MEMORANDUM FOR:  

SUBJECT: Proposed Interim Guidance for FEC  

REFERENCE: OSTENT Draft of November 15, 1956.  

Keystone is in general agreement with the draft text under reference, but would like to offer the following specific comments and recommendations:  

A. Item 7 under "Hungary" appears to Keystone to be of major importance, and might well be placed in the forefront of the guidance on Hungary.  

B. Item 3 under "Hungary" could be somewhat amplified to point up, inter alia, the need to give publicity to all statements by international figures condemnatory of Soviet military activity in Hungary, e.g., the recent Wehrm statement calling for Soviet withdrawal.  In the same item, it is suggested that RFC be asked to refer as seldom as possible to the Kadar "government", and to make plain that responsibility for decision-making in Hungary now is borne by the USSR.  

C. Keystone feels that item 5 under "Hungary" should be revised to point out the need for most careful consideration of the content of any pamphlets mailed into Hungary.  A Washington review of such pamphlets would be desirable.  

D. Item 10 under "Hungary" should be omitted.  Consideration of support for "new" emigres and the replacement of older elements is a matter for separate consideration in line with recent conversations between OSTENT and Keystone.  

E. Item 5 under "Poland" also should be omitted, and reserved for separate consideration.  

G. Keystone agrees that the items on "Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania" add little new, and should be omitted.
Events of the past several weeks have produced changes which significantly affect FEC operations. These include:

1. A situation in Hungary resulting from the spontaneous revolution, put down in a blood bath by Soviet troops, in which the Soviet Union now virtually occupies the country; and with a Soviet commandatura for all practical purposes now governing the country; a puppet government without semblance of popular support; a violent Soviet and anti-Communist population passively resisting by means of a general strike; guerrilla warfare in some areas; tens of thousands of dead and wounded; a people who requested western assistance (particularly on the part of the United States) at the height of their rebellion against the Soviet Union and who are now, at the least, disappointed that such assistance did not arrive and, at the worst, may become almost as anti-West as they are anti-Soviet as a result; deportations of Hungarian youth and others to Soviet Russia; and in which the attempts of the United Nations to aid the Hungarian people appear to be unproductive.

2. A “new” Hungarian emigration in the West, numbering at least 20,000 and increasing daily.

3. A substantial loss of prestige on the part of the Soviet Union in the Free World, including neutralist areas and groups, and among many communist parties.

4. A situation in Poland less advanced than Tito in many respects, less permit in Yugoslavia. From all that can be judged at this time, the Polish people appear to be willing to support the Gomulka regime. It is
reasonable to assume that such support in the long term will be directly proportionate to the degree he is successful in meeting the demands of the people for greater freedom from Soviet control and for greater individual freedoms and economic improvement.

5. A significant decrease in the jamming of Western broadcasts, including RFE into Poland, it is assumed as a matter of official Polish policy. A significant decrease in jamming of Western broadcasts to Hungary, probably because of the general situation in that country, rather than as a matter of policy of the Soviet Union or the Hungarian puppet government.

6. Reported unrest, particularly on the part of students and young intellectuals in the other Satellites.

7. An increased state of alert and readiness of local security units in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria as a result of nationalist pressures heightened by developments in Hungary and Poland.

For the time being, therefore, until the course of events in the Satellites may be more clearly understood, the following guidance for FBC is set forth below:

1. No action should be taken by FBC which is considered likely to provoke further bloodshed.

2. RFE/Hungary should refrain from tactical advice of any kind.

3. RFE should be committed to the balanced reporting of factual news, with a minimum of commentary on local events. Full coverage should be given to the efforts of the West to assist the Hungarian people, including action in the United Nations; assistance by the West in furnishing medical, food, clothing and other assistance; assistance to Hungarian refugees in the West; activities of recent Hungarian refugees in the West in mobilizing public opinion and other activities for carrying on the fight for the freedom of the
Hungarian people from the West; Western reaction to the events in Hungary; the defections from the Communist parties in the West; and the like. Broadcasts to Soviet troops should be continued.

6. Material assistance to refugees should continue through FECS in cooperation with other relief and welfare agencies.

7. A major information effort should be organized by FEC among the "new" emigration. This should include:

a. An inventory of leadership and action potential with emphasis on youth, student, worker, peasant and intellectual groups, able and willing to continue the fight for the Hungarian people from the West;

b. An audience analysis of reaction to RFE broadcasts

Other information likely to be useful in future FEC operations or in refining present activities; information of interest in the United States generally as to activities in Hungary and the other satellites.

8. Plans should be developed to fully exploit in the Free World the reversion to Stalinism and the naked colonialism of the Soviet Union in Hungary via all FEC assets, including FEER, FEP and RFE.
Plans should be developed to utilize the effective people in the "new" emigration by FEP, FEER and RFE.

10. The relationship of the effective people in the "new" emigration to the present Hungarian National Council, the representation of the "new" emigration in the ACEN, as well as their participation in other multi-national exile organizations is a matter of priority importance. Steps should be taken to give priority support and emphasis to activities in which the effective elements of the "new" emigration play a part, while at the same time, not alienating the "older" emigration as represented in the MEC. (This need for not having split, disorganization and confusion must not be forgotten.)

11. Attention should be given to the problem of disaffection, discouragement and general anti-U.S. attitude among Hungarian refugees. This should be appropriately coordinated with the Crusade. Particular attention should be given to correcting the widespread impression now being given credence in the press that the Free Europe Committee provoked the Hungarian revolution, or at least, implied that Western support for same would be forthcoming. This line is also being taken by various communist propaganda groups. This should be appropriately coordinated with the Crusade.

Poland

1. The situation in Poland in which we judge the "thaw" and "liberalization" are proceeding about as far and as fast as is possible under the circumstances calls for careful handling by FEC.

2. RFE's Polish Desk's "temporary armistice" with the Gomulka regime, carefully and indirectly through factual news reporting while at the same time encouraging liberalizing forces now in motion to produce concrete results, seems to us to be the correct policy line, at least for the time being. RFE should continue to avoid tactical advice to the Polish people.

3. Because of the discontinuance of jamming in Poland and because of the need for avoidance of any kind of provocation in a tense situation containing the same ingredients which produced the Hungarian revolution, FEC should not
5. PFE and other PEC divisions should give thought to the pros and cons of encouraging selected exile intellectuals to return to Poland under appropriate guarantees and conditions, to further anti-Soviet and pro-liberalization trends. 

Sponsors will oppose PEC's views of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania

1. PFE should continue as a voice of opposition in these countries, where the "thaw" has progressed the least, using present general policy and programming approach.

2. 

3. 

Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

1. PEC, largely through FPER, supports certain groups and activities having objectives similar to those of PEC toward other captive countries.

Sponsor suggest that PEC as a whole define its objectives with
respect to these countries, and consult with Sponsor further on these matters.