Gray Broadcasting Policy

Toward

THE SOVIET UNION

I. Purposes

In the interest of assuring maximum impact and effectiveness of the total US broadcasting effort directed to the USSR and to Soviet-dominated areas in Eastern Europe, the methods and aims of both official and unofficial American radio stations broadcasting to the area are periodically reviewed in the light of current US policy objectives. In accordance with instructions of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy, individual papers have been prepared for each of the target countries and on each broadcasting operation concerned, outlining the role each should play in furthering both general and specific American objectives.

The following paper concerns only Gray broadcasts to the Soviet Union. It seeks to achieve maximum effectiveness by defining for the Gray station a constructive role and positive tone while assuring close conformity of the activities and aims of the station with current policy objectives of the US with respect to the Soviet Union. Insofar as practicable, this role is separate and distinct from that of the official Voice of America.

II. Policy Considerations

A. Background of US Policies

The fundamental aims of US foreign policy are to maintain the security of the US and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions, and to promote the general welfare of its peoples.

The US seeks a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

B. Assumptions about the USSR

1. Soviet Policy - Despite a number of significant developments in the Communist orbit since the death of Stalin, the threat to the US, and in fact to the Free World, from the USSR remains basically undiminished.
As far as can be determined Communist leaders retain the objective of undermining and ultimately destroying all rival power. They command a military capacity of truly formidable proportions which is growing daily in scale and sophistication. The world Communist apparatus although no longer automatically responsive to a single locus of power remains a powerful instrument of anti-Westernism and subversion. It continues to enjoy the advantage inherent in a policy which seeks to exploit and magnify the world's ills rather than to overcome them.

2. Stability - The Soviet Government faces increasingly serious internal problems: the failure of agriculture (not alone in the USSR but throughout the bloc), the rising discontent of the youth and intellectuals, and the increasingly-felt demands of Soviet citizens for status, security, and a higher standard of living. Moreover, the profound divisions within the Communist world which have shattered the image of Communism on a universal system and the irresistible wave of the future have gravely disrupted both Communist organization and Communist ideology.

However, nothing discernible in the present situation justifies the assumption that the Communist power structure is in jeopardy in the near future or that problems within the Communist camp will compel Communist leaders to modify their hostility toward the West or abandon any of their objectives. Over a period of time the above named factors undoubtedly will produce significant changes in the Communist fabric, but change probably will be erosive rather than explosive. Meanwhile Soviet power is and will remain a hard reality and the Communist threat to US and Western security, undiminished.

C. US Policy Toward the USSR

The US believes its security will be enhanced if in the long run the Soviet Union conducts itself as a responsible and cooperative member of the society of nations and evolves in the direction of government responsive to the will of the Soviet people. The precise nature and composition of such a government is a matter for the determination of the Soviet people themselves. The US recognizes that many of the national minorities in the USSR aspire to a greater degree of autonomy than they now enjoy, but does not favor any course of action which would predetermine governments or states that may evolve in the present territory of the USSR.

The US in pursuit of its long-range objectives seeks to counter and reduce the military threat of the Soviet Union without, however, provoking hostilities which could lead to nuclear warfare which would endanger the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system. There is no foreseeable prospect of significantly reducing Soviet military strength, which is the core of Communist power, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation of such military action is not an acceptable course for the US. Although the Sino-Soviet dispute has brought about increasing disunity in the bloc,
the exclusion of Soviet power from Albania, and considerable confusion in the programs and activities of Communist parties and of international Communist front organizations, there appears little likelihood that differences between Moscow and Peking will become so great as to result in a relaxation of Soviet pressures on the West.

Accordingly, US policies are designed to (a) affect the conduct and policies of the Soviet Union in ways that further US interest (including safeguarded disarmament); (b) to foster tendencies that lead it to abandon expansionist policies; and (c) to encourage political, economic, and ideological independence within the Communist world.

In pursuing this general strategy, the US efforts are directed to:

a. Deterring Communist aggression and preventing total war insofar as compatible with US security.

b. Assisting in building the strength and cohesion of the Free World.

c. Influencing Soviet conduct by means of political, military, economic, information and cultural programs and actions.

d. Taking advantage of attitudes, conditions, and developments within the USSR in order directly to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government in ways that further US and Free World security.

e. Exacerbating friction between Moscow and Peking in their efforts to dominate the world Communist movement.

f. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the Free World.

III. Radio Broadcasting

A. Policy considerations affecting radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union

Radio broadcasting plays a leading role among the limited means available to the US for taking advantage of attitudes, conditions, and developments within the Soviet Union which might foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government. In view of existing limitations on other effective media, radio bears a heavy responsibility for advancing all US information objectives in the Soviet Union even though jamming and other Soviet countermeasures greatly reduce its impact.

For maximum impact on the Soviet audience it is essential that both the officially and unofficially sponsored American stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union should develop among all listeners a high degree of respect for the stations as reliable, responsible, and trustworthy sources of news, commentary, and other information.
B. Target Groups in the USSR

It should be borne in mind that Soviet listeners live in a totalitarian state in which possibilities for modifying regime policies through "pressures from below" or individual action are extremely limited. Although specific Party and government policies and practices are widely unpopular, in the absence on the horizon of any alternative, the broad mass of the population apparently does not entertain serious thoughts concerning its fundamental alteration. It hopes, however, for amelioration of present conditions through changes within the framework of the present system.

In view of the US objectives of liberalizing the regime and encouraging evolutionary changes generally, the primary audience of US propaganda media is the "politically-alert" -- those who can exercise the greatest influence in this direction. The "politically-alert" elements include high party and governmental (including military) officials, managerial and administrative personnel, skilled workers, writers, artists, scientists, teachers, and probably most important of all, the youth of the USSR. These categories embrace listeners of all national origins. Furthermore, this audience also has the greater access to short wave sets. While the aforementioned groups are the primary radio targets, the larger audience includes all the diverse elements of the Soviet population. Word of mouth transmittal of "repeatable" items of broadcast extends still further the reaches of radio programs.

Soviet troops stationed outside the USSR, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Germany, constitute an especially valuable target in view of their eventual return to the USSR, their closer contact with the non-Soviet world, and better listening opportunities. One of the objectives of US broadcasts beamed to this group, in view of their greater potential opportunity to escape, is, in an indirect and discreet manner, to induce defection among top members of the group.

C. Gray Broadcasting to the USSR

Gray broadcasting is an unacknowledged instrument of the US Government. Its sole reason for existence is to further US policy. Its aims are those of American foreign information policy in general, which includes specific formulations of policy for both the official radio and the Gray station.

D. The Relationship Between Gray and Official Stations

Gray broadcasting, in furthering these aims, has distinctive characteristics which differentiate it from acknowledged official broadcasting, such as VOA. This stems from the fact that the US Government is not formally accountable for the content of gray broadcasts, though its actual responsibility may be inferred.
A careful allocation of roles between official and Gray broadcasting permits each to concentrate on those aspects for which it is best fitted so that taken together their operations cover the principal aims of US broadcasting to the Soviet Union. A number of features are common to both types of broadcasting, but by mutual agreement, each carries responsibility for certain specific tasks, separate and distinct from the other.

E. Objectives of Gray Information Programs

Gray information programs to the Soviet Union should give primary attention to the following objectives:

1. Expose Communist aims and duplicity; counter distortions and omissions of Soviet propaganda.

2. Encourage manifestations of evolutionary development in the Soviet Union along lines consistent with US security objectives and the legitimate interests and aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

   a. Convince influential elements within the USSR that there are alternatives to present Soviet policies which would be compatible both with the security of the peoples of the Soviet Union and with world peace.

   b. Encourage attitudes among all elements of the population of the USSR, including the Soviet leadership, which could lead to a moderation of aggressive features of Soviet foreign policy and which might over the long run lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of the Communist regime.

   c. Encourage the viewpoint among all Soviet citizens and officials that the top priority task facing the USSR is the solution of its domestic economic and social problems for which peace is absolutely essential.

   d. To the extent possible undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own ideology by such means as encouraging the introduction of elements of pluralism in Soviet society and respect for universal ideals such as "freedom under justice."

3. Encourage the free exchange of peoples and ideas between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries.

4. Encourage defection, albeit indirectly, to the Free World of Soviet nationals, particularly Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.
Long Range

Seek to implant in all elements of Soviet society the idea that even within the Soviet governmental structure there are alternative policies which would better satisfy the real interests and natural aspirations of the Soviet people, at the same time as these changes would lessen the dangers to world peace.

Short Range

1. Expose Communist aims and duplicity; counter distortions omissions of Soviet propaganda.

2. Stimulate popular pressures for giving top priority to the solution of the USSR's domestic economic and social problems for which peace is absolutely essential. This would impede on activist, adventuristic foreign policy.

While the above objectives are to a degree shared with VOA, the Gray station bears primary responsibility for covering these objectives from the standpoint of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. The Gray station will share with VOA responsibility for broadcasting in the national minority languages.

F. Structure of Gray Broadcasting Station

The organizational structure (operating base) and image (propaganda face) of the Gray broadcasting station should be as follows:

1. Organizational Structure

The station should be organized as a joint endeavor of Americans and emigres, but with policy and operational control and direction resting in American hands. As an instrument for furthering unannounced policy, the Gray station will be governed strictly by policy guidance furnished through appropriate channels. In the absence of specific policy guidance covering a new or unexpected situation, the station will adopt measures consistent with the overall objectives of the US and of this statement of Gray Broadcasting Policy Toward the Soviet Union.

The station will maintain liaison with emigre groups and organizations, but shall not be responsible to them in any way either for station policy or program content. Emigres working with the station should, however, be encouraged to exercise initiative and imagination in exploring new approaches within the framework of established policy.
The Gray station should assiduously cultivate an image of itself as the voice of free erstwhile Soviet citizens speaking to fellow countrymen who are still under Communist domination. While there may be some question as to whether or not Soviet citizens feel a large measure of kinship and sympathy toward those who have left the USSR and that there is thus a bond between them that enables Soviet emigres to speak for their countrymen, nonetheless, there are approximately one million Soviet nationals who have chosen the West since 1939 and an equal number exiled between 1917-1939. These people are dispersed throughout the Free World. Their sheer numbers should serve as a drawing force for their compatriots in the USSR, and the emigre face is the most desirable available image the Gray station can assume. It should, however, be stressed that it is the experience of the emigres in the Free World and their past acquaintance with Soviet life that are the Gray station's principal assets. It is from those assets—and not from any presumed authority of individual Soviet emigres or groups of emigres—that the Gray station should be able to draw and to express thoughts and ideas that will stimulate Soviet listeners to think critically of the Communist system. The station should represent everything in the emigre community which illustrates the advantages and superiority of a free society.

Despite being the spokesman for the national exile, the radio station must maintain its independence of this exile community and above all refrain from identifying itself with emigre political parties or organizations; it should not represent any emigre political group or groups nor serve as a vehicle for the platform of such groups. It must seek to serve as a window between the Soviet peoples and the West through the medium of the emigres in the West. To achieve this image the station must achieve stature and respect on its own merit, yet drawing fully upon the emigration and Western institutions in a form which is sympathetic to the peoples of the USSR and understanding of their need to work things out in their own way and in their own form. The station should not try to represent the emigration as a strong political force. It would place primary stress on trying to identify the emigres speaking over the station with the people they left behind.

The emigre image of the station is potentially useful in the event of open hostilities between the USSR and the West, or other unforeseen major change within the Soviet Union. Under such conditions a Gray station would be able to exploit even more than at present an area of Soviet vulnerabilities of demonstrable value in a manner which is denied to official US stations. The emigre image is thus a valuable holding instrument.
IV. The Role for Gray Radio Broadcasting to the USSR

The general nature and content of broadcasts to the USSR will be adapted to the special characteristics of the Gray radio as (1) a voice of the Soviet emigre community interested in the welfare of fellow-countrymen in the USSR, and (2) an instrument, unattributable to the US Government for furthering US policy.

A. US Policy Control Over the Gray Radio

1. Broadcasts will adhere to the general lines of US policy while maintaining objectivity and flexibility appropriate to the Gray Radio's identity. With respect to internal and external affairs of the US which merit or demand treatment in broadcasts to the Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will report objectively covering legitimate points of view including those not necessarily in accord with the current public position of the US Government.

2. As an instrument for furthering unannounced US policy, from time to time special guidance will be furnished the Gray Radio through appropriate channels. Such guidance usually will relate to matters or treatment which can be undertaken by the Gray Radio as an unattributable radio, but which would be inappropriate for an official organ or voice of the US Government, and may appear to conflict with announced US policy.

3. The Gray Radio will strive for broad and balanced programming and will avoid the appearance of an American propaganda instrument. In its coverage of world news and developments necessarily an important place will be given to American policy and events in the United States in view of the position of the US as the leading Western power and the great interest of Soviet audiences in facts on America and American life. However, it will be kept in mind that the primary responsibility for informing the Soviet audience about life and developments in the US lies on the official radio.

4. Because the US Government and its official media must maintain a position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, the Gray Radio bears a special responsibility with respect to Soviet domestic affairs. The Radio will further the unannounced objectives of the US by discussing with due regard for the sensitivities of its audience the myriad ways in which the Communist dictatorship acts against the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Soviet people, deprives them of any meaningful role in the making and control of policy, and interferes grossly in their private lives. At the same time, the Radio indirectly will suggest alternatives to Communist totalitarianism through discussions of the structure and operation of democratic political, economic, and social institutions in free societies.
5. The Radio will attempt to convince its listeners that the US, and the West in general, has only peaceful intentions toward the Soviet Union, but that world peace cannot be assured until the deep aspirations for peace of the Soviet people can find channels for influencing the policy of their government. The Radio will make clear that it is the aggressive and subversive policies of the Communist regime and its manipulation of the economic and human resources at its disposal, both within the USSR and abroad, which constitute the real menace to the peace of the world. In its discussion of alternative political systems the Radio will in no way suggest that the West seeks to impose any particular form of democratic government on the Soviet people, rather that the West desires only that the Soviet people have a government of their own free choice, a government truly representative of the Soviet people.

6. The Gray Radio will combat Soviet propaganda lines concerning the "decline" of Western society, and Communism as the "wave of the future." By calm and seemingly objective reporting of all developments attesting to the growing unity and internal strength of the democratic West and its capabilities of defense against possible aggression, the Radio will emphasize the growing awareness throughout the world that genuine social and human progress is inseparable from democratically guaranteed civil and individual freedoms.

7. In the event of emergency conditions in the Soviet Union -- violent demonstrations, armed uprisings, revolution, or war -- the Gray Radio will confine itself to straight factual reporting until it receives directions through appropriate channels.

8. In the implementation of immediate goals of US policy toward the Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will be guided by the following basic principles:

1. The Radio must establish a reputation for scrupulous accuracy and complete reliability. Only in this way will the Soviet peoples turn to the Gray Radio for guidance in the event of a domestic or international crisis.

2. In order to have maximum impact on the Soviet audience, the Radio must employ a reasoned, friendly tone and ensure that its programs are consonant with the contemporary language and psychology of the Soviet peoples.

3. The Gray Radio recognizes that the eventual replacement of Communist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union by some form of representative government will stem from the dynamics of Soviet society itself rather than from outside pressures. The nature and pace of these fundamental changes will depend upon the peoples of the
the Soviet Union themselves. The Radio's role is that of a catalyst, enlarging the numbers of Soviet citizens who see the world situation and internal USSR developments in a more realistic light by disseminating facts and views suppressed or distorted by official media, stimulating skepticism about the prevailing system, and suggesting alternative methods and institutions.

4. The Gray Radio will rely on indirection to stimulate independent thought among its listeners and suggestion of points of view and feasible lines of approach to a given problem rather than attempt directly or indirectly to urge any line of action or promote any particular political creed.

5. In recognition that liberalizing currents in other Communist countries can make a significant contribution to similar developments in the Soviet Union, the Radio will attempt to arouse and increase a sympathetic understanding among its listeners of what these peoples are trying to achieve. Such an understanding may be translated into a subtle restraint on Moscow's ability to interfere with positive developments in Eastern Europe as well as into pressures for similar policy modifications in the USSR.

6. News and explanatory comment on the news, objectively written and well backgrounded, will constitute the main element of the Radio's broadcasts. The Radio will be guided in its selection of news by considerations of objective importance, propaganda effectiveness in addressing the specific audience, and of omissions and distortions of Soviet media. Recognizing the dearth of factual information available to Soviet citizens on the non-communist world, the Gray Radio will strive constantly to broaden its coverage of world events and of significant political, economic, social, and cultural developments in free societies. The Radio will also inform its Soviet listeners of important developments within countries under Communist rule, especially those glossed over, ignored, or distorted in Communist media.

7. In broadcasts to the various nationalities concerning the problem of national minorities of the Soviet Union, the Radio will be guided by the principle of non-predetermination which holds that it is the right of the peoples themselves to determine the over-all state structure of the USSR when they are free to do so.

8. As the voice of free representatives of the peoples of the USSR dedicated to the task of helping the Soviet peoples to find their own path to eventual freedom, the Gray Radio must dissociate itself from any and all emigre groups and organizations and their platforms. The Radio will, however, when appropriate, e.g. news-worthy, report objectively on the activities of individual emigres
and emigre groups to point up personal rights and opportunities which exist in the Free World. Moreover, the Radio will reinforce its character as a non-partisan service organ for the Soviet peoples by imparting to its Soviet audience a measure of the diversity of political, economic, social, and intellectual life of the non-Communist world.

C. For the consistent implementation of the foregoing basic principles, the Gray Radio will be guided in its daily operations by the following high-priority considerations and practices.

1. General Approach and Techniques

a. In view of the complex emotional involvement of the peoples of the Soviet Union in events and developments over the decades of Communist rule, and of the patriotic sensitivities of even those Soviet citizens dissatisfied with one or another aspect of Communist rule, it is imperative that the Gray Radio avoid generalized or vituperative attacks against Soviet leaders and Communist domestic and international policies. Criticism of individual leaders and of the Soviet regime should be focused on specific practices and policies which are inimical to the interests of the Soviet people, which are prejudicial to the longings of the Soviet people for peace, which contravene professed Communist principles and goals or the generally accepted precepts of humanity. The Radio will acknowledge the real (as distinct from regime claims of) economic, scientific, social, and cultural progress of the USSR at the same time as it points out cogently and objectively the limitations, inefficiencies, disproportions, and heavy human costs of Soviet progress compared with that of other areas of the world.

b. The Radio will attempt to convince its listeners that the root cause of Soviet failures to satisfy the people's material and human needs is the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state and its basis, the all-pervasive power-monopoly Party which exercises its control through and in the interests of a small group of top Party officials. Similarly, the Radio will attempt to increase its listeners' awareness of the disruptive and "colonialist" nature of international Communism and of its responsibility for keeping world tensions at a high level, while at the same time avoiding stimulating the Soviet listeners' pride in their leadership and in a system which has realized certain gains from its aggression and subversion. The Radio will depend upon the cumulative effect of calm, factual, objective, analyses on the thinking of the Soviet listener rather than engaging in unceasing polemics with the Soviet regime.
c. To encourage the audience to think in terms of possible alternatives to the Soviet system the Gray Radio should systematically analyze, explain, and interpret the guiding principles and actual functioning of important democratic institutions in the non-Communist world, e.g., the cooperative movement and popular ownership and control of Western economic and social institutions. However, there should be no implication that any particular system of government or social institutions, existing or proposed, is being urged on the listeners, nor any attempt made to conceal the existence of unresolved problems in non-Communist societies. In keeping with its individuality and character, the Radio may comment on the greater or lesser relevance of selected Western experience and institutions for the Soviet peoples.

d. The Radio should pay particular attention to ideological, institutional and programmatic divergencies within the "Socialist Camp," using to the maximum degree possible original source materials to keep the Soviet listeners fully informed on the variety of attempts by various Communist regimes to apply Marxism Leninism to contemporary conditions. Knowledge that other Communist regimes permit their peoples greater freedoms and show a greater responsiveness to popular desires is likely to have great impact on the Soviet audience.

Manifestations of intra-bloc rivalry and friction, especially those which are not known to the Soviet audience, are of primary concern to the Gray Radio. Polemics among Communist parties and their leaders in and outside of the bloc offer an abundance of material and themes for the Gray Radio; the original source materials are often so condemnatory of Communist leaders and so compromising to world Communism that no gloss is necessary or desirable.

e. The Gray Radio must always approach world developments from an enlightened Soviet emigre point of view and avoid creating or contributing to a impression that the Radio represents primarily the interests of the United States or the West in general.

f. Stories about defectors and emigres, besides indirectly inducing defection, support the general aims of the Gray Radio by illuminating the inequities of the Soviet system and the advantages of a democratic society. In order to enhance receptivity of their message by the Soviet audience, psychological conflicts inherent in the decision to defect should be admitted, as well as the emotional and material difficulties of settling into a new life. To further the emigre image of the Radio and to heighten listener interest, the activities and achievements of prominent emigre figures will be featured.
The Radio will also transmit to its listeners views of prominent Western figures through special interviews and other techniques and may include in its programs appropriate messages from Western groups and organizations - e.g., students, writers, artists, scientists, labor groups - to their Soviet counterparts.

2. Themes and Targets

a. Gray Radio programs should, where appropriate, be developed around and exploit the following themes, among others:

(1) "Wave of the Future." The trend of history is overwhelmingly away from totalitarianism and toward open societies whose governments are based on genuine popular sovereignty.

(2) Ideological Bankruptcy of Communism. Moscow's polemics with Peking and the vituperation exchanged between Moscow and Tirana have speeded up the disillusionment of many Communist adherents and sympathizers. The unquestioning belief and loyalty even of long-time Party members has been shaken.

(3) Peaceful Western Foreign Policy. The sole aim of US foreign policy, and that of the West in general, is a simple one: a peaceful world community in which the people of independent states are free to choose their own social and political system and mold their own futures so long as they do not threaten the freedom of others.

(4) Destructive Soviet Foreign Policy. Soviet hostility and aggressiveness toward other nations increases the danger of war, disturbs friendly relations between the Soviet and other peoples, and damages the real national interests of the peoples of the USSR.

(5) "Socialist" System. Even many Communists who have remained within the fold have come to realize that Soviet "socialism" is the exploitation of men economically, politically, socially, and culturally for the benefit of the Communist state. Use of the term "socialist" to characterize the Soviet system is a fiction cynically cultivated by Moscow to mislead their own people as well as the outside world.
The following observations on certain vulnerabilities in Soviet society are illustrative of ways in which the Gray Radio should make its programs peculiarly meaningful for the Soviet audience.

(1) The material conditions under which the peoples of the Soviet Union live after more than 45 years of Communist rule is a most important theme for the Gray Radio. First of all, dissatisfaction with the low standard of living, and knowledge of the gap between the way of life of high Party functionaries and the mass of the people, probably unites a greater number of people in all strata of Soviet society than any other grievance. Second, in line with Communism's materialist foundations, updated in the current Party program, regime spokesmen allege that only "Communist" society (as defined and constructed by a small elite) can satisfy the material and cultural needs and desires of the laboring classes.

To the extent that the Soviet regime is compelled to allocate resources to provide more food, housing, and social services for Soviet citizens, to that extent the regime's maneuverability domestically and internationally will be restricted, e.g. in pressing forward with the arms race and with spectacular space projects, in developing heavy industry of great war potential, and in increasing economic and military aid to bloc and non-bloc countries. This is all the more true since limited material improvement only whets the appetite for a more abundant life. Moreover, with a lessening preoccupation with obtaining the basic necessities, the Soviet citizen's attention will turn to seeking relaxation of controls on other areas of life in Soviet society.

The Gray Radio's approach should be subtle and varied. Merely to draw attention to the shortcomings of Soviet economic life or to make simple direct comparisons with standards of living in the West often only provokes a defensive reaction on the part of the listeners. The Radio should tell listeners of the effects of the regime's domestic and foreign policies on the standard of living of the peoples of the USSR and of the part played by inefficient organization, poor administration, and omnipresent Party control in holding back programs. Regime concessions to the needs of the people should not be ridiculed but used to point up the need for still further concessions. Above all, programs should emphasize the economic feasibility of greatly improving living conditions in the Soviet Union once a new order of priorities is adopted.
(2) Programs on the standard-of-living theme should be oriented also to impress workers in agriculture as well as in industry with their importance to Soviet society and with their potential ability to make the regime responsive to their needs and aspirations. For this purpose, fullest publicity should be given to concessions other Communist regimes have given to workers and peasants, e.g. in the raising of factory wages, improvement of working conditions, and freedom to cultivate private farm plots. Programs emphasizing the increasing dependence of the Soviet regime on the labor efficiency and goodwill of individual workers in industry and agriculture will contribute to this basic broadcasting aim.

(3) In order to encourage and deepen efforts to bring about a better and freer life within the Soviet framework, the Gray Radio should systematically transmit evidence from within Soviet society which indicates increasing popular and more articulate--concern for the material well being of the Soviet people and for spiritual and human values neglected or distorted by the regime.

(4) The Gray Radio will give priority attention to those elements in Soviet society--high party and government officials, administrators, managers, technical intelligentsia, officer corps, cultural intelligentsia, youth and students--who do not now occupy command positions in Soviet society, but who have a great potential for influencing the future course of Soviet development. While many individuals in these groups have benefited from the Soviet system, nevertheless they too, both in their professional and private lives, have grievances, e.g. the inflexible rule of the upper Party hierarchy, exclusion from real participation in decision making, Party enforced ideological conformity and controls on information, speech, foreign travel. They may also resent the prevailing materialism and cynicism of the ruling bureaucracy and corruption in high places. Broadcasts should attempt indirectly to reinforce the view that the upper Party echelons have divorced themselves from the interests of the people.

(5) The rivalry between the USSR and Communist China for undisputed strategic and doctrinal authority over the world Communist movement more clearly than any other development has pointed up the chasm between Communist ideology and practice, the rigidity and inhumanity of Communist leadership, and the irrelevance of much "Marxism-Leninism" to contemporary conditions. To party members and sympathizers throughout the world it is evident that
there is no longer a single center of world Communism nor a single Communist doctrine; in place of the purported monolithic "socialist camp" there has developed de facto two rival centers. Their approaches to the capitalist world are radically different as are their blueprints for harnessing Communist human, ideological, and material resources for the march toward "Communism." Moreover, each demands unquestioning submission to its authority and has ridiculed and abused the other.

The systematic dissemination of accounts of Sino-Soviet differences, of details of the Sino-Albanian dispute, of heterodox views and practices in Bloc countries, in Yugoslavia, in the world Communist movement in general, as well as of the statements of disillusioned ex-Communists, is of special importance. Criticism and actual or potential deviationist views from Communist sources will be highly persuasive because they are couched in the habitual language and frames of reference of the target audience—communication is direct, the approach is "legitimate." Moderating developments in countries under Communist rule will provide valuable food for thought for the politically alert targets, the dissatisfied members of which, out of conviction or considerations of practical expediency, tend to think in terms of effecting positive changes within a basic Communist system. (The Gray Radio will not advocate the theory of Marxism as such or use a Marxist approach.) At the same time, the present inclination of Soviet intellectuals to reexamine Soviet reality in terms both of their national traditions as well as of basic Communist theory should be encouraged by broadcast presentations of the best of traditional Russian and other national democratic thought.

In addition progressive and leftist western intellectuals, some of whom have a following in the USSR, should be used where possible, to stress the basic requirements of creative freedom, in indirect support of Soviet intellectuals who are striving to broaden their areas for expression and to condemn enforced distortion of creativity to serve political motives.

(6) Although direct appeals by the Gray Radio to the strictly Party professional are likely to be unproductive, the Radio may contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of reduced confidence among Party members in the motives and ability of the top Party leadership in forwarding basic Party aims, an atmosphere which will, in its turn, facilitate the general ferment in Soviet society and make the Party more vulnerable to pressures for change. Programs on dissension and on divergencies from Soviet practice
within foreign Communist movements may serve as useful material for this purpose. The same might be true of thoughtful analyses of the Party's serious alienation of those strata of Soviet society on which the continuance and strengthening of Soviet state power and prestige depend.

(7) Recognizing that the Soviet state embraces many nationalities and that desire for national as well as personal self-expression is an important ingredient in the ferment in Soviet society, the Gray Radio's programs to the national minorities should foster pride in language, history, culture, and individuality. The Radio should point up regime moves to bring about complete assimilation of all peoples of the USSR into one "Soviet people" without, however, arousing inter-national animosities of advocating separatism. It should instead emphasize the necessity of establishing a truly democratic society in place of the existing Communist totalitarian regime as the essential precondition for the realization of national and individual aspirations of all the peoples of the USSR.

(8) While Soviet military personnel stationed in Central and Eastern Europe are basically interested in the same type of material as their relatives and fellow-countrymen at home, the Radio should take into account their special situation by noting the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples of these areas and their specific grievances against Moscow domination. Broadcasts should highlight policy and institutional differences which contribute to the better living conditions and freer life in these countries. The Radio should stress complaints about regime policies common to all peoples under Soviet domination.

(9) The Gray Radio will make no appeals to military or civilian personnel to defect. Through broadcasts about emigres and defectors, it will emphasize the good treatment and the fund of opportunities in non-Communist countries open to those who have defected.

V. Gray Radio Broadcasts Will Avoid:

A. Inclusion of any material harmful to the interests of the host governments which might embarrass the radio in the conduct of its relations with the host governments.

B. Polemical, vituperative or blatantly propagandistic presentations. Messages will be most effective when constructed and delivered in a calm and reasoned manner.
C. Use of any material which would cause listeners to regard it as the voice of any government or of any emigre political grouping or faction.

D. Any departure from the principle of non-predetermination of the future state structure of the USSR.

E. Criticism which would offend the listeners' self-esteem or national pride.

F. Direct encouragement of any action which could expose the listener to regime reprisal.

G. Programs which could legitimately be construed as deliberate appeals for revolutionary action.

H. Tactical advice or the promise of outside aid in the event of disturbances or armed uprisings.

I. A condescending tone or material presented in such a way as to imply on obvious assumption of the political naivete of the listener.

J. Use of political, ethical or philosophical generalities, which are likely to have a Communist-perverted meaning for the Soviet audience, without making clear the practical manifestations of these concepts.

K. Sensationalism; frivolous or vulgar satire or humor; flamboyant language.