SECRET/NODIS

March 3, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT:

ROK Weapons Plans

The attached telegram to Embassy Seoul has been cleared by General Scowcroft.

Jeanne V. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

HR 94-MC, #7
By KBH, NARA, Dec. 5/16/97

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)

DISPATCHED 3/03 (btm)
1. Washington agencies concur fully in Embassy assessment that ROKG is proceeding with initial phases of a nuclear weapons development program. Subsequent intelligence reporting on this has added further confirmation to Embassy's excellent summary of evidence contained in reftel. Interagency study on South Korean nuclear capability has been finished and indicates that ROKG could develop limited nuclear weapons and missile capability within ten year time frame. (Copy of study pouch ed to Embassy.)

2. In the case of Korea our general concerns are intensified by its strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK possession of nuclear weapons would have major destabilizing effect in an area in which not only Japan but USSR, PRC, and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in the event of conflict. Further, ROK efforts to secure a nuclear weapon capability will inevitably impact on our
bilateral security relationship. This impact will be complicated by the fact that ROK nuclear weapon effort has been in part a reflection of lessened ROKG confidence in U.S. security commitment, and consequent desire on Park's part to reduce his military dependence on U.S.

3. We recognize that there are significant difficulties and a long timeframe before ROKG would be able actually to produce nuclear weapons. Ten year estimate would seem a realistic one. However, the fact that ROKG is now attempting to establish nuclear capability will inevitably become more widely known well before explosive device or weapons actually come into being and would have significant political impact in itself on the ROK's neighbors.

4. It remains USG policy to oppose the further spread of nuclear explosives and, while continuing to provide power reactors and fuel under IAEA safeguards for necessary energy projects, to control the spread of sensitive technology and equipment which would enhance the nuclear weapons capability of other countries. We are endeavoring to implement this policy not only bilaterally in our dealings with non-nuclear weapon states such as the ROK, but also in a multilateral framework which will control the worldwide availability of nuclear materials. Strictly FYI: We have proposed a confidential conference among the most important suppliers of nuclear materials (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, FRG, Japan, and USSR) to develop common export policies which would seek to develop
guidelines for restraint on sensitive items and remove the problem of safeguards from the commercial bargaining process. All except France have agreed with U.S. to begin such a conference and we are awaiting a reply from France. In recent U.S.-French contacts, the question of French willingness to supply a re-processing plant or technology (to extract plutonium from spent fuel) to the ROK was raised. The French indicated that they had not yet signed a proposed agreement for a small pilot reprocessing plant and were seeking to have IAEA safeguards provided if the deal does go forward to completion. END FYI.

5. Therefore, our basic objective is to discourage ROK effort in this area and to inhibit to the fullest possible extent any ROK development of a nuclear explosive capability or delivery system.

We are considering several complementary policy courses to give effect to this objective. These policies will be evolved inside of, or in consonance with, the multilateral framework just described. Using this approach, we hope in the near future to formulate a clear policy on this question toward the ROK.

6. The following are the policy courses we are now actively considering:

a. Inhibit ROK access to sensitive technology and equipment, both through unilateral U.S. action and through the development of common supplier nation policies. As regards unilateral U.S. actions, we would, in addition to applying full IAEA safeguards
to the sale of power reactors and fuel, also seek to withhold from the
ROK, or to provide only under appropriate safeguards, any technology
or equipment which we would judge to be sensitive in terms of
contributing to the acquisition of self-contained nuclear weapons
capability. This would be done in a manner consistent with the
criteria in 10 CFR 110 (which include the application of safeguards),
with the significance of the proposed activity, and with availability
from other sources. We are also looking at existing agreements
to see if there is room for tightening constraints to inhibit diversion
d of weapons-useable material. As regards common supplier nation
policies, we are particularly concerned with enrichment and
reprocessing technologies, and with any ROK acquisition of Candu
reactors, which present fewer obstacles for clandestine diversion
do the more common light
water reactors.

We realize that in some cases ROKG might well have plausible
rationale other than nuclear weapons development for procuring
certain elements of such technology or equipment. Nonetheless,
we would not intend to provide technology and/or equipment which
we would feel might be harmful to our own interests and the stability
of the area. Such an approach would also provide an indirect signal
that we are aware of ROK intentions, and would not support them
under any guise. Restriction of such technology and equipment
would also slow the pace of ROK efforts in nuclear area and
increase costs significantly while not harming legitimate power needs,
which could be met through reactors fueled by enriched uranium imported from abroad. Even in those instances where ROKG might be able to go to other suppliers, this would cost more both in economic and political terms. And any significant ROKG efforts to procure sensitive nuclear related equipment or technology would over longer run be visible and heighten sensitivities of other possible suppliers, including the French. Finally, recognizing relationship between independent nuclear explosive capability and delivery systems, we are examining ways in which account can be taken of later in our general non-proliferation strategy.

b. Press the ROK to ratify the NPT. The Canadians are already pressing the ROK to do so. The ROK seems to have been responsive to our own initial approach, but we will want to follow up on this, preferably in cooperation with the Canadians. We would also intend to support the Canadian intention to defer their final decision on the sale of research reactors.

c. Improve our surveillance of ROK nuclear facilities, and increase our information on the current state of ROK technical development in this area. We would intend to undertake a study of appropriate ways to move forward on this policy course. Tentatively, we are considering a program for more regular visits to ROK nuclear energy installations and inspections by technically trained personnel.
7. Request Embassy Seoul's comments on the approach outlined above.