REPORT OF THE PANEL ON U.S. GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCASTING TO THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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I. Preamble

The Panel is persuaded that international communications will become more important in shaping international relations. The increasing destructiveness of weapons will in all likelihood increase the value of communications in reaching other peoples, thereby influencing the behavior of other states and thus promoting our national goals. The increasing tendency even of Communist states to become responsive to popular will means that opportunities will increase to affect popular aspirations in Communist countries. In the years to come, the Communist states themselves, and particularly the Soviet Union and China, doubtless intend to step up their efforts to influence public opinion in non-Communist countries. The United States can abstain from similar efforts directed at the Communist countries only at great risk to its national security.

It is our view that the United States should promote and accelerate the internal evolution of Communist states into less hostile and more moderate, increasingly pluralistic political, social and economic systems. In the case of East Europe, it should be an additional purpose of United States policy to stimulate popular interest in rejoining Europe and in participating in all-European undertakings. East Europe could thus serve as a transmission belt, in time influencing Soviet attitudes in the same direction.

In the case of the Soviet Union, in addition to promoting internal evolution, a broader understanding of U. S. policy will
mitigate the efforts of the Soviet Government to indoctrinate its peoples with an expansionist and militant ideology.

In the case of China, in addition to efforts to reduce Chinese militancy, communication with the Chinese people should be designed to stimulate in them those tendencies which already have appeared among the peoples of East Europe and of the Soviet Union, i.e., a desire for more internal liberty, more external contacts, and a more relaxed political system. Moreover, any broadcasting effort to China should avoid the appearance of subversion or of seeming to confirm the Chinese Government's efforts to portray the United States as hostile to the Chinese people. In some cases, this may even necessitate an identification with Chinese national ambitions.

The primary objective of international broadcasting by the U. S. Government is to influence the behavior of specific foreign governments and peoples within target areas, to the ends that these targeted governments do not harm the best interests of the United States, or the targeted peoples exert pressures upon their respective governments not so to act.

To accomplish this objective, international broadcasting by the U. S. Government should be designed:

a) To speak on behalf of the U. S. Government to the peoples of various countries throughout the world, so that such peoples understand the position of the U. S. Government on matters of policy and react to such exposition sympathetically or, at least, with tolerance.

b) To communicate generally with foreign governments so that such governments understand the position of the U. S.
Government on matters of policy, and in unusual circumstances to keep open a special channel of communication with a particular government so that such government can rapidly receive a special communication from the U. S. Government.

c) To inform the peoples of the various countries throughout the world of newsworthy happenings within the United States, and of international developments outside the United States, with accuracy and dispatch.

d) To inform the peoples throughout the world of developments in American culture, education, art, science, technology, agriculture, etc.

e) To reflect responsibly thoughtful and diversified opinion throughout the United States upon matters of domestic and international policy so that the existence of an open society within the United States is demonstrated.

f) To speak to foreign peoples by covert means, black or gray—or both, from time to time so that United States strategic policies are assisted tactically and without embarrassment to the U. S. Government.

It would appear to us that broadcasting services designed to accomplish the ends spelled out above in a) and b) can only be successfully operated when they are administered openly by the U.S. Government and are received by foreign governments and peoples with credibility and will full recognition of their official sponsorship.

Desired credibility for all radios, overt and covert, is achieved when listeners believe such broadcast services objectively reflect
the truth. There may be unique circumstances under which the over-
riding national interests of the United States might urgently require
that objectivity be waived, but such deviation from objectivity must
be carefully weighed and very rarely used.

It follows that all radios must achieve a reputation for reliability in the presentation of its news and thus gain desired credibility. If they fail in this, all other aspects of their broadcast services come under suspicion or disbelief or, eventually, into disrepute. Objective news reporting services are the indispensable underpinnings to all the radios.

As to covert broadcasting services, they permit the U. S. Government to speak with several voices, only one of which is attributable; they permit the U. S. Government to comment upon the internal affairs of a country with which the U. S. Government maintains official relationships; they permit the U. S. Government to comment upon the personalities of officials of foreign governments with which the United States maintains official relationships; they permit the U. S. Government to urge a course of action upon a foreign people contrary to the desires or interests of their respective governments; and, finally, they permit the accomplishment of these purposes with less risk of embarrassment either to the U. S. Government or to those foreign governments upon whose territories are placed the transmitters and studios necessary for the broadcasting of such services. The reasons are, in short, tactical in nature, and covert services are designed to allow the U. S. Government to disavow any association with such operations. Covert broadcasting services, therefore, should not stray from the circumscribed limits of tactical maneuver, else
their effort might become counter productive to strategic consideration.

II. Procedure

With the above considerations in mind, and in accordance with our terms of reference, the Panel has conducted extensive conversations with officials of the Department of State and the USIA, as well as with representatives of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). We visited the facilities of RFE and RL in New York and Munich, as well as the VOA Munich office, RIAS in Berlin, RFE transmitter facilities in Portugal, and VOA transmitter facilities in Tangier. We wish to express our gratitude for the assistance and cooperation extended to us in the course of our assignment.

In making our evaluation of RFE, RL, VOA, and of the China Radio proposal, we used the following criteria:

1) The availability to the above organizations of adequate sources of information and research on the domestic affairs of the target areas.

2) The quality of personnel in the existing organizations, and recruitment opportunities for the proposed one.

3) Availability, use, and importance of defectors.

4) The organizational capacity of the sponsoring U. S. Governmental agency.

5) The potential vulnerability of the existing and the proposed organization to public exposure and attacks, either from domestic groups or from foreign governments.

6) The flexibility of the respective organizations in
reporting and commenting on the internal affairs of foreign states.

7) The impact of covert operations on the sponsoring United States agency.

8) The problem of obtaining transmitter rights on a governmental or on a non-governmental basis.

9) The problem of morale of foreign personnel in relationship to their employment by official or non-official U. S. organizations.

10) The flexibility of the sponsoring U. S. agency in recruiting both American and foreign personnel.

III. Responses to Terms of Reference, III: Key Questions in Respect to the China Radio Proposal

A. 1. Relating to possibility of VOA being assigned essentially the same objectives, can VOA do the job more economically?

   We have no evidence to justify the conclusion that the VOA could undertake the China Radio Proposal more economically.

2. -- with equal or greater impact on the audience?

   We have no reason to conclude that it would have a greater impact, and there is some probability that it would be less.

3. -- with equal, greater or less risk to the U. S. Government?

   We feel convinced that the risk to the United States Government would be greater if VOA were to undertake the China Radio Proposal.
4. -- more efficiently in terms of U. S. Government policy and management procedures?
We found nothing to indicate that VOA procedures would be more efficient.

5. -- with equal assurance of viability over time?
We consider that a VOA effort in that regard would have less viability because it could affect adversely the development of official American-Chinese relations, or the development of these relations would require a change in its approach, thereby affecting VOA's credibility.

B. How do these two possible approaches compare in terms of:

1. -- relations with Congress?
We feel that VOA's relations with Congress would become more complicated because of internal political pressures in the United States.

2. -- pressures from the Chinese Nationalists?
In our view Chinese Nationalist pressures are likely in either case, but it is to be expected that they will decline in intensity with the passage of time.

3. -- relations with Asian Government on whom we are dependent for facilities?
We believe that RFE and RL precedents are relevant here, and that hence an unofficial venture should be preferable since it would raise fewer problems in official relations.

4. -- availability of significant programming material and capacity to utilize it?
On balance, in part because of the probable need to rely occasionally on covert sources, which is incompatible.
with the integrity of VOA operations, a separate facility would have a greater capacity to develop and utilize significant programming material focused on the domestic affairs and interests of the target.

5. -- availability of programming personnel?
In general, it would seem that an unofficial facility would have greater latitude in recruitment and perhaps greater attractiveness in obtaining competent personnel.

C. Is the "image" the radio presents to its Chinese audience important? If so, what are the advantages/disadvantages of a governmental vs. private image?
The "image" of the proposed China Radio is very important; it should not be that of the U. S. Government, but, rather, of a project supported by Americans and Asians, including overseas Chinese, and staffed by Chinese who are able to express a view of the world which, although not that of the government in Peking, is authentically Chinese in character.

D. What does past experience demonstrate in respect to the extent to which VOA or a US-identified "private organization" can go (in terms of domestic pressures, Congressional attitudes, agreements under which its installations abroad operate and impact upon audiences) in the following fields:

-- advocacy of "revisionism", "national communism" and other communist deviations?

-- appeals to the nationalism of its target audiences?

-- stress upon internal affairs and internal developments within the Communist World?

A US-identified "private organization" can go much farther than VOA in "revisionism", "national communism", other Communist deviations, nationalism, and Communist internal developments; indeed, it would be awkward for VOA to
operate in these areas.

E. Is RFE and Radio Liberty experience valid in respect to the problem of communication with Communist China?

RFE and RL experience is to a very considerable degree valid in respect to communication with Communist China, especially in the areas of management, personnel recruitment, technical facilities, policy guidance, and information gathering. However, greater difficulties are to be expected in personnel recruitment and information gathering.

F. In summary, is it feasible to repurpose VOA to do the job envisioned by Radio China proposal? If it cannot undertake the entire responsibility, what is VOA's proper role in respect to broadcasts to China?

It is not feasible to repurpose VOA to do the job envisioned by China Radio Proposal. VOA's proper role is to increase the quality, quantity, and scope of its current broadcasts to China in accordance with its presently assigned mission.

G. Considering China Radio proposal without reference to VOA, are there any inherent risks of failure, exposure or unexpected negative results in it so great as to justify not attempting it because of these limitations?

See Basic Conclusions and Recommendations below.

What weight should the following factors be given:

1. -- Communist attacks?
   Little or none.

2. -- Nationalist attacks and attempts at influence?
   These will pose serious problems but with care they probably can be contained.
3. -- Attacks by lobbyists in the U. S. through Congress and otherwise?
   Not serious—in our view the effectiveness of the domestic China lobby has declined.

4. -- Journalistic exposure?
   No more than RFE or RL, and possibly less, particularly if it does not solicit funds publicly, and because its headquarters presumably will be—and should be—in Hawaii, i.e., outside the continental United States.

5. -- Embarrassing disclosures and demands for investigation in international organizations?
   No more than RFE and RL, and perhaps less as to such organizations because China is not a member of them.

6. -- Negative reaction among audience in China?
   There will inevitably be some negative reaction among the audience in China. This factor alone, however, does not justify not attempting the project.

7. -- Negative reaction and pressures from Overseas Chinese?
   There will be some negative reactions and pressures from Overseas Chinese but these will be less important than a negative reaction from the audience in China.

8. -- Possibility of not obtaining sufficient information to broadcast relevantly and competently on internal affairs in China?
   It will be more difficult to obtain sufficient information to broadcast relevantly and competently on internal affairs in China than it now is for RFE and RL, but no more difficult than it was—and perhaps even less—in the case of the Soviet Union in the early 1950's.
9. **Possibility of not being able to recruit effective broadcasting staff?**

It will be much more difficult to recruit effective Chinese-language broadcasters and U. S. control personnel than it was and is for RFE and RL. Therefore, if the China Radio Project is to be undertaken, much greater attention will have to be paid to recruitment, in-service training, and control procedures.

IV. Responses to Terms of Reference, IV: Key Questions in Respect to RFE and Radio Liberty

A. Are the distinct roles of VOA, RFE, and Radio Liberty now defined with sufficient clarity, and with what effectiveness do they respectively fulfill their assigned missions?

RFE and VOA have reasonably clear images of their role and purpose. In RL the Panel found some ambivalence and ambiguity concerning its long-range goals in relationship to change in Soviet society. Generally speaking, the roles of RFE and RL are comparable with each other, while that of VOA is substantially different. Within this context, RFE broadcasts to East Europe seem more effective than RL's to the Soviet Union. RFE broadcasts to a target area in which the governments, at least initially, were not indigenous but were imposed from abroad. These countries have a tradition of independence and friendship with the United States. RL broadcasts to an audience that does not in general consider its Government to be an alien institution. Thus East European nationalism reenforces the impact of RFE broadcasts; Russian or Soviet nationalism
works against the effectiveness of RL broadcasts. Accordingly circumstances beyond the Radios' control, i.e., the prevailing situation in the target areas, in part determine the relative effectiveness of the two Radios. So, too, some RFE country broadcasts (e.g., the Polish) are also more effective than others.

The recent steps to redirect VOA toward a greater emphasis on objectivity and balance in order to achieve maximum credibility are encouraging. However, we question whether divergent American views are at all times yet presented by VOA with sufficient balance.

B. Does the job they are doing still need to be done in terms of U. S. policy objectives? Are they likely to be more needed or less needed five years from now?

Yes. Given the likely conditions five years hence, and the capacity of U. S. foreign policy and of these organizations to adjust meaningfully to these conditions, RFE and RL will be at least as needed as now. In fact, given the possibility of greater internal national tensions and intellectual ferment in the Soviet Union, the mission of RL may well become more important than it has been in the past. In the event that in any East European country there develops a significant climate of freedom, including the right to political dissent, which at this moment we do not think likely, RFE's broadcasts to that country should be terminated. Until there is such a development, and during the period of liberalization, RFE is more needed to accelerate the trend.
E. Do RFE and Radio Liberty represent serious obstacles to improvement of U. S. relations with the countries to which they broadcast?

They represent obstacles to a degree that our foreign policy represents obstacles, i.e., improvement in relations with Communist states is not an end in itself but only if it contributes to the desired evolutionary changes. The Radios may represent a technical difficulty in the transaction of business between governments but this should not be confused with being an obstacle to the effective promotion of basic U. S. national interests.

D. Are these radios advocating any courses of action among their listeners or contributing to any attitudes that are adverse to U. S. policy interests?

The Panel finds that the Radios do not advocate any courses of action that are adverse to U. S. policy interests. However, the Panel is concerned by RFE's failure, because of policy restrictions imposed apparently in the past on it, to promote effective Polish-German reconciliation by addressing itself frankly to the Oder-Neisse question and similarly by its enforced silence on the so-called "Partisan" issue involving internal strife within the Polish leadership; by the absence of attention given by RL and its sponsors to the question whether it ought to promote national consciousness among the Soviet nationalities as a means of developing a more pluralist Soviet society; and by the fact that some of VOA's country policy papers are out of date.

Moreover, the Panel is distressed to learn that in certain circumstances the VOA refrains as a matter of policy from
broadcasting domestic viewpoints critical of U. S. foreign policy, thereby diminishing its own credibility.

E. Are their broadcasts on the internal affairs of these countries accurate? influential among key elements? beneficial or harmful to U. S. foreign policy interests?

We found no significant evidence that they are inaccurate; we were impressed by RFE's research and analysis on the Communist world; we believe that RFE broadcasts are influential among the elites, particularly in Poland; we are concerned that RL has not developed a research and analysis capacity in the non-Slavic Soviet areas. The last query is repetitive of issues raised under D.

F. Do either of these radios entail any inherent, growing risks of exposure or any foreseeable problems which might render them unviable or their positions in the countries on which they are dependent for facilities untenable?

In the Panel's view the inherent risks arise out of the likelihood of political instability in the host countries. These risks point to the need for all three organizations to develop auxiliary, stand-by facilities. It appears that primarily engineering and short-range political considerations guided the original choice of sites. Longer range political considerations ought to be given systematic advance attention and the use of alternative technical facilities, such as space satellites, should now be more fully considered.

G. Is the cover and sponsorship of RFE and Radio Liberty deteriorating? improving? Does it require new effort and new departures? Could they operate effectively with openly acknowledged U. S. governmental support? Could their activity be merged with the VOA in whole or in part?

We have no basis for judgment concerning the effectiveness of cover and sponsorship in the target areas. We do not
believe that efforts to discredit the organizations as CIA appendages or Wall Street "tools" have been effective. We have the feeling that hostile efforts to identify RFE and RL with those of their host countries which are historically viewed with animosity in the target areas (e.g., Germany in relationship to Poland and Russia) have been more effective, a point to bear in mind in regard to the China project. RFE and RL cannot be merged with VOA, except at the expense of VOA's reputation as a completely objective and entirely overt institution. Conversely, they cannot be run with openly acknowledged U. S. Governmental support, except at the expense of complicating U. S. international posture, particularly with countries with which we are maintaining diplomatic relations. This being the case, it follows that a cover is necessary primarily for formal reasons. With respect to the question of cover and sponsorship in the United States, it is our judgment that the effectiveness of the cover has been seriously eroded. The adverse effects of its deterioration are balanced by the increasing political sophistication of the American public. Nonetheless, RFE's public solicitation of individual (as opposed to corporate and foundation) gifts has produced major risks with limited material fruitfulness.

IV. Further Comments and Specific Suggestions
A. Public solicitation of individual gifts for RFE should be discontinued as unnecessary deception of the American public.
B. RFE should be given greater latitude to discuss openly and
freely the various sensitive issues in the Polish-German relationship so that it can better promote German-Polish reconciliation and also increase its effectiveness in Poland.

C. Radio Liberty should undertake a systematic study of the developing nationality tensions in the Soviet Union and re-examine its current policy guidelines with regard to the nationality question. An approach designed to stimulate greater national awareness within the Soviet Union, even though not separatism, may have the desirable effect of diminishing Soviet capacity for international mischief-making.

D. VOA should make a more deliberate effort to broadcast balanced coverage of dissenting domestic opinions with regard to domestic or foreign policy of the United States Government.

E. The possibility of using space satellites should be examined and alternative facilities for the three organizations should be prepared.

F. More carefully worked out customs arrangements with host countries should be undertaken in the event of new ground facilities being developed, to avoid the excessive costs and delays found to prevail in the case of the VOA installation in Morocco.

G. More attention should be paid to the political-historical significance of the location of broadcasting facilities in
order to avoid in the future some of the negative aspects of RL's and RFE's location in Germany.

H. RIAS should undertake a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of its broadcasts to East Germany and of their relationship to U. S. national interests. The Panel noted that no such analysis had been made recently.

I. More thought should be given to the use of an Advisory Board to the proposed China Radio project for the purpose not only of providing sponsorship but also for protecting personnel from external interference and external domestic attacks. A highly placed board of distinguished and dedicated citizens, combining governmental and area experience, can be a very major operating asset to the facility.

J. Intensive effort should be made to obtain Federal legislation which would credit service abroad for the Radios toward residence requirements for naturalization.

K. Since the Radios serve essentially as instruments of information and persuasion, more intensive efforts in the field of audience research are desirable. Further, the Radios should jointly consider evaluation of existing research, and the encouragement of new research, in the field of sociological communications in order to determine the potential effects of mass communications. All such research should be used both as a management and a programming tool.
L. Given the increasing importance, noted at the outset, of international communications in shaping international relations, and given the relative insignificance of the cost of these radio operations compared to the costs of weaponry, there should be greater generosity in funding them.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The Panel unanimously recommends that:

A. The present general missions of VOA, RFE, and RL be continued.

B. VOA broadcasts to China be expanded in accordance with VOA's general mission.

C. A systematic effort be made to formulate a U. S. policy guidance for broadcasts to China on the model of those existing for broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in order to provide in advance the framework for any expansion of meaningful programming to China.

The majority of the Panel (Messrs. Brzezinski, Griffith, and Salant) recommend that the China Radio proposal be approved. The majority recognizes that there are difficulties, disadvantages, and risks inherent in the Proposal. Since these are well stated by Mr. Hayes below we need not summarize them here. But all of these difficulties, disadvantages and risks relate only to the degree of likelihood of success, and of course success cannot be guaranteed, nor do we suggest that the road is easy or simple. We are not, however, persuaded that the Proposal involves positive and inherent
dangers to U. S. objectives and interests now or in the future.

Moreover, we believe that the risks, disadvantages, and difficulties are on balance significantly outweighed by the potential benefits. Chief among these benefits are:

1) The availability of a broader spectrum of voices, approaches, ideas, and broadcast programs to China, including for the first time one dealing with Chinese domestic affairs.

2) The avoidance of a dilution of VOA functions and a compromising of VOA's general credibility, as well as a diminution of its efforts to achieve its central mission of projecting U. S. policy and life.

3) The Proposal's policy line of gradual evolution and in-system change will advance improvement of U.S.-Chinese relations. Moreover, in the contingency of further worsening of U.S.-Chinese relations, its facilities and personnel would be a major asset to U. S. security.

4) Our answers to the specific questions above, the criteria set for ourselves, and RFE and RL experience all point to the desirability of a separate broadcasting facility not tied publicly to a specific U. S. Government institution such as VOA. As indicated in our Preamble, covert broadcasting services provide the U.S. Government with additional flexibility and maneuverability not available to an official governmental voice.

5) VOA, moreover, would find it extraordinarily awkward to promote evolutionary changes within the Chinese Communist political system without becoming an immediate and vulnerable target of Congressional criticism, domestic attacks, and Taiwan
protests. (See III, D, above.)

In the final analysis, given the probability of significant changes in post-Mao China and their profound meaning for U.S.-Chinese relations, a decision not to have such a facility in being several years hence involves many more serious risks than a decision now to adopt the Proposal.

Respectfully submitted,

Zbigniew Brzezinski

William E. Griffith

John S. Hayes

Richard S. Salant
Partial Dissent by Mr. Hayes:

I concur with my colleagues in all respects except as to their recommendation that the China Radio proposal be undertaken at this time. I do not concur as to the China Radio proposal for the following reasons:

1. If I am to assume that the form and substance of the China Radio proposal are comparable to RFE and RL then I am not so confident as my colleagues about the availability of an ingredient essential to mount such a service successfully, i.e., sufficient "internal" information from inside mainland China for rebroadcast back into the country. One of the important aspects of RFE is the manner in which it has been able to secure information from within its five target areas for broadcast to the areas, thus building listener interest and credibility. There exists, however, in each of the RFE target areas, although in varying degree, a substantial supply of daily press material, a large available current literature, a substantial amount of foreign tourism, a large number of correspondent with relatively easy entry into the target areas, a substantial number of nationals who are allowed exit permits for external travel, together with accessible machinery for their discovery and debriefing, and the ability to mail a substantial number of letters from within the target area to outside them. These factors make the "export" of internal information for the eventual use of RFE possible. It would appear that these factors exist to a far less degree in the case of the proposed China Radio as does available internal information from
inside mainland China for its use.

2. If I am to assume that the form and substance of the China Radio proposal are comparable to RFE and RL, then I am not so confident as my colleagues about the availability of another ingredient essential to mount such a service, i.e., a sufficient and continuing supply of broadcasting personnel acceptable to target areas and sympathetically received by the audiences therein. The shortage of such personnel is already apparent at both RFE and RL and at both establishments officials pointed out their concern in this regard. I judge that the shortage is more acute at RL than at RFE and in my judgment the shortage would be even more acute in the case of the proposed China Radio. Acceptable broadcasting personnel should be indigenous to the areas to which they direct their broadcasts. Hence, they must come from the ranks of exiles, or refugees, or defectors, or émigrés. In the case of RFE it is possible for a broadcaster from these ranks to assume the role of "patriot." Inasmuch as each of RFE's target areas was at one point in history an independent country and has at present a regime superimposed upon it by the presence of the Soviet armed forces, these two factors are able to convert "opposition" into "patriotism." Thus, it is considerably more difficult for a broadcaster at RL to assume, within the Soviet Union, the status of "patriot" and to avoid the connotation of "traitor," but I believe it to be yet more difficult in the case of the proposed China Radio. The Chinese emphasis on face and pride seem to me to militate against the success
of broadcasters who obviously will be among those who have left their homeland and who from the outside are criticizing it and its actions.

3. A necessary ingredient to a successful broadcast operation such as the China Radio proposal is the availability of research sources within the target area. Without such sources, it is extremely difficult for programmers to schedule, readjust and revise program content or to judge relative broadcast efficiency. Especially does this seem so to me in the case of a service based, as are RFE and RL, upon audience "involvement." A listener to such a service must feel that the service is presented for him; is dedicated to his best interests; that broadcasting personnel are his friends representing him as against his own regime. Hence, his required "involvement" and hence programming which is based upon careful research to determine how best to achieve this listener involvement. It appears to me that RFE has developed applicable research techniques which are moderately adequate to meet its needs; RL to a far lesser degree. Mainland China, however, appears to approach what has been called the "inaccessible universe" insofar as listener research is concerned.

4. I am hard-put to understand how the China Radio proposal copes in its broadcasts with the political problem posed by the Chinese Nationalists. Do its opinion broadcasts favor a "two China" policy? How, then, does it avoid the "U.S. lackey" tag? Do its opinion broadcasts favor a "one China"? If so, whose "China"?
If the service avoids the subject altogether, it will fail to address itself to a question which must be of primary interest to the Government of Mainland China and many of the country's thought leaders.

5. To 4. above, I add the further potential political problems in broadcasting which might arise from the fact that broadcasts of the proposed China Radio could be heard by approximately 10,000,000 "overseas" Chinese living within range of its signals in Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Burma, Hong Kong, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. In each of these countries the Chinese community presents a unique and different domestic problem. Policy guidance in this regard of the China Radio proposal would be detailed and complex to a degree unmatched by those faced by either RFE or RL and perhaps to a degree which would so dilute the service as to lessen substantially its effectiveness.

6. It is not difficult to visualize a situation in which the establishment of the China Radio proposal might provoke the Government of the Mainland of China into an even more extreme and argumentative position in justification of its own policies and as a counter-propaganda measure. The more extreme these positions become the more difficult it is for the Government of Mainland China to retreat from them. Hence, it seems to me not impossible to rationalize that the proposed China Radio makes communication between the United States
and the Chinese more difficult, not less so.

7. I am not satisfied that the evidence we have at hand demonstrates (1) that there is a tradition of heavy radio listening within mainland China as is the case within the five target areas of RFE and within much of the target areas of RL. (2) that there is currently heavy radio listening within mainland China. (3) that the growth in production rates of radio sets within mainland China or for importation is such as to indicate even a moderate saturation rate of set possession. (4) that the use of radio broadcasting within mainland China by the Chinese Government itself is overly effective among its own population. (5) that the results of any current foreign broadcasting into mainland China are proving meaningful. If the U.S. Government is to proceed with an acceleration of broadcast service into mainland China it must face the possibility of a considerable period of time -- perhaps five to ten years -- until the results of such service become effective.

8. While the reasons stated above would be applicable in the case of either the proposed China service or the VOA, I believe that the five to ten year period of "seeding" would prove of more value to the United States if the service broadcast to the Chinese people were that of the VOA because of these possibilities which might shorten the seeding period or make it more effective: (1) It is possible that the Chinese tradition with its emphasis on respect for established order might lead Chinese listeners to be attracted more easily to an official "establishment" voice even though it might be the voice of a "barbarian" opponent rather than to one not so officially sponsored.
In this connection we have been told of the success of the American Forces radio station in Korea in achieving listeners in northern China. (2) The educated Chinese would appear to be most intellectually curious. If this is so, it seems that the China Radio proposal becomes vulnerable when examined by the intellectually curious listener. Precisely what is its sponsorship? Its purpose? From where do its broadcasters come? Why do they attack their own country? Who pays them? In this case, curiosity could supply the motivation to make such a service counter-productive. (3) An effective aid in the audience-building process during the seeding period might well be broadcasts designed to attract Chinese attention through the use of news from the "outside" world, especially China's position in the world, the effect of Chinese governmental actions upon other nations of the world and the reactions of other nations to such actions. Such matters, I believe, can be presented with considerable skill and impact and conceivably more appropriately by an official U.S. service and will at the same time well serve the interests of the United States.

9. I have seen no plans which would lead me to believe that the form and substance of the proposed China Radio would be substantially different from those of RFE and RL. I have been struck by the fact that experts with whom we have consulted has emphasized the vastness of China and the complexity of its peoples, the linguistic problem in any attempted communication with them, the encrusted traditions of its culture, and the extraordinary lack of certainty in forecasting either its action or its reaction.
I am not persuaded that a covert service which, in effect, is a Chinese version of a united European pattern will be satisfactory. Perhaps in the future a new form of communication will have to be devised for the Chinese, but no such new form was included within our framework of reference.

10. With my colleagues I agree that on balance RFE has performed satisfactorily in establishing a dialogue with listeners within its target areas. With my colleagues I agree that RL has not performed as efficiently. Believing this and finding in the proposed China Radio few of the factors which have led to the broadcast efficiency of RFE and, conversely, finding in the proposed China Radio many of the same factors which have led to the lower efficiency of RL, I do not view the probability of success of the proposed China Radio with much optimism.

I conclude, therefore, that the interests of the United States are better served if (1) the VOA proceed as expeditiously as possible to mount a broad Chinese service. The VOA is currently engaged in constructing new transmitter sites for this purpose and upon the completion of such construction I would urge a program schedule for mainland China more expanded than the present service broadcast by

I would urge that the VOA depart from its established procedures and include within its Chinese service, a program content which reflects Chinese culture in addition to its regular service. Such presentations should include Chinese opera, Chinese plays and Chinese story-telling. These art forms are proscribed within mainland China and their presentation by the Chinese service of the VOA might assist in the building of audiences. I would
suggest, too, that the VOA continue to include in its broadcasts to mainland China such internal information as it can with propriety and with a due regard for its official sponsorship, secure. I am not persuaded that the VOA cannot so expand the scope of its Chinese service and still preserve both its credibility and integrity.

(2) Plans for the establishment of the proposed Radio China be suspended.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

John S. Hayes