Agreed Policy Governing Free Europe Committee Operations

* This statement supersedes all previously issued statements of general policy concerning Free Europe Committee operations.

I. Assumptions:

In planning exploitation of opportunities which have emerged as a result of Communist policy shifts, the following is assumed:

A. The denigration of Stalin has created serious difficulties in Soviet relations with the Satellites; it has raised basic questions as to the infallibility of Soviet leadership among important elements of communist parties in the satellite nations; it has aroused to varying degrees latent aspirations for relaxation of oppression, restoration of national independence, and the establishment of governments responsive and responsible to popular will.

B. Soviet policy will continue to follow a line of limited relaxation of coercive techniques of control in the satellites, while still endeavoring to maintain effective domination of these countries. This relaxation may extend even to the satellite nations being permitted to follow certain independent lines of national action on issues which are not estimated by the Kremlin as dangerous to real Soviet controls.

C. Soviet policy will continue to permit growing contact between the satellites and the Free World, in effect partially lifting the Iron Curtain, but not to the extent that the Kremlin considers any important element of its power is threatened.

D. Even though the Kremlin is assumed to intend retaining real control over the satellites, recent more flexible policies have set in motion certain social and political trends toward independence, personal freedoms, and representative governments which may prove irreversible short of forcible repression. Satellite leadership, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia, has been shaken. Many prominent individuals have been down-graded. The positions of others are imperiled. These trends lend themselves to encouragement and development in directions favorable to U.S. long-term interests.

E. Yugoslavia will insist upon remaining an independent political power though allied to the Soviet Union for the pursuit of specific political and ideological objectives. In its strategic or long-term aims it will be the partner of the Soviet Union. Its tactical practices in central and eastern Europe will vary from country to country, conditioned to some extent by the degree of geographic proximity. In the captive nations nearest Yugoslavia its tactical aims will appear to be parallal to those of the U.S. Government up to the point where "liberalization" in a given country exceeds that in Yugoslavia itself.

* FBC efforts are currently directed primarily toward Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania; to a lesser extent toward Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and in Free World areas where exiles from the above countries are assisted in working toward agreed-upon objectives.

FBC is presently developing "country plans" which will define its policy and operational objectives in each country and in the Free World generally.
II Discussion:

Under Stalin, Soviet policies in the satellite nations were based on total Soviet domination achieved through coercive police-state measures. After the death of Stalin there was a brief period in 1953-1954, referred to as the "new course", during which the people in the satellite nations were given some temporary relief, at least in the economic field. However, it was not until the 20th Congress of the CPSU that policies were set in motion which have much greater significance for the way of life in the satellite nations. At the Congress the leaders of the Presidium (Politburo) at least in word, gave their approval to differing roads to Socialism, to the establishment of popular fronts, and even to parliamentary forms of government. The Belgrade declaration of Mesarin, Bulganin and Tito was blessed by the Congress, and national communists thereby appeared to become an alternative to which the satellite nations might aspire. Most important of all was the denigration of Stalin with all of its far-reaching implications, especially in its impact on the satellites.

As a result of the foregoing developments, unrest in varying degrees has begun to appear in the satellite nations. As far as the majority of the people are concerned, however, there has not been any significant improvement of their lot or change of their basically anti-communist, anti-regime attitude. Collectivization of the farms and priority for the development of heavy industries are still the stated basic policies of their governments (It should be pointed out however that the regimes appear to have been frightened into promises of transfer of investment from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture as the result of internal economic pressures in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is also pointed out that kulaks and other private farm owners are currently being referred to with greater tolerance, especially in Poland and Hungary). There has been some surface relief as a result of diminishing interference by the police, some improvements in working conditions, less propaganda, and more opportunity for real amusement in the various cultural outlets such as radio, books, films, newspapers, etc.

The important change has been within the communist parties. Unquestionably a substantial number of communists have been deeply affected by the denigration of Stalin and the recognition that much of what he stood for was wrong. The denigration of Stalin also provides satellite communists with the recognition that Moscow leadership is not infallible and, in fact, can be very harmful. Many communists, particularly the youth, have become disillusioned. There is evidence of a significant struggle in the satellites between those communists whose major loyalty is to Moscow and who therefore don't want liberalization to go too fast and get out of control, and those communists who are primarily loyal to their own national interests and who therefore want the "thaw" to proceed at a more rapid pace.

The developing ferment within the communist parties has been particularly noticeable among the youth and intellectuals. It has manifested itself in many ways, including outright attacks on the Soviet Union. The thaw has gone furthest and the agitation has become most apparent in Poland, which has always resisted Soviet domination more than the other satellites. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary also have a growing degree of unrest. There is a change in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, but there have not been splits of such apparent depth within the parties in these countries. Stalinist controls at this writing appear to remain most firm in East Germany. Although Rakosi has been removed from his position in Hungary, he appears to have been succeeded by another Stalinist.
In sum, for reasons of internal Soviet necessity, a pact was made with Tito at Belgrade in May-June 1955. That pact contained a declaration to the effect that each country was entitled, without interference, to erect its own political and social institutions; specifically to follow its own road to "socialism." As a consequence, Moscow began this year to permit each "satellite" Party and regime an increased measure of autonomy, along the lines of "liberalization" promised the Soviet peoples by the 20th Congress CPSU. Under pressure from Tito, but also under popular pressure "from below" heads began to fall. Where leaders have disappeared they have not, however, been succeeded in the highest post by leaders of the anti-Stalinist opposition but by their own subordinates, e.g. Ochab in Poland, Gero in Hungary, Yugo in Bulgaria. This situation is still in flux. Nowhere has a true anti-Stalinist opposition come to power. But we have seen for the first time, instead of a mute national opposition, the emergence of clusters of concerted opponents, a series of "professional elites" speaking out and taking action in several countries. They speak within the framework of State-created organizations; but it is certain that many are at heart anti-communist and it would appear that we must look to these elites and not only to the broad popular opposition to force further concessions and reforms upon their governors.

The other important change is the fact that the Iron Curtain has been partially raised. There is growing official contact between the satellite governments and Free World governments. The exchange of persons in all fields including scientists, students, sports teams, cultural groups, etc., has increased significantly. Films from the Free World are being shown again on a limited basis; western periodicals and some newspapers can be purchased openly on the newstands in some satellite cities; arrangements are being made for the exchange of some radio and television programs; tourism has returned for the first time since the Iron Curtain was created, and this summer private satellite citizens will be able to travel to certain Western European countries. A large selection of western books is again on the shelves of libraries, accessible to any citizen. The western nations are now participating in several trade fairs in Satellite Europe. East-West trade has expanded 35% during the past year. Even some of the physical manifestations of the Iron Curtain have been removed along the Austro-Hungarian border where barbed wire, mines, and watch towers have been removed, though the barriers may merely have been moved farther back into Hungary, or may be of a different and less conspicuous nature.

The increasing East-West contacts will probably have much more negative impact on the East European exiles than they will on the people behind the Iron Curtain. Most of the political exiles have kept well abreast of the times and abandoned long ago their earlier hopes of liberation by war. The more flexible and responsible of them see real opportunity for positive action through East-West contacts.

Since political warfare depends upon contact with the enemy, there is now a real opportunity to wage it in the satellites. This opportunity is the more exploitable because of the many indications that events in the satellites are moving more rapidly than the leaders expected or were fully prepared to cope with.

III. Objectives:

A. Strategic

1. To conduct U.S. political warfare in such a way as to induce the people and elites of the captive nations to favor the adoption of the following national goals:

   a. Freedom from Soviet control over internal affairs.
b. Freedom from Soviet control in external affairs to the practicable extent that it can be brought about by neutralization on the Austrian or Finnish model, with the concomitant withdrawal of the captive nations from the Warsaw Pact and from CEMA which today hold those nations militarily and economically in the Soviet Orbit.

c. Freedom to negotiate the formation of non-military regional agreements or federations and eventually, either directly or through regional units, to negotiate entry into all-European non-military organizations or into an all-European federation or confederation.

2. To take full propaganda advantage of the Belgrade Principle which recites that "questions of internal organization or differences in social systems...are solely the concern of the individual countries" and to refrain from identifying this goal as "Titoism" or "national communism" or by any other restrictive label.

3. To ensure that the Yugoslav model shall not be deemed a model with which the captive peoples can rest content for themselves, by refraining from acts and words which would encourage contentment therewith; and, further, to deal in the same way with the idea of "national communism" in order that the glitter of the adjective should not blind peoples and elites to the harsh realities contained in the noun.

4. To satisfy the yearning of every captive people, and particularly of its elites, for the full resumption of its historic ties with the culture and civilization of the West by carrying on an appropriate program of East-West contacts with those peoples.

5. To conduct our political warfare in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of democratic institutions in the captive nations and the satisfaction of essential liberties for the individual and the nation, among them the following:

   a. A constitutional government allowing for non-communist parties, free elections by secret ballot, free parliamentary debate, and effective local bodies and institutions, and in independent judiciary.

   b. True equality of opportunity by elimination of class warfare and removal of handicaps due to "class origin," religion, and individual opinion on social and political affairs.

   c. Freedom of intellectual inquiry and expression.

   d. Freedom of thought, expression, assembly, worship, press and the other components of a democratic bill of rights.

   e. Freedom for the peasant population to base its existence upon the three pillars of peasant life: property, the family, religion.

   f. True democratic trade unions organized and administered in the interest of the worker and not of the state-capitalist employer.

   g. Freedom of enterprise for those who seek to be self-employed, including the artisan, the shopkeeper, and the practitioner of the liberal professions.

   h. Freedom of internal movement and communications.
SECRET

1. Freedom of communication with the non-communist world.

B. Tactical

1. To encourage liberalization of institutions and decentralization of authority and decision-making power to the point where a return to Stalinist measures will be politically impracticable for regime or party leaders.

2. To continue cross-reporting of the progress of anti-Stalinism and demands for liberalization in the several captive nations.

3. To continue, specifically, moral support for individual peasant proprietorship, free trade unionism, self-employment, private professional practice, and other democratic demands being currently made by economic and intellectual groups in the captive nations.

4. To encourage autonomy of local political councils and to guide them by describing local government in the United States and other free nations.

5. To report all Yugoslav manifestations which contribute to the embarrassment of Stalinists in power and to the withdrawal of Stalinist leaders as a means towards further attenuation of communism in order that democratic institutions may eventually become fully operative.

6. Bearing in mind the importance lent by the Pravda of the CPSU to its campaign for transition to "socialism" in the free world by non-violent means; and

Remembering the role voluntarily assumed by Tito as principal agent of the new Soviet-Yugoslav partnership in the luring of social democrats into a communist-socialist alliance against the capitalist democracies; and

Considering that the tasks of construction and reconstruction in the captive countries present problems of such magnitude as to make government leadership and direction inevitable—

a. To take all possible measures to make the captive peoples aware of the facts about the new capitalism (in American and elsewhere) and particularly the extent to which the fruits of enterprise are shared between owners, management, workers, government and the consumer, and the ways in which its concern for the welfare of the community is manifested.

b. To show clearly that a new non-doctrinaire concept of socialism is guiding the social democratic parties of the free world, prompted by emphasis on the welfare and dignity of the worker instead of emphasis on out-dated dogmas, both in the Scandinavian countries and elsewhere in Europe.

c. To display that there has been an interpenetration of capitalist and socialist ideas, and that both the new capitalism and the new socialism seek to safeguard the liberties while promoting the welfare of the individual in the free community.

7. To discredit membership in CSWA by showing that it means:

a. Radical impossibility of following a national economic path because it makes the national economy, in its structure and goals, its
opportunities and rewards for the individual and the nation, in contrast to Soviet Russia's ideology, plans and ambitions.

b. Continued employment of an excessive part of the national manpower and resources for military ends, thus pressing down the standard of living.

c. Exploitation of the national manpower and resources in the interest of Soviet Russia's campaign of "economic cooperation" with the West by which the captive peoples are deprived of the benefits realizable from their own industrialization and are forced to sell abroad at a loss in order to further Soviet Russia's political purposes.

d. An artificial barrier to the traditional and profitable economic relations of the captive peoples with the free nations of Europe and the other continents, and to direct unrestricted sources of essential supplies available in the free world.

e. A barrier to membership of the captive peoples in the intra-European economic organizations (OMEC, IPU, CEE, Euratom...), or association with these organizations from which western Europe has already profited so greatly in its persistent efforts to create a common European market.

8. To discredit membership in the Warsaw Pact by showing that subservience of the national armed forces to the General Staff at Moscow is:

a. False to the national sentiment because the people and their sons do not wish to defend Soviet Russia but only to defend their own country.

b. A degrading colonial status equivalent to that from which the forces of India (for example) were released by the British Government.

c. An ever-present threat of being drawn into local or general war by Soviet Russia and in the sole interest of Soviet Russia.

d. A material burden pressing upon the national standard of living which could be greatly lightened by independence from the Soviet Union because it is self-evident that no Western power threatens the independence of the captive nations.

9. To promote the idea of future integration in a European political and economic community as a peaceful objective which would lead to beneficial social and economic results.

10. To use available radio facilities and purveyors of the printed word (including airborne leaflets and mailing projects) as channels for contact by the captive peoples with Western culture, science and the arts; and, further, as means through which to satisfy the hunger to learn about free institutions constantly reported from the captive nations.

11. To enlist important opinion moulders (governmental and private) in the free world in support of the above strategic and tactical objectives. These should include political leaders, leaders of trade unions, international organizations, religious, farm, civic, youth, women's groups; communications
media; journalists and others.

IV. Operational Tasks:

1. The Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe, the Free Europe Press and the Free Europe Exile Relations Division) should continue to intensify its activities with respect to all listed objectives.

2. More specifically, the Free Europe Committee should:

   a. Continue radio broadcasts to the Satellites as long as essential liberties and democratic institutions (set forth in III Objectives, above) are denied its people by the Soviet Union and its controlled regimes.

   b. Continue to drop leaflets by balloon until free and uncensored entry of printed matter is assured.

   c. Continue mailing projects to specially selected groups of regime and Party functionaries, members of professional, managerial and intellectual bodies, and others among whom the new elites of the national opposition are to be found.

   d. Continue its distribution of the Khrushchev "secret speech" in the languages of the captive nations, both in those countries and in exile circles, including refugee camps and settlements.

   e. Continue and increase activities utilizing responsible exile organizations and individuals who can contribute to the objectives of this plan. It should work toward broadening the base of exile understanding and responsibility in adopting more flexible attitudes toward the opportunities presented by the present political relaxation in the satellites and encourage exile initiative in seizing these opportunities.

   f. Continue its operations to counter the communist campaign to penetrate, manipulate, fragment, and subvert the various East European emigrations, and be sensitive to new opportunities to do so.

   g. Continue to use outstanding exiles to seize opportunities to debate communist satellite officials on such issues as the degree of Soviet control and the remaining manifestations of Stalinism in their countries. It should seek these opportunities wherever neutralist areas may be affected. It should create opportunities for such debates whenever particular events such as the Poznan riots occur.

   h. Utilize outstanding and appropriately selected exile leaders in the underdeveloped areas of the world, including Latin America, to explain the nature of Soviet colonialism and to give eyewitness accounts of the techniques which the Soviets use to take over control of another country. Similarly, such exiles should attend international meetings, should participate in international organizations, should write articles in publications and otherwise attempt to influence important opinion moulders toward the above objectives.

   i. Continue its preparation of handbooks on the countries of its interest for distribution to American groups and tourists preparing to visit the captive nations and for eventual translation into appropriate languages and use by others after further exploration of this matter.
B. Related Operations

Although many of the following may be carried out more appropriately by
organizations other than the Free Europe Committee, they are listed as suggested
activities:

1. Select and place reliable and informed individuals on major tours
being sponsored from the West to the East by the communists. (For example,
there will be six tours to Poland this summer and fall for Americans of Polish
extraction.) Such individuals could be used for briefing other members of the
tour. They could spot communist agents planted in the tours and counter their
propaganda activities among more naive members. They could ask embarrassing
questions at press conferences in Poland. Most important of all, they could be
used for factual reports, particularly in their native language press when they
return to the West. These operations should also be conducted from the many
countries which are now stepping up East-West contacts.

2. Attempts should be made to influence high level satellite politicians.
(Generally, such operations should be carried out only in collaboration with
the State Department and only when normal diplomatic channels cannot be used.)
For example, when Polish Premier Czarekiewicz visits France this fall, one
might arrange to have some of his former Socialist colleagues contact him.

3. Carefully selected individuals should, with the approval of the Depart-
ment of State, establish social and other informal contact with satellite diplo-
mats in the Free World.

4. Consideration should be given to inspiring and subsidizing travel to
and from the satellite nations for the purpose of carrying out the objectives
in this plan.

5. Consideration should be given to subsidizing the development of greater
circulation of selected Western books, newspapers, and periodicals in the
satellite nations.

6. Meetings and congresses both in Western Europe and satellite nations,
can be influenced to our advantage. For example, a congress of writers could
have considerable political potential.

7. Influence should be established in various international organizations
where satellite officials work with western governments on substantive matters,
such as the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva.

8. Where contact exists with satellite officials, an effort should be made
to assist the expansion of Yugoslav influence in the satellites so long as a
closer relationship between satellites and Yugoslavia can be used to weaken Soviet
control of the satellites. On the other hand, efforts should be made among
Yugoslav government officials to sharpen their appreciation of all emerging
differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Socialists friendly to the
"committed" areas, i.e., NATO countries, etc., should be used to accuse Yugoslavia
of becoming a tool of the USSR, thus pressing Yugoslavia to demonstrate more
clearly that it is not.