflict.

Relations of American Committee to Radio and Political Center

2. The propagandizing of the population of the Soviet Union against the communist government is work which can be effectively accomplished only by representatives of the peoples of the Soviet Union, serving solely
the interests of the Soviet peoples and understanding and responding to their sentiments and aspirations. The necessary leadership of this work must be found among representatives of the peoples of the Soviet Union who enjoy freedom abroad. A Political Center qualified to assume leadership of the struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union against their communist rulers is now in the process of organization. In the event that the Political Center is not established prior to the inauguration of radio broadcasts, the broadcasts should be made in the name of the Commission set up to organize the Political Center or of a Committee appointed by that body. In any event it is of paramount importance that the organization in whose name broadcasts are made to the Soviet Union is a genuine creation of the Soviet exiles-not a foreign agency of a Russian group set up as a stooge by a foreign power. In this connection it is essential that the relations between the Political Center and its activities and the American Committee be placed on a basis appropriate to the role to be played by the Political Center. The function of the American Committee is (1) to assist the Soviet refugees to create an effective organization of leadership, as the Committee has been doing, and (2) to make available to them the means, radio facilities, etc. whereby they can communicate with their fellow countrymen behind the iron curtain. The relationship, therefore, should be that existing between allies, between partners, who are associated in a common enterprise. The Political Center should never be treated as an agent of the American Committee and every effort must be made to avoid taking any action, or making any statement, which implies that the Political Center and its activities are subordinate to the American Committee.

Control of Broadcasts

3. The Political Center will require considerable assistance in inaugurating radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union. While affording assistance to the organization of the broadcasts, it should be the endeavor of the American Committee to build up in the Political Center a genuine Russian organization qualified to carry on the broadcasts without any participation of the American Committee other than that involved in the extension of assistance and in the supervision of the observance of certain general principles laid down by the American Committee, such as that the broadcasts will not be utilized to propagate the political doctrines of any particular party; that they will not include material tending to provoke overt action against the Soviet Government, etc. In this connection the selection of the Russian who will have charge of the broadcasts is of primary importance. The appointment to this post of a capable individual, in complete sympathy with the purposes of the American Committee, will preclude the development of delicate problems and controversies which will inevitably arise if, as the result of the inexperience of the Russian director, the American supervisor is forced to play a directing role rather than an advisory one in the preparation of the broadcasts.
Basic Character of Broadcasts

4. It is important that the Americans associated with the radio activities clearly understand the basic character of the broadcasts in order that the broadcasts can render the greatest service to the struggle of the Western Democracies against Bolshevism and that there may be no duplication of, or competition with, the broadcasts of VOA. The broadcasts to the Soviet Union supported by the American Committee are to be Russian broadcasts—not American broadcasts; they are to serve the interests of the Russian liberation movement—not the interests of the United States. Consequently, they will not explain or defend American policies, propagate American ideas, extol the American way of life, build up American prestige, play American jazz, or otherwise encroach upon the field of activity of VOA. They will not partake in any way of American broadcasts. The radio of the American Committee is to be an organ, set of the people, of the United States, but of the people of the Soviet Union, as represented by a group of Soviet refugees who have associated themselves to assist the struggle of their fellow countrymen against Communist oppression.

Contents of Broadcasts

5. With regard to the contents of the broadcasts, which will be directed in the beginning primarily to the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet civilian personnel in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria and the satellite countries, it should be borne in mind that a Soviet citizen will risk his liberty and possibly his life in listening to these broadcasts. Consequently, it is important that the contents of the broadcasts be such as to justify his taking this risk. The radio programs should be carefully worked out with a view to the attainment of certain definite objectives; every item should serve a definite purpose. Every effort should be made to build up the credibility and authority of the radio so that the broadcasts will exercise the greatest possible influence in the Soviet Union. The following are some of the major objectives which we should pursue in selecting material to be included in the broadcasts:

(a) The destruction of the Soviet government's monopoly of information which is one of the bases, probably the most vulnerable, of the Communist power. As several radio emissions to the Soviet Union are active in this field, it would seem advisable for the radio of the Political Center to confine itself to the dissemination of news items of the greatest importance to the Soviet public as a result of the news being ignored by Soviet information media or presented by them in a distorted fashion. Particular care should be taken in preparing news broadcasts not to include items which are of no interest to the population of the Soviet Union.

Of course, indirectly the broadcasts will serve American interests to a very high degree because the strengthening of the opposition of the peoples of the Soviet Union to their communist rulers and the consequent weakening of the Soviet State will strengthen the forces of the Free World struggling against International Communism.
(b) The destruction of the Soviet government's monopoly of intellectual education and guidance. Political and economic developments should be presented and explained in such manner as to make readily apparent fallacies of communist ideology. A systematic effort should be made to refute the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. It is believed that a well-conceived radio program along these lines would have very fruitful results.

(c) The destruction of the myth of the inevitable victory of Communism. Every effort should be made to convince Soviet citizens of the moral and material superiority of the Free World over the Communist system, of the invincibility of the Free World and the inevitability of its victory over Communist imperialism. News items should be selected to impress Soviet listeners with the great strength of the Free World, its material resources, scientific achievements, economic progress, etc., with the steps taken by the Western Democracies to build up their economic and military strength, etc. Propaganda along this line is of great importance in view of the tremendous and unremitting efforts of the Kremlin to inculcate the idea of the superiority of the Communist system and the inevitability of its extension over the whole world. There is no question but that the morale of opposition elements would be greatly strengthened by the destruction of the myth of the inevitability of the victory of Communism.

(d) An important objective should be to convince the peoples of the Soviet Union that they do not stand alone in their opposition to Communist tyranny and that they have friends in the West who understand their situation and sympathize with them in their sufferings: that the Western Democracies have only the friendliest feelings for the peoples of the Soviet Union whom they regard as their allies in the struggle against the Communist dictatorship in the Kremlin; that the Democratic Nations have no aims prejudicial to the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union which are to be settled by the Soviet peoples themselves. In connection with this objective of winning the peoples of the Soviet Union as allies of the West, an effort should be made to demolish the myth created by the Kremlin that the Communist movement is a champion of world peace. Since the masses of the population of the Soviet Union are sincerely in favor of peace, their support should be sought by demonstrating to them that the Kremlin's aims and policies lead to war and that Western political concepts and methods offer the only hope of working toward an international order which can bring about real peace after the overthrow of Bolshevism.
(e) Consideration should be given to the inclusion of material calculated to encourage defection as soon as appropriate arrangements have been made for the reception and handling of refugees in accordance with the principles of freedom and dignity espoused by the Western Democracies. These arrangements should cover reorientation, resettlement and opportunity to participate in anti-Communist work. It should be borne in mind that the prestige of the Political Center would be greatly impaired if its radio specifically encourages defection and those who respond are not well treated.

(f) Special programs should be worked out for the various groups reached by the broadcasts, such as army officers, soldiers, technicians, scientists, etc. In the case of the scientists, for instance, of whom there are undoubtedly many in the Soviet civil and military administrations in the occupied areas, the special program should contain information on scientific activities abroad denied to Soviet scientists by their government, in particular, data concerning the experimental verification of scientific theories which imply the unsoundness of basic tenets of the official ideology of the Kremlin, the discussion of scientific principles and trends, the logical development of which would conflict with Marxism-Leninism, etc. The ground for the defection of Soviet scientists can be laid by Soviet emigre scientists disclosing the conditions of freedom in which scientific work is carried on abroad.

(g) The broadcasts should contain carefully selected items of information and emigre life and developments in the Soviet emigration, especially on emigre anti-communist activities and activities in defense of the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. When the Political Center is established every effort should be made to build up the prestige of the Center in order that it may enjoy the greatest authority in the Soviet Union.

(h) As the broadcasts are Russian broadcasts, it is important that all material be presented from the point of view of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Items which might affront, estrange or antagonize any of the peoples of the Soviet Union must be excluded. It would seem advisable to develop programs designed to remind the peoples of the Soviet Union of episodes in their history which most vividly depict their opposition to political, cultural and spiritual oppression. Such programs would tend to strengthen the morale of the Soviet peoples, but they would have to be worked out with the greatest care in order to avoid giving offense to the sentiments of any national group.